• Nebyly nalezeny žádné výsledky

Hlavní práce66479_kali01.pdf, 587.9 kB Stáhnout

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2023

Podíl "Hlavní práce66479_kali01.pdf, 587.9 kB Stáhnout"

Copied!
48
0
0

Načítání.... (zobrazit plný text nyní)

Fulltext

(1)

UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS, PRAGUE FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MASTER’S THESIS

2019 Bc. Ivan Kalashnikov

(2)
(3)

UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS, PRAGUE FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International and Diplomatic Studies

Ukraine's outlook for the EU membership in the context of the world order transformation

(Master’s Thesis)

Author: Bc. Ivan Kalashnikov

Supervisor: Ing. Jan Martin Rolenc, Ph.D.

(4)

Author’s Declaration

Herewith I declare that I have written the Master’s Thesis on my own and I have cited all sources.

Prague, 26 April 2019

………..

Author’s Signature

(5)

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Ing. Jan Martin Rolenc, Ph.D., for his excellent guidance, caring, patience, and providing me with an excellent atmosphere for doing research.

I would also like to express my very profound gratitude to my friends and parents for providing me with unfailing support and continuous encouragement throughout my years of study and through the process of researching and writing this thesis. This accomplishment would not have been possible without them.

(6)

Table of Contents

Introduction ... 8

1. World order and theories of international relations ... 11

1.1. Definition of the world order ... 11

1.2. Types of the world order and its transformation ... 12

1.3. Causes of the world order transformation ... 16

1.4. Theories of international relations ... 17

1.4.1. Realism ... 18

1.4.2. Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism ... 20

2. Ukraine’s European integration ... 22

2.1. Historical aspects of integration ... 22

2.2. Ukraine’s Eurorevolution and its repercussions ... 25

2.2.1. Crimea annexation ... 26

2.2.2. War in Donbass ... 27

2.3. Third-parties ... 28

2.3.1. Russian perspective ... 28

2.3.2. American perspective ... 30

3. Analysis of Ukraine’s European integration ... 32

3.1. Impact of the world order transformation ... 32

3.2. Internal reasons of Ukraine’s European choice ... 33

3.3. External reasons of Ukraine’s European choice ... 34

3.4 Obstacles to integration ... 36

Conclusion ... 40

References ... 42

(7)

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

IR International Relations EU European Union

US United States of America

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization AA Association Agreement

RF Russian Federation

NIC National Intelligence Council USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics CIA Central Intelligence Agency

UN United Nations

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa CIS Commonwealth of Independent States MAP Membership Action Plan

DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement ARC Autonomous Republic of Crimea

DPR Donetsk People's Republic LPR Luhansk People's Republic

OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine

ENP European Neighborhood Policy AP Action Plan

CU Customs Union

BSF Black Sea Fleet

SSA Stabilisation and Association Agreement

(8)

8

Introduction

The relevance of this research is stems from two primary reasons. First, is due to the fact that today we witness the process of a search for a new system of international relations (IR) that was triggered by the collapse of the bipolar system, followed by America’s global superiority (Brzezinski, 1997) and its consecutive reduction (Layne, 2012; 2018) relative to the increasing role of rising powers in the global politics. This process is very complex and extensive. These transformations affect everything, ranging from domestic and foreign policies of states, to an individual and his or her world view. Second, is because Ukraine’s issue is a very recent and highly discussed matter, especially in the regions closest to Ukraine, such as Europe and Russia. Thus, Ukraine’s future is of high importance to both Russia and the West (including the United States (US) which has demonstrated it has a stake in this issue as well).

As President of the European Council Donald Tusk said during his visit to the Ukrainian Parliament, rephrasing the words of Pope John Paul II referring to Poland when it started its road to Europe: “(…) there can be no just Europe without an independent Ukraine. That there can be no safe Europe without a safe Ukraine. To put it simply: there can be no Europe without Ukraine!”

(Tusk, 2019). Having such a discourse from one of the most influential people in the European Union (EU) reflects its highest interest in the situation in Ukraine, the country that is close to Europe in many terms, including geographical and religious.1

At the same time, more than a thousand years of history of brotherhood unites Ukrainians and Russians together. The history of both states can be tracked to what was called Kievan Rus’, with a Kiev being “mother of the Russian cities” and the center of Russian world for several hundred years until its fragmentation into dozens of small Russian principalities and the consecutive unification in 16th century to what we know as the Tsardom of Russia. The territory of Tsardom of Russia encompassed the territory of nowadays Ukraine and from that point Ukraine was part of the Russian world until its independence in 1991 after the dissolution of Soviet Union (USSR) (Grekov, 1953; Pashuto, Florya and Khoroshkevich, 1982). However, common history is just one of the numerous factors which marks the importance of nowadays Ukraine for Russia.

Moreover, there is another powerful and interested in Ukraine’s future party, which is the United States. One of the main reasons why it is important for the US to keep Ukraine closer to the West is to prevent the revival of Russia as the Eurasian empire, which could hinder the implementation of the American geostrategic goal of forming a larger Euro-Atlantic system (Brzezinski, 1997). An initial step towards this process could be the incorporation of Ukraine into NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Moreover, it is a matter of public knowledge that the US has applied substantial financial and technical assistance to Ukraine to further these goals (Morelli, 2017).

Such an interest of the great powers in the country on a crossroad of Europe and Asia is reaffirming its importance in the sphere of global politics. Historically, this kind of rivalry between great powers usually led to an open conflicts and wars, ending in reshaping the system of

1 According to the Catholic Near East Welfare Association, in Ukraine there were about 4,5 million people declared their adherence to a Catholic church in 2017. This church is largely concentrated in western Ukraine (Annuario Pontificio, 2017).

(9)

9 international relations. Therefore, the nature of international relations is not constant and does not boil down to some “natural state”. The complexity and inconsistency of such a development and its far from obvious nature raise many discussions that constitute an important part of the content of the theory of international relations.That is why the policies of individual states, their ends and actions are of particular importance, because it is a practical test of one or another theory of international relations, that either justify or disprove the correctness of some of its principles. Moreover, changing nature of the system of international relations can create a moment for a significant shift in the foreign policy of a particular state, since tectonic plates of international order are shearing, such a moment can come into sight. Ukraine, with its historical turn of its foreign policy, is an example of this.

In as much as at the time of transformation of the world order rising powers gradually growth and increase their importance, respectively decreasing the unquestionable superiority of the world hegemon of last couple decades, the United States, we face the transition of the international order from unipolar to multipolar world (Kupchan, 2002; Todd, 2003; Layne, 2012;

Acharya, 2017; Layne, 2018). This transition opens new possibilities for some of the states and simultaneously it brings new challenges for them and/or the other states.

Thus, Euromaidan revolution and following Russian aggression has led to an accelerated finalizing of the Association Agreement (AA) between Ukraine and the EU, which was decisively signed in the June 2014, marking the turn of Ukraine’s foreign policy toward the West. Newly elected President Petro Poroshenko made a speech affirming Ukraine’s attachment to European political values, underlining “its sovereign choice in favour of future membership in the EU”

(“Poroshenko's speech”, 2014). This is indeed a historical moment for the relationship between the EU, Ukraine and Russia. However, did these events occur just by themselves or rather as a result of the transformations taking place in the global political arena? Or there are other factors that influenced such a scenario? And what does that mean for Ukraine? These questions are part of the matter this research intends to explore.

Therefore, the overarching goal of the thesis is to identify the impact of the world order transformation on Ukraine's prospects and obstacles toward the EU membership and to determine the challenges and possibilities it brings for Ukraine.

In order to achieve the goal of the thesis, I propose following research questions:

• Did transformation of the world order influence Ukraine’s “European choice”?

• What were other factors that weren’t related to the world order’s transformation that contributed to this choice?

• How do all these factors affect Ukraine’s prospects to become a member of the EU and what challenges in this regard Ukraine faces?

In order to approach the research questions, the first chapter is devoted to the explanation of the world order concept and its examination through the lenses of the theories of international relations. In the second chapter the context of the research and involvement of the third parties in the process of Ukraine’s transition to the Western world, namely the Russian Federation (RF), the EU and the US is reviewed. Additionally, this chapter introduce the reader with the historical background of Ukraine’s process of integration to Europe, as well as the most important milestones of its cooperation with the EU. The third chapter is the main part of the

(10)

10 thesis, which deals with the analysis of the world order transformation influence on Ukraine’s foreign policy, and the analysis of Ukraine’s prospects and obstacles on the way toward the EU membership. To conclude, the last chapter is devoted to the summarization of the findings of the analysis.

The focus and the scope of the thesis demands for the application of qualitative approach, hence the usage of qualitative data, as it was emphasized by David and Sutton (2004), “(…) words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data” are what the qualitive research should focus on (p. 35).

Taking into consideration the lack of publicly available first-hand, primary data and internal documents of the parties related to the issue, such as files, communications, minutes of meeting, email exchanges, etc. between countries’ institutions, important actors and other relevant stakeholders, and impossibility of getting this data being an external actor to this system, the research will be predominantly built on the secondary data analysis approach.

Drawing upon a wide range of secondary data, in order to carry out the analysis is therefore the logical path forward. The chosen secondary data sources consist of a vast number of scholarly literature, such as books, academic publications and research papers, as well as news reports and official reports from both, like-minded and conflicting scholars and sources from different countries. This choice of sources accounts for a wider angle from which the analysis can be conducted, therefore avoiding certain degree of bias in the material. Nevertheless, some of the primary data will also be analysed in the thesis, such as the publicly available speeches, interviews with important decision makers, and available public information related to the issues including governmental and diplomatic documents and declarations.

(11)

11

1. World order and theories of international relations

1.1. Definition of the world order

In the history of mankind, various states, be it China, Rome, Byzantium, Britain, Turkey, Russia, France, Germany or other countries (Brzezinski, 1997), sought control over resources, seizing other countries’ territories and nations. Always, sooner or later such an actions were confronting interests of other actors in world politics, what led to the struggle for the redistribution of spheres of influence. The empires were succeeding each other in the fight for world domination, what had a significant impact on the formation of the system of international relations, on the formation of some international order.

However, what does the order in international politics means, and is there any order at all? Is there any existent order, the essence of which, or at least its definition, would be agreed by all the world’s powers? Waltz (1979), father of neo-realism, in his reflections noticed that “The prominent characteristics of international politics, however, seems to be the lack of order and of organization” (p. 89). How, in the system of international politics, with “The inherent equality of sovereign states, regardless of their power or domestic system” (Kissinger, 2014, p. 23), that emerged as a result of bloody conflicts known as the Thirty Years’ War and principles of which remains dominant in international politics after almost four centuries, any type of order can exist? For realists, who describe the international politics system as anarchical, the concept of order means that in the system there are the orderer and the one that must obey the orderer.

“In the absence of agents with system-wide authority, formal relations of super- and subordination fail to develop” (Waltz, 1979, p. 89). Then what is the order and an international order per se? Followers of different theories of international relations sees and explains it differently and each of them is, to degree, right.

Idea of order has variety of meanings in the context of international politics, and certain orders can take many forms. Thus, Mazar et al. (2016), defines it as “the body of rules, norms, and institutions that govern relations among the key players in the international environment”

(p. 7).

Ikenberry (2001), defines an international order as a set of “governing arrangements between states, including its fundamental rules, principles, and institutions” (p. 23). Thus, he emphasizes that the distinctive characteristic of an order is the structured character, it differentiates from chaos and casual relationships by having some pattern and structure.

Ross (2015), in its turn, incorporate a time dimension to it and define the world order as:

“the pattern of interaction among states and the societies they govern during a particular period of time” (p. 317). Same as Ikenberry, Ross underline that the world order has a distinguished structured character.

A bit different angle on the definition of the world order takes Richard A. Falk (1999), who defines the it as “(…) the distribution of power and authority among the political actors on the global stage” (p. 29). He believes that the world order depicts the existent proportions of power among states and the effects of such a power distribution on their coexistence, their interests

(12)

12 and ends, on the way they interact. This definition to some extent similar to one which is conceived for the purpose of this research.

The definition on which the thesis mainly draws upon was provided by the authors of US National Intelligence Council (NIC) report on the forces and choices shaping the world, which represents how this institution sees today and the future. The authors of the report saw fit to define the international system prior to the international order, what is a derivative from the former. According to them (NIC, 2017, p. 73), “International system refers to the distribution of power and interactions among states as well the suite of institutions, rules, and norms that guide these interactions (…)”, while the term international order “(…) is often used to characterize the nature of these interactions, typically associated with specific types of order such as the rules- based international order created after 1945”. Such an interpretation of the world order was chosen as the principal one due to its compliance with perception of the world order of the followers of theory of realism, the theory that was chosen as the theoretical framework of the thesis.

In this way, the international system, or all-inclusive global context in which political actors operate can be distinguished from the international order. Because “The international system reflects all aspects of economic, political, social, cultural, ecological, and other forms of interaction that exist among states” (Mazarr et al., 2016, p.8).

1.2. Types of the world order and its transformation

After the concept of the world order is defined, it is needed to expound various types of it. There are different varieties of the world order which depends on the number of dominating political actors within the structure of the international system in the specific period of time and on the actual structure of this system. The definition of types of this concept is also depends on a context, theoretical framework, as well as the person defining it. However, the classification provided by the authors (Lesage et al., 2016), was taken as a basis for the purpose of the research, the authors state: “the world order can be unipolar, bipolar and multipolar” (p. 78).

Unipolarity refers to a situation where one exceedingly powerful state dominates the global arena (Devetak, 2012). According to some scholars, international politics faced such an order for a relatively short period after the end of the Cold War2, when the international system was dominated by the US, inasmuch as its opponent, the USSR ceased to exist as a state and actor in international system (Chiaruzzi, 2012; Layne, 2012, Ikenberry, 2001, 2011). However, for some (Lavrov, 2007), characterization of the post-Cold War period as unipolar and stressing US domination is nothing more than a myth. Few scholars — notably Kenneth Waltz and Christopher Layne — argued that unipolarity would be a temporary transitional phase from bipolar to a multipolar world order (Waltz, 1993; Layne, 1993).

However, one should bear in mind, that unipolarity is not always equal to hegemony, as these terms often go along with each other. As Wilkinson (1999) put it, “Hegemony denotes a

2 The term Cold War refers to a period of geopolitical tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, started after World War II and ended with the revolutions of 1989 and the 1991 collapse of the USSR. For more information see: Gaddis, J. (2005). The Cold War: A New History. New York, NY: Penguin Press.

(13)

13 unipolar structure of capability matched by a unipolar structure of influence” (p. 142), it does not necessarily mean that hegemony is the same as unipolarity, as the world order can be unipolar but not having a hegemon (in its classical definition) that act as a hegemon. At the same time, it does not exclude that the superpower in the unipolar structure can act as a hegemon in some instances.

The period after World War II and until the dissolution of USSR characterized as bipolar international order, what refers to a situation where two overwhelmingly powerful states dominate the global arena (Devetak, 2012). The Cold War period probably is the best example of the bipolar order (Fels et al., 2012).

Third type of the world order differs from two previous by a relatively larger number of dominating powers. Some scholars argue that current international system, same as during some periods in the history before, such as nineteenth century, can be characterized by the multipolar world order (Huntington, 1999; Mearsheimer, 2008).

Now, when the classification of the world orders is defined, it is important to put it into a historical perspective and cast a look on the latest evolution of the world order and the reasons behind that. It is important to do that, because less than four decades back humanity faced epoch-making power shift in the global arena and transition of the world order. To degree, these changes affected everything and everyone, ranging from a life of an individual living in seemingly remote from the epicenter of transformations area, be it Vietnam, Korea or South America, to the grand strategy and the ends of great powers.

In modern history, not until the 1990s was the system of international society dominated by a single state, the US. For the last two centuries of modern political history, starting from the end of the eighteenth century and until the end of the twentieth century, the architecture of the international order was either multipolar, usually with five great powers of variable strength that project their force globally, or for a short period bipolar, as from 1945 to 1989 (Gray, 2013).

No scholar disputes that post-World War II world order could be characterized by a bipolarity, which ended with the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the USSR. Great tragedy for some and a great success for the others, however it was indeed a momentous change for the whole international society. Thus, George W. Bush in his State of the Union address (1992), said:

“But the biggest thing that has happened in the world in my life, in our lives, is this: By the grace of God, America won the Cold War”.

The end of the Cold War and dissolution of the USSR brought the final curtain down on a near half century of bipolarity and, in doing so, gravely transformed the geopolitical map of world politics, bringing a plurality of new states into the international system and drastically changing the political map of Eurasia, at the same time re-igniting geopolitical tensions in this region. The period born out of the swift passing of the existential military threat and the structural geopolitical turmoil that followed made a lot of people to reconsider their views and/or to make assessments. In this way, US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director, Robert Gates (1993), referring to this upheaval in world politics said: “The events of the last two years have led to a far more unstable, turbulent, unpredictable and violent world" (p. 3), or as Stanley Hoffmann (1992), put it, "the problem of order has become even more complex than before" (p. 37).

(14)

14 It is worth mentioning, that were not that many theorists and adherent of any theory of international relations and/or practicians that occupies high or low level position that were able to predict such a transformation of the international society. One of the most known examples is George F. Kennan’s “Long Telegram” which he wrote while serving as deputy head of the mission in Moscow. Nevertheless, it was very unclear what kind of the international order came after and this is a subject for a debates until nowadays. Murray and Brown (2012), describe the situation as such:

Few doubted that the implosion of the Soviet Union presaged a geopolitical sea- change but, for several years at least, significantly less consensus coalesced around what this meant for international security and politics in the wider sense. The collapse of bipolarity heralded, for some, the belated emergence of the multipolar age long delayed by the Cold War. (p. 1)

At the same time, Brzezinski (1997), was sure of the US supremacy and its global dominance in the global affairs, he states:

In brief, America stands supreme in the four decisive domains of global power:

militarily, it has an unmatched global reach; economically, it remains the main locomotive of global growth technologically, it retains the overall lead in the cutting-edge areas of innovation; and culturally … it enjoys an appeal that is unrivaled

… all of which gives the United States a political clout that no other state comes close to matching. It is the combination of all four that makes America the only comprehensive global superpower. (p. 23)

In order to achieve the goal of the research, some particular point of view on these events should be determined. Applied in the thesis perspective implies that after the post-war bipolar international order, the brief period of unipolarity and uncontested global dominance of US has come. The predictions of a multipolar world, with a number of dominating powers, such as Germany (and Europe at large), Japan, China and a weakened Russia turned out to be inaccurate.

The only key questions in the debates about the unipolar order or unipolar moment related to the sustainability and closeness this order could bring and the length of such a moment (Dobrescu and Ciocea, 2016).

In the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, the reality of US dominance and the, as yet unrealised, power of its assumed rivals seemed to confirm the existence of a unipolar world (Murray, 2012).

Krauthammer (1990), was one of the first scholars to claim that the post-Cold War period is characterized by unipolarity, he wrote:

The most striking feature of the post-Cold War world is its unipolarity. No doubt, multipolarity will come in time. In perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the United States, and the world will, in structure, resemble the pre-World War I era. But we are not there yet, nor will we be for decades. Now is the unipolar moment. (p. 2)

In 2002 he returned to his 1990 judgement, again confident that the previous analysis had been too modest, in the second publication he added, “The unipolar moment has become the unipolar era” (p. 17).

(15)

15 It goes without saying that Krauthammer was far not the only person following these idea.

Such prominent authors as Brzezinski (1997), Ikenberry (2001; 2005), Wohlforth (1999), Kissinger (2014) and many other scholars and experts were underlying American dominance and leadership in world politics after the end of the Cold War.

One of the arguments supporting the claim of the US global dominance at the time can be found in the actions of the US following dreadful series of four coordinated terrorist attacks that happened on September 11, 2001. In response to these attacks, a US-led coalition overthrew the ruling Taliban government and destroyed the terrorist headquarters of al-Qaeda that were based in Afghanistan. After that the coalition used this opportunity and launched a war against Iraq, despite strong opposition by the United Nations (UN) and many states of different power and significance. Such actions may be considered as a concrete sign of the supremacy of the US and the absence of any power to confront this decision, which is a sign of unipolarity (Chiaruzzi, 2012). Moreover, eventually the US power was left unchecked, since the opposition to this war did not lead to a balancing coalition, what is consistent with Mearsheimer’s logic of offensive realism, which will be looked into in following chapter of the thesis.

As it was previously mentioned, there is a big debate going on the topic of power shift between the emerging or as it also called reemerging powers (such as BRICS3 countries) and the developed countries (Cox, 2012; Rachman, 2016;Acharya, 2018; Layne, 2018). However, of late more and more experts express their concerns of the assumption that the current world order is unipolar. Thus, US National Intelligence Council in its report on the current state of the world and global trends predictions published in 2008 stated:

The international system – as constructed following the Second World War – will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, an historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of nonstate actors. By 2025 the international system will be a global multipolar one with gaps in national power continuing to narrow between developed and developing countries. (p. 6)

However, this report is published almost every four years and, in its report, as of 2017, NIC stated (p. 6) that “Between states, the post-Cold War, unipolar moment has passed and the post-1945 rules based international order may be fading too”. Having such a discourse from the country’s honorable authority, a think tank that provides US policymakers with the strategic information and predictions is a strong evidence supporting claims of US power decline and the end of the unipolarity.

And besides that, it is worth mentioning that in such a state of the world order, the role and importance of international organizations of the global meaning that are responsible for protecting of peace and riddance of conflicts in the world, such as the UN, is gradually declining.

Moore (2017), gives an examples of recent conflict in Europe between the West and Russia, with Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and annexation of Crimea peninsula, and the war in Syria, which have proven that the UN is losing its authority and incapable of prevention and resolution of global conflicts. However, for the most part it depends on the UN Security Council

3 BRICS - is an acronym for an informal group of states comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

(16)

16 members who can affect the UN conflict resolution operations and promote solely their own interests by using the veto power.

1.3. Causes of the world order transformation

Now, when the concept of the world order is defined and the various types of it were introduced and supported by the brief historical overview, it is time to cast a look to processes behind it and reasons for a transformation of the order. It is clear that the topic of the world order transformation is far from obvious and is highly debated among IR scholars and experts.

For many contemporary academics, who rely on Thucydides’ evaluation of the causes of the Peloponnesian war (Thucydides, 1972), the change of the international order is explained by a fundamental shift in the ratio of forces among great powers. There are a number of theories and frameworks of this transformation, such as power cycle theory (Doran, 1971), power transition theory (Organski and Kugler, 1980) or hegemonic war theory (Gilpin, 1988), which, however, share the idea that the most important factor affecting dynamics of international politics is the patters of relative decline and relative growth among the great powers (Cesa, 2012).

For Carr (1946), the main factor transforming the international society lies in the fundamental differences between countries, that makes them struggle for power. For him, international society have an oligarchical configuration, in which several powers are more important than the rest. He sees it divided into two classes which he calls the haves and the have- nots. Former ones possess wealth, power and influence and are satisfied with the existing world order, whereas the latter ones that have less influence and power are dissatisfied with the existing world order and try to tip the balance, what causes the transformation. For that reason, he rejects “the utopian assumption that there is a world interest in peace which is identifiable with the interest of each individual nation” (p. 51).

As a result, we see struggle for power as main driving force of the transformation of the world order. For many scholars, the casual relationship of the world order transformation process is to some extent similar. Thus, Paul Kennedy have drawn same conclusion, but in slightly different framework. He (1988) saw the great and rich powers’ desire to expand their political influence with the help of military means as the main factor transforming the international society. For him, the differences in economic and technological development predisposes richer and more powerful states to increase and/or stabilize their political influence by either establishing empires (as it was in case of Spain, Britain and France during their “golden age”) or by trying to get rid of dangerous or even potentially dangerous rivals (as in case of the US during twentieth century). Such a predominance, however, cannot last forever and sooner or later would be challenged by the rising powers, which usually growing much faster than the predominant power. And even if the predominant power is still growing in absolute terms, it already enters a phase of relative decline due to the more rapid growth of the rising power. The greater power, in its turn, usually instinctively response to the rising challenge with increased military and defense spending, what accelerate its own decline due to decreased amount of investment into its production side. The example of it can be USSR in the last phase of the Cold War.

(17)

17 Waltz (1979), saw the balance of power, which regularly produce systematic configurations and counteracts excessive accumulation of power as a reason for change of the order. For him, all states de facto “at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (p. 118). Therefore, the distribution of power among states, especially in the military field, is the only principal changing component in the international system.

Notwithstanding the fact that great powers are always present in the international society, their importance varies across history. Some of them keep their status for a longer time, while others go through a much faster cycle. However, all great powers rise and fall. And that is where lies the key to understanding two principal phenomena of IR: systematic change and the origin of major wars (Cesa, 2012).

1.4. Theories of international relations

This chapter presents the IR theory used in this thesis to carry out the analysis. Besides that, it provides information on most popular branches or versions of the chosen theory which received most of the attention. Moreover, this chapter provides a quick overview of mainstream IR theories in order to introduce the reader with some of the issues and debates in the field of IR.

Same as the concept of order, the term “theory” is almost always a contest term per se, basically, in any field of academic enquiry, and the social sciences today and particularly the field of IR has been spared by this phenomenon as well. Moreover, not just a term, but the nature and purpose of theory was and is debated until today. In this way, presently some of the scholars rejects the possibility of a science of IR that uses standards of proof taken from the physical sciences to establish same levels of explanatory accuracy andpredictivity. Thus, Chomsky (1994), stated that in international relations “historical conditions are too varied and complex for anything that might plausibly be called ‘a theory’ to apply uniformly” (p. 120). Such views in IR field generally known as post-positivism, which has occurred around and rejects the claims of positivism. This debate is the currently dominant, known as The Fourth Great Debate in IR, or also called as The Third Great Debate by those who reject the description of the inter-paradigm debate as a Great Debate (Lapid, 1989). In words of Burchill and Linklater (2005), this debate is centred on “whether theories – even those that aim for objectivity – are ultimately ‘political’

because they generate views of the world which favour some political interests and disadvantage others” (p. 2). This debate was presented in this chapter in order to familiarize the reader with the latest updates in IR theory field and does not aim to cover all the existent debates delve deep into its components due to a physical limitations of the thesis.

However, generally, “for the most part the debate over science and IR has been carried out as a debate between positivism and its critics” (George, 2012, p. 26). Positivism has traditionally provided the dominant account of what science is.

William Thomson, often referred to simply as Lord Kelvin, an Irish mathematical physicist, during his lecture delivered at the Institute of Civil Engineers said the phrase that subsequently became very famous and used when explaining what the positivism:

(18)

18 I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it

in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be (Lord Kelvin, [1883]

1889, p. 73).

Positivism is a very contested term in science, what resulted in presence of so many disagreements and debates. It is not an easy task to define it, however, it has several generally accepted principles, based on which it is possible to define the positivism. In words of Oxford scholars (Dunne et al, 2007), positivism:

Generally understood to refer to a philosophy of science that is founded on (1) the empiricist theory of knowledge (which argues that sensory experience provides the only legitimate source of knowledge); (2) an assumption of “naturalism” (the belief in the unity of natural and social sciences); (3) the belief in the possibility of making fact-value distinctions (separation of normative, political, and ethical beliefs from

“factual” statements). (p. 338)

Now, when some basic terms and updates in the field of the theories of IR were introduced, several distinguished theories of IR will be explained in the following sub-chapters, underlying and explaining the author’s choice of a theory used in the thesis.

1.4.1. Realism

The concept of realism can be traced back to Athenian general (strategos) and historian, Thucydides (c. 460 - 406 BC) and Florentine diplomat and philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli (1469 - 1527), who are usually perceived as pioneers of classical realism (Monten, 2006; Keaney, 2006).

This theory has historically been the dominant theory of IR. The pragmatic acceptance of conflict and power politics are vital from the realism point of view (Chiaruzzi, 2012). It assumes that order in international relation exist just as unstable product of balance of power or hegemony (Levy, 1983). Realism approach avoid wishful thinking in international politics and deals with it as it actually is, rather than as one would like it to be. One of its principal claims as a tradition of thought lies in its name, underlying this decisive aspiration to engage with obstinate political realities, notwithstanding its violent or tragic nature.

Key tenets of classical approach to realism and its distinctive importance and dominance were expressed by a British professor, Martin Wight (1991, p. 15):

The initial pointer towards the Realists was that they are those who emphasize in international relations the element of anarchy, of power politics, and of warfare.

Everyone is a Realist nowadays, and the term in this sense needs no argument.

According to Carr (1946), who derived it from the Machiavelli, there are three essential realist principles. First, ”history is a sequence of cause and effect, whose course can be analysed and understood by intellectual effort, but not … directed by ‘imagination”’ (p. 63). Second,

“theory does not create practice …, but practice theory” (p. 64). Third, and most disputable one,

“morality is the product of power” (p. 64). Following this logic, realists perceive political dimension of human nature, role of ambition, greed and fear in political actions that generates conflicts.

(19)

19 All of this was remarkably expressed by another prominent realists, English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, in his masterpiece Leviathan ([1651] 1968). In this book he came up with the one of the most fundamental ideas of realism, that life in the realm of international politics is miserable because it is a constant, be it latent or actual, condition of war. For realists, the structure of international relations is anarchical, where everyone exists on a lawless and ungoverned environment, “without a common Power to keep them all in awe” (Hobbes, 1968).

Hobbes calls this structure “the state of nature” or “natural condition” and conclude that international relations are a state of war. In the world without any world government, where sovereign states do not recognise any authority above them, realists depict two conclusions:

“first, nothing can impede the normal recurrence of war; and second, states are responsible for their own self-preservation” (Chiaruzzi, 2012, p. 39).

For the post-World War II world, realism was mainly associated with Hans J. Morgenthau and his seminal textbook of realist theory (1948), that laid the foundations of a realist understanding of this period. He placed power at the center of politics, stating: “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” (p. 25).

Most apparent example of realist “doer” is the first German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck, whose aims and actions can be associated with the realist way of thinking in his efforts to establish a nuanced counter-balancing among great power of Europe in order to avoid a war (Keaney, 2006).

However, there are other strands of realism which have their own respective pioneers.

Thus, Jackson and Sørensen (2013) identifies four main variations of realism: classical realism, strategic realism (Schelling), structural or neo-realism (Mearsheimer and Waltz), and the most recent variation that does not have its clear pioneer yet, neoclassical realism. However, within different branches of realism one can find conflicting with each other claims, which makes the theory even more complicated. As an example, Mearsheimer (2001) as a structural realist argues that the most important goal of a state is constant aspiration to gain more power in order to become a hegemon, the dominant in the international society state, whereas Waltz (1979) – also a structural realist – claims that the state’s overarching end is ensuring its own security by accumulating a satisfactory amount of power. This principal difference between Mearsheimer and Waltz views on realism established two sub-groups within the neo-realism strand: offensive realism (Mearsheimer) and defensive realism (Waltz). Mearsheimer’s offensive realism used in the thesis as the basic theory for the analysis and is reviewed in the following sub-chapter, however, for the sake of completeness, Waltz’s defensive realism is shortly described in this sub- chapter.

So far as security, but not power, is the main factor ensuring survival of the state, defensive realism perceive nation states as ‘security maximisers’. Whereas power is rather a mean to insure security, which makes states gather a reliable amount of power that can guarantee their security (Waltz, 1979). Waltz argues, that the international system would not be balanced, in case states would seek to maximise their power. Nonetheless, both offensive and defensive realism recognise that sue to the anarchic system of international politics, states exist with the constant threat of war.

Despite that the realism is mostly considered as the prevailing theory in IR, there is another theory that “has a strong claim to be the historical alternative” (Dunne, 2014, p. 114),

(20)

20 which is liberalism.It may be an alternative to realism, because of core ideas of liberalism are opposite to realist principles as liberalism takes its point of departure in “a positive view of human nature; … a conviction that international relations can be cooperative rather than conflictual; … a belief in progress” (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013, p. 99). Nevertheless, both theories agree on the belief that “war is a recurring feature of the anarchic system”, with a liberalists having a different point of view on the causes of war. Moreover, same as among realists, who follow different strands of realism and hence have different views on some principles of the theory, for supporters of different variations of liberalism, causes of war varies hugely, ranging from the balance of power system to interventions by governments (Dunne, 2014).

Developed in response to realism, a theory of liberalism sees the global arena as subject to the imperatives of geopolitics and main war as the final judge. It is a theory of choice, where political and social evils are not just a paramount characteristics of humanity, but can be cured in a long-drawn battles. One of the modern liberal theory’s strengths is its negation of the finality of the realists imperatives, while taking their constraints seriously. Unlike the traditional liberal theories that undervalue the importance of power in international politics, modern liberal thought includes realist conception of power while making emphasis on the fact, that there’s more and power it’s not the whole story. However, one of the principal strengths of a modern liberal thought is its incorporation of new trends in global politics. However, this does not necessarily mean that its incorporates all the new trends and issues, since it neglects some issues, such as global terrorism (Richardson, 2012).

1.4.2. Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism

As mentioned in previous sub-chapter, the theory of realism is very multiplex and embrace in it quite a different variations of itself, which are sometimes even conflicting.

Therefore, as long as the theory of offensive realism applied in the thesis in order to conduct the analysis, it is important to thoroughly cast a look on it. However, before that, it is worth explaining the reasoning for such a choice. First of all, physical limitations of the thesis do not provide a possibility to conduct the analysis applying every variation of realism. Second, in order to perform a thorough and complete research, it is always better to focus on a single theory and apply its lenses on the object of analysis. Third, Mearsheimer’s theory have been ranked among the most important advances in modern realism and is an important addition to Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism (Toft, 2005) and despite having some principal weaknesses, such as Mearsheimer’s unremitting focus on power-security competition among great powers and just little attention given to the issues in other aspects of international politics (Snyder, 2001), it is still a justifying choice for testing Mearsheimer’s theoretical propositions against contemporary international politics.

In his works Mearsheimer analysed how offensively-determined states may behave as revisionist powers in response to structural constraints (Chiaruzzi, 2012). Focusing on strategy and war in his masterpiece Tragedy of great power politics, Mearsheimer (2001), propose that great powers “are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals” (p. 29). In that he deviates from the views of other notable realists, both Waltz and Carr. He stresses that great powers constantly trying to extend their hegemony and rarely satisfied with what they have. That is where he deviates from Waltz (1979), because Mearsheimer’s statement implies

(21)

21 that the ultimate end of a great power is not just ensuring its security, but maximizing its capabilities in order to guarantee its survival in anarchy. In his words (Mearsheimer, 2001):

offensive realists … believe that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system. (p. 21)

In this statement Mearsheimer’s opinion on the factors influencing transformation of the world order can be seen. Given that all the great powers strive for a power maximization and their great rivals have the ends of the same kind, thus “status quo powers are rarely found in world politics”, which makes the nature of the world order impermanent.

He also gives a significant importance to a great powers’ behaviour in terms of territorial expansionism, supporting his claims by presenting a cases of powers with such a behaviour, that constantly seek the opportunities to expand, such as Germany from the second half of the 19th century and until the end of the World War II, and USSR for the period of its existence (Mearsheimer, 2001).

However, he considers a bipolar type of the world order to be the most balanced and peaceful one, whereas he thinks of a multipolar world order as very unbalanced and more likely to cause wars and conflicts (Mearsheimer, 2001). In the chapter 2.2 the director of the CIA Robert Gates was cited, he said: “The events of the last two years have led to a far more unstable, turbulent, unpredictable and violent world" (Robert Gates, 1993, p. 3). In this way Robert Gates’

vision of the post-Cold War world fits well the logic of the offensive realism which perceive a multipolar world order as more unbalanced and therefore unstable. Thus, in this case, the offensive realists’ logic coincide with that of the director of the CIA, the main body of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence of the US, what may serve as another evidence of the reasonableness of the offensive realism.

(22)

22

2. Ukraine’s European integration

This chapter is devoted to the explanation of the context of the thesis. While physical limitations of the thesis do not allow to present an adequate historical overview of the political situation in Ukraine for the sake of wholeness, the chapter presents the events that precede and caused the Ukraine’s Euromaidan revolution and following radical change of Ukraine’s foreign policy. The chapter also reviews some of the repercussions of the revolution and tries to shed some light on the third-party involvement in these events.

2.1. Historical aspects of integration

Ukraine as an independent state was formed on August 24, 1991, after the proclamation of the Act of Independence and the holding of a republican referendum on December 1, 1991.

After that, its international status has changed radically. As an independent state, Ukraine gained full sovereignty in carrying out its foreign policy. Since independence, the country has entered the international arena as a young state that has declared its wish to become democratic and constitutional state. In order to achieve this, Ukraine had to decide which course of development should be chosen.

After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine, like all former Soviet republics was in the grip of an economic crisis, as the all-union economic complex collapsed. The main blow fell on industry and agriculture. From 1990 to 1994, four governments have changed in the country, seven programmes of the crisis exit were considered, however none of them was implemented due to the hesitance of the authorities and the weak elaboration of strategies. Economic stabilization began only by the 2000, and the strong economic growth began just several year later (Kasianov, 2008).

After the stabilization of the financial system, the most important tasks were to ensure further growth of the economy, modernize production and strengthen positions in foreign markets, including the EU market.

In the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, Supreme Soviet of the Republic on July 16th, 1990, emphasized the desire of the new state to abandon nuclear weapons and to pursue the status of a neutral and non-aligned state while, however, being involved in the European process and structures. Thus, the declaration states:

The Ukrainian SSR solemnly proclaims its intention to become in future a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, produce or acquire nuclear weapons.

(“Declaration of State Sovereignty”, 1990, Paragraph IX)

And in the next paragraph the declaration also states: “The Ukrainian SSR is an equal participant in international communication … [which] is directly involved in the pan-European process and European structures” (Paragraph X).

At the same time, the Agreement on the Formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of December 8, 1991, signed by then President of Ukraine Leonid

(23)

23 Kravchuk, mentioned preservation of the common military-strategic and economic space of the CIS countries (“Agreement”, 1991).

In the conditions of gaining independence by Ukraine, mentioned declarations demanded a clearer definition of the foreign policy course. An important step in this direction was the resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine4 dated July 2, 1993 "On the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine", which affirmed the priority of the European vector of Ukrainian development and the desire to seek accession to the European Union, as already by that time, the EU has become a powerful financial, economic and political part of the world.

However, at the same time, was pointed out the importance of maintaining a good neighborly and friendly relations with Russia as a key factor in the security of the country (Usova, 2011).

Nevertheless, this decision allowed Ukraine to make first steps toward the EU, which resulted in signing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine (PCA) in 1994, with final ratification in 1998.

The PCA envisaged the cooperation of the parties on a wide range of issues, such as political, trade-economic and humanitarian. In the framework of the agreement, seven priority areas of cooperation between Ukraine and the EU were identified, these are: energy, trade and investment, justice and internal affairs, harmonization of legislation, environmental protection environment, transport, transboundary cooperation and cooperation in science, technology and space. In this framework Ukraine have received technical and advisory assistance from the EU, primarily based on the TACIS programme.5

Already in 1998, the EU adopted the Common Strategy on Ukraine and created a special structures in order to implement the provisions of the PCA, such as the Cooperation Council, the Cooperation Committee and the Parliamentary Cooperation Committees. Despite that in the Common Strategy on Ukraine the partnership was characterized as “strategic”, the prospect of a membership in the EU was absent (PCA Ukraine, 2017).

It is obvious that the Common Strategy adopted by the EU did not suit Ukraine. This is not surprising, since there were objective reasons for consideration of Ukraine as a potential member state: from the beginning of the 2000s and up to the global economic crisis of 2008, Eastern Europe was the most dynamically developing region of the world, and its economic lag behind Western Europe was rapidly declining, although remaining quite significant (Kulikova, 2014).

As a result, the PCA laid the foundation for the development of political dialogue between Ukraine and the EU and have led their relations until 2005, when the EU-25 adopted the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and included Ukraine in the “Eastern Neighbors” group, along with 6 more CIS countries (EU-Ukraine Action Plan, 2005). The main goal of the policy was to form a “circle of friends” and to expand a political dialogue with them, with deepening an economic cooperation with these “friends”. By the means of a bilateral Ukraine-EU Action Plan (AP) for 3 years with a possible extension for 1 year, Ukraine should have achieved several goals, which are: obtaining a status of the market economy country; accession to the WTO and beginning of negotiations on a Free Trade Area with the EU.

4 The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is the unicameral parliament of Ukraine.

5 TACIS (Technical Assistance to the CIS and Georgia) is the European Community's particular effort to support the ongoing process of economic reform and development in the 11 states of the CIS and Georgia.

(24)

24 Throughout this period, Ukraine should have limited its cooperation with Russia and other CIS countries mainly with bilateral relations, but the creation of a multilateral free trade zone was not ruled out. As a result, The ENP did not lead to fundamental changes in relations between Ukraine and the EU and still lacked any prospects of the EU membership.

At the same time, many things depended on who governed Ukraine at the time, as the country has been going through the period of closer relations with either the EU and NATO, or Russia, depending on who was the president of the country. Thus, new impetus to the Euro- Atlantic integration of Ukraine was given by the election of Viktor Yushchenko as the President in January 2005, the same year when the ENP was introduced.

During his presidency Ukraine had intensive dialog with the countries of the West, and worsening of the relations with Russia at the same time. Already in 2008, during the meeting of NATO members in Bucharest, final summit declaration (North Atlantic Council, 2008) included statements confirming NATO members’ aspiration to include Ukraine in the organization:

NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO… MAP6 is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP… Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine. (p. 6)

However, back then NATO members did not find a consensus in a debate on providing the MAP to Ukraine and Georgia, with at least seven countries, such as France, Germany, Italy, Hungary and the Benelux countries arguing against this (Myers and Erlanger, 2008).

During his last years of presidency, in 2009, Viktor Yushchenko has achieved Ukraine’s inclusion to the Eastern Partnership programme which supposed to establish a political association between the EU and Ukraine, as well as its gradual economic integration without formal membership in the EU.

Thus, from July 1, 2010, Ukraine’s policies in relation to the EU were carried out on the basis of the Law of the Republic of Ukraine “On the principles of domestic and foreign policy”.

Article 11 of the Law states: the fundamental principle of Ukraine’s foreign policy is “ensuring the integration of Ukraine into the European political, economic, legal space for the acquisition of membership in the European Union”. What probably is the last achievement of Viktor Yushchenko as a President, in terms of Ukraine’s European integration.

In its turn, election of Viktor Yanukovych as the new President of Ukraine in 2010 was marked by a noticeable improvement in Russian-Ukrainian relations for a period of four years, until the Euromaidan revolution and everything that came after. Annexation of Crimea peninsula by Russia and its military aggression and de-facto waging a war in Donbass region naturally slumped all the Russians relations with Ukraine, increasing Ukraine’s desire to integrate to European world as soon as possible.

6 Membership Action Plan (MAP) is NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the organization, which does not automatically guarantee a membership, however, basically mean country’s actual involvement in NATO.

(25)

25 Nevertheless, despite improvement of Ukraine’s relations with Russia, the negotiations on and preparation of the AA which is meant to be the most progressive step in the EU-Ukraine relations had continued. Which resulted in singing political chapters of the AA in March 2014, as a gesture of support for the Ukraine in its conflict with Russia (EU relations with Ukraine, 2019).

And on 27 June 2014, the EU and Ukraine finalised the AA at the heads of government summit to mark the beginning of a new stage in their relations. This event reversed the decision by then President Viktor Yanukovych not to sign the AA at the Vilnius summit in late November 2013, which was initiated in 2012 by his administration and which had a particular importance for the people of Ukraine at the time (Pridham, 2014).

As alternative to the AA, Yanukovich had an offer from Moscow consisting of a 15 billion US dollars loan and thereduction of gas prices from 400 to 268.5 US dollars per thousand cubic metres (with a Moscow reserving the right to reconsider the price in the future) (Portnov and Portnova, 2015).

All the following years Ukraine’s government was trying to deepen and enhance its relations with the EU and USA, which has resulted in the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) entering into force on January 1, 2016, and the adoption of a regulation on visa liberalisation for Ukrainian citizens travelling to the EU for a period of stay of 90 days in any 180-day period by the European Council.

In this way, one of the last and most significant steps in Ukraine’s European integration is the changes to Ukrainian Constitution confirming its path toward the EU and NATO. The changes adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on February 7th, 2019, proposes that Ukraine's irreversible course toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration be stipulated in the preamble of the Fundamental Law along with the confirmation of European identity of the Ukrainian people (“Ukraine's parliament backs changes”, 2019).

According to today's official policy of Ukraine, membership in the EU as the final stage of European integration is a strategic goal of the state, since, according to the authorities, this is the best way to realize national interests in the form of building an economically developed and democratic state, strengthening its position in the global system of international relations. For Ukraine, European integration is one of the ways to modernize the economy and technological sphere, obtain foreign investment, create new jobs, and enter the world market, in particular, the EU market.

2.2. Ukraine’s Eurorevolution and its repercussions

In the end of 2013, the political crisis in Ukraine led to a three-month-long mass civil protests that started as a peaceful protest on Kiev’s Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti), which afterwards internationally came to be known as the Euromaidan or Eurorevolution. These protests resulted not only in the change of the government of the country but also in a radical shift in the popular attitudes toward Ukraine’s largest geopolitical neighbors:

the EU and Russia (Haran and Burkovskyi, 2015).

In all probability, Yanukovych’s decision to stop further preparations for the finalization of the AA, including the DCFTA, with the EU was the most important trigger for the Euromaidan

(26)

26 movement. This decision came very unexpectedly for not only to the world community but also to Ukrainians themselves (Zank, 2015). First protests against president’s decision to interrupt negotiations with the EU, started to break out and gained speed rapidly right after the announcement of this decision. Once the protests started, most of the events took place in Kyiv and western city of Lviv, while no significant mass movements in the Eastern and Southern part of Ukraine were registered.

In December 2013, then EU Commissioner for Enlargement Štefan Füle, then First Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Serhiy Arbuzov and then Ukrainian Foreign Minister Leonid Kozhara announced continuing of the AA negotiations. At the same time, the protests have continued to grow and have turned to be “a movement against the Yanukovych regime” (Portnov and Portnova, 2015). On January 22nd, the cruelest phase of the protests has entered with multiple deaths due to unidentified snipers shooting demonstrators in Kiev.

On February 21st, following negotiations with Russia, Germany, France and Poland, Yanukovych announced pre-term presidential elections set for December 2014 and have promised to reintroduce the Constitution of 2004 (which provides less power for the president, comparing to the following editions of Ukraine’s constitution), a declaration was signed in Kiev by the negotiation partners and the three opposition leaders. The Verkhovna Rada, by a vast majority, have adopted reintroducing of the Constitution of 2004. Nevertheless, protesters rejected the trade-off for not being enough far-reaching, and announced an ultimatum to the president asking him to resign by the next morning. At the night of February 22nd, Yanukovych fled Ukraine with the help of the Russia, after the Ukraine’s political elite agreed to depose him.

After that, the only legitimate governmental institution – The Verkhovna Rada, voted for a new government and Yatsenyuk was appointed Prime Minister (Portnov and Portnova, 2015).

2.2.1. Crimea annexation

In March 2014, Ukraine faced another problem. Unmarked men in a green uniform (so- called “little green men”) took control over strategic objects and local authorities of Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC), maintaining their protection and functioning, they also blocked Ukrainian military facilities, military units and headquarters. These people in green uniform were Russian military personnel, what easily can be confirmed by the equipment they used, because many elements of their equipment were equal to those used in Russian military. Despite Kremlin officially declared its non-involvement, everyone in Crimea and the rest of the world clearly understood who these “little green men” were. Later in April, Putin acknowledged that the Russian military "provided conditions for free expression of will" (“Putin: our military”, 2014), during the referendum on the status of Crimea, and in October, he also admitted that Russian troops had blocked Ukrainian military units (“Meeting of the Valdai, 2014).

Later in March, the government of ARC announced a referendum on joining Russia, which was condemned and voided by the West. These events happened at the time when Russia declared new Ukrainian government as not legitimate and that in fact “anti-constitutional coup and armed seizure of power” (“Vladimir Putin answered”, 2014) took place and expressed the need of protecting the rights of the Russian people on the territory of Ukraine. By that move, Moscow took an advantage of the Ukrainian political crisis and severely complicated the situation

Odkazy

Související dokumenty

23 CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE: adopted at the Fifth Session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 28 June 1996 and amended on 8 December 2004 by Law No.. Council of

Jestliže totiž platí, že zákonodárci hlasují při nedůležitém hlasování velmi jednot- ně, protože věcný obsah hlasování je nekonfl iktní, 13 a podíl těchto hlasování

Výše uvedené výzkumy podkopaly předpoklady, na nichž je založen ten směr výzkumu stranických efektů na volbu strany, který využívá logiku kauzál- ního trychtýře a

Výběr konkrétní techniky k mapování politického prostoru (expertního surveye) nám poskytl možnost replikovat výzkum Benoita a Lavera, který byl publikován v roce 2006,

Rozsah témat, která Baumanovi umožňuje jeho pojetí „tekuté kultury“ analyzovat (noví chudí, globalizace, nová média, manipulace tělem 21 atd.), připomíná

Mohlo by se zdát, že tím, že muži s nízkým vzděláním nereagují na sňatkovou tíseň zvýšenou homogamíí, mnoho neztratí, protože zatímco se u žen pravděpodobnost vstupu

[r]

Navrhované analytické řešení pracuje s budoucí robustní architekturou (viz kapitola 3.6.1) pouze okrajově, je celé stavěno na dočasné architektuře (viz kapitola