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UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS, PRAGUE FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BACHELOR’S THESIS

2020 Kai Wangle

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UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS, PRAGUE FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International and Diplomatic Studies

The Impact of China’s Uyghur Policy on its International Soft Power (Bachelor’s Thesis)

Author: Kai Wangle

Supervisor: Jeremy Alan Garlick, M.A., Ph.D.

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Author’s Declaration

Herewith I declare that I have written this bachelor’s thesis on my own and I have cited all sources.

Prague, 4 December 2020

………

Author’s Signature

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Jeremy Garlick for his assistance and consultation. A special thanks goes to my partner and my family for their support and patience throughout the writing of this thesis.

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List of Abbreviations

ASPI – Australian Strategic Policy Institute

BRI – Belt and Road Initiative, officially the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21^st-century Maritime Silk Road

CI – Confucius Institute

CCP – Chinese Communist Party, also the Communist Party of China ETIM – East Turkestan Islamic Movement

FDI – Foreign direct investment GWOT – Global War on Terror

IJOP – Integrated Joint Operations Platform NBA – National Basketball Association PRC – People’s Republic of China ROC – Republic of China

TECRO – Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office TIP – Turkestan Islamic Party

UNHCHR – Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights VPN – Virtual Private Network

WTO – World Trade Organization WUC – World Uyghur Congress

XPCC – Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, also Bingtuan XUAR – Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

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Introduction

As China’s unprecedented growth over the last four decades has made it one of the world’s economic powerhouses, the country has increasingly sought to expand its influence around the world. Key to these ambitions is its vast western province of Xinjiang, which is home to 12 million Uyghurs, a Turkic-speaking Muslim ethnic group. While they Uyghurs have a long and fraught history with China, they have been the target of today’s single worst human rights violation outside of a warzone since China launched its People’s War on Terror in 2014.

The paper is a case study in China’s Uyghur policy in Xinjiang and its impact on China’s international soft power. It will examine the history of the Uyghurs’ relationship with China and analyze reports on its treatment of Xinjiang’s Uyghur minority collected from firsthand accounts, photographs, and satellite images as well as official statements and documents to establish China’s policy in Xinjiang. Additionally, through analyzing the international response to China’s repression of the Uyghurs it will determine the effects of its policy on its global image and ability to wield soft power as it seeks to become a global superpower.

The first chapter focuses the concept of soft power. It examines soft power as defined by Joseph Nye who first coined the term in the 1980s as well as the uses and limitations of the concept. It will examine the Chinese approach to soft power, how it has fused it with hard power through economic incentives, and its novel approach of using traditional soft power tools a defensive manner in its quest to expand its influence internationally and become a global superpower. It will explore several instances of China’s use of soft power and the impact they’ve had on China’s perception abroad.

The goal of the second chapter is to examine the history of Xinjiang and the Uyghur crisis from its incorporation into the People’s Republic of China in 1949 it its launch of the People’s War on Terror in 2014. It will examine the strategies used to solidify its control over the region, Uyghur resistance to Beijing’s increasingly repressive tactics, and the events that led China to frame its actions in the region as part of the Global War on Terror.

The third chapter looks at the current situation in Xinjiang and China’s aggressive efforts to erase Uyghur identity. It will examine the emergence of so-called ‘re-education camps’ that house more than a million Uyghurs, the forced labor programs and the all-encompassing

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surveillance apparatus that has turned Xinjiang into the world’s most comprehensive police state in its efforts to change the physical and cultural landscape of the region and assimilate it to Beijing’s political and cultural ideals.

The fourth chapter examines the development of reports on China’s abuses in Xinjiang and how it has reacted to them. It will examine the international response to the issue from developing countries, the Muslim world and the West as well as China’s efforts to evade criticism of its actions. Finally, it will explore role of the Uyghur diaspora, Chinese technology companies and China’s increasing use of defensive soft power, analyzing the likelihood of China facing repercussions for its actions and the implications for its ability to wield soft power to further its international ambitions.

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1. Soft Power and How China Wields It

The concept of soft power was first introduced in the 1980s by Joseph Nye. Nye defines power as the ability to influence others in order to achieve one’s desired outcomes. Hard power coerces its targets – either by threats or incentives, while soft power co-opts them. According to Nye, in wielding soft power, actors, primarily countries, but also international organizations and NGOs, rely on three main resources: culture, political values, and foreign policies. These resources produce attraction and shape the preferences of others, leading them to buy into the actors’ values and wish to help them achieve their objectives. Soft power can be high – aimed at elites in a country, or low – directed at the general public. According to Nye it is much more difficult to wield than hard power, as many of the resources are outside the government’s control and often take much longer to achieve desired outcomes.

In his 2004 book on the subject, Nye focuses largely on the example of the United States, which has long used soft power to its benefit. Its democratic values, freedoms of speech and religion, and economic prosperity have been instrumental in fomenting America’s largely favorable image abroad and helped forge alliances which allowed it to become the world’s hegemon in the latter half of the twentieth century. This image is reproduced by the vast amounts of media showcasing American culture to the world – from the state sponsored Radio Free Europe broadcasting across the Iron Curtain during the Cold War to Hollywood, the music industry, consumer brands and more recently social media. Finally, American values are cemented in international organizations, such as the UN or the WTO, which have codified personal freedoms and free trade as universal ideals. This is used in tandem with hard power to achieve US objectives, since having international rules consistent with its interests gives its actions legitimacy.¹

Critics have argued it can often be difficult to disentangle hard power from soft power. For example, foreign aid, traditionally labeled as a soft power tool is often tied implicitly or explicitly to the beneficiary taking a certain side in international disputes. In the projection of ideals soft power can also overlap with hard power, such as when George W. Bush announced to America’s allies that they were “either with [the United States] or with the terrorists” in the

1 Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. 1st ed. New York: Public Affairs, May 16, 2004.

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aftermath of the September 11^th attacks. While the statement was not accompanied by any military force or economic threats, it forced countries to join America’s coalition, lest they be labeled as evil, threatening their identities.²

While Nye primarily talks about soft power in the context of democracies and liberal values, he points out that soft power is not a normative concept and can therefore be used by any regime for benevolent or nefarious purposes.³ Additionally while Nye regards soft power as a means to get other nations to act in accordance to its objectives, other scholars have pointed out that soft power can also be used defensively.⁴

1.1. China’s Soft Power Prowess

Since soft power relies upon subjective perceptions and qualitative data, it is virtually impossible to quantify. However, that has not stopped people from trying. Portland Communications, a London thinktank has created the self-purported “most accurate index of national soft power ever produced” in its annual Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power report. The report, which lists Joseph Nye as a key contributor, analyzes an assortment of objective data and international polling to determine the top 30 countries which wield the most soft power. Its 2019 edition places China 27^th.⁵ The country preforms best in its culture category, ranking eighth, while also doing well in education and enterprise. Its weaknesses stem from its low scores on indices of individual freedoms, transparency, and human rights. The report emphasizes China’s resilience through what it describes as a tumultuous year, characterized by the US-China trade war, the blacklisting of Chinese technology companies, continued tensions in the South China Sea, the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement and increased criticism of its treatment of the Uyghurs. It is noteworthy that this barrage of bad publicity was accompanied by a slide in international favorability rankings of only three spots

2 Mattern, Janice B. “Why Soft Power Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics.” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 (June 2005): 583–612.

3 Nye, Joseph S. The Future of Power. PublicAffairs, January 13, 2011.

4 Yıldırım, Nilgün Eliküçük, and Mesut Aslan. “China’s Charm Defensive: Image Protection by Acquiring Mass Entertainment.” Pacific Focus 35, no. 1 (April 23, 2020): 141–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12153.

5 McClory, Jonathan. “The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power, 2019.” The Soft Power 30. London:

Portland Communications, 2019. https://softpower30.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Soft-Power-30- Report-2019-1.pdf.

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as compared to 2018, which alongside improvements in culture, education and enterprise indices have allowed China to remain in the same position in the overall ranking as the previous year despite the challenges to its reputation.⁶ Other institutions’ global soft power rankings rate China much higher due to their incorporation of business and trade data in their analyses, which Nye and Portland’s report consider hard power. The 2020 Global Soft Power Index, published by Brand Finance ranks China fifth,⁷ While the Elcano Royal Institute’s 2018 Elcano Global Presence Report places China second in its soft power rankings.⁸ Despite the discrepancies in the rankings, based on differing definitions of soft power and different data sets, both reports corroborate Portland’s findings of the disparity between China’s reputation and its overall influence, giving the country a reputation ranking of 25^th and 24^th respectively.

1.2. Culture

The idea of establishing China’s soft power has been discussed in Chinese political circles since the mid-1990s, but reached a turning point in 2007, when President Hu Jintao first expressed the need to enhance the country’s soft power his keynote speech to the 17^th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, stating that culture is an increasingly important source of national cohesion and a “factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength.”⁹ Since taking over in 2013 President Xi Jinping has echoed his predecessor’s remarks, issuing directives to “promote China’s cultural soft power by disseminating modern Chinese values” and establishing the “China Dream” by communicating the country’s soft power message.¹⁰

As Nye points out in his definition, soft power is generally harder for governments to wield than hard power because it relies on factors largely out of its control, Furthermore it is not easily measurable and can take much longer to develop than traditional power instruments. This is

6 Portland Communications. “The Soft Power 30: China, 2019 Overview,” 2019.

https://softpower30.com/country/china/.

7 “Global Soft Power Index 2020.” Brand Finance, 2020.

https://brandirectory.com/globalsoftpower/download/brand-finance-global-soft-power-index-2020.pdf.

8 Olivié, Iliana, and Manuel Garcia. “Elcano Global Presence Report 2018.” Real Instituto Elcano, 2018, 59.

9 Hu, Jintao. “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 17th Party Congress.” Qiushi Journal, October 15, 2007, 29.

10 Voci, Paola, and Luo Hui. Screening China’s Soft Power. Routledge, October 2017.

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very much contrary to the CCP’s modus operandi, which has decided stick to its traditional playbook, issuing rigid top-down directives and setting ambitious targets. Its efforts to dictate its cultural soft power are generally considered not to have been very effective, particularly when one considers the billions behind them, and the country’s ability to co-opt still lags significantly behind its coercive prowess.¹¹ That being said it would also be inaccurate to suggest the initiative has been entirely fruitless.

Perhaps the most visible manifestation of these directives was China’s hosting of international mega-events in an effort to showcase the country and its culture to broad international audiences. These include the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, the 2010 Asian Games in Guangzhou and the Shanghai World Expo the same year, as well as the Winter Olympics, set for Beijing in 2022.¹² It has also generally promoted tourism, both by attracting and ever greater number of international visitors and by encouraging its own growing middle class to go abroad.

China is currently the fourth biggest destination for international tourists, and its biggest source, both in terms of number of travelers and tourist spending abroad.¹³

Another major area for promoting the Chinese ideals is education. China has long been a source country for international students, but it is quickly becoming a top destination country as well.

In 2015 China became third largest receiving country for international students after the US and the UK, hosting nearly half a million foreign students in 2019,¹⁴ even providing stipends for poorer students from developing nations. It also invites scholars and artists for cultural exchanges and lectures. In the other direction it sends Chinese teachers to schools and universities and youth volunteers to developing countries under the Chinese equivalent of the Peace Corps.

11 Biswas, Asit K, and Kris Hatley. “China’s Soft Power Struggles.” Policy Forum (blog), November 8, 2017.

https://www.policyforum.net/chinas-soft-power-struggles/.

12 Shin, Hyun. “Unequal Cities of Spectacle and Mega-Events in China.” City 16 (December 18, 2012): 728–44.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2012.734076.

13 Travel China Guide. “2019 China Tourism Statistics: Facts and Figures of Inbound and Outbound,” 2020.

https://www.travelchinaguide.com/tourism/2019statistics/.

14 Wei, Gao, Wang Lin, Yan Jingdong, and Wu Yanxiong. “China as a Global Destination for International Students.” Journal of Politics and Law 13 (February 29, 2020): 135. https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v13n1p135.

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The Chinese Ministry of Education has also established a network of language and cultural centers called Confucius Institutes (CIs). These emulate the model of the UK’s British Council or France’s Alliance Française which promote their country’s culture without explicit links to the countries’ agendas. China’s network, which boasts over 580 branches in 159 countries, offers primarily language lessons, but also a range of extracurriculars spanning from cooking, to calligraphy, Chinese history, and tai-chi. However, it wasn’t long after the first CI was established in South Korea in 2004 that controversy began to surround the institution. Unlike other countries’ cultural institutes, CIs have established themselves almost entirely on university campuses, where they have stirred accusations of spreading Chinese propaganda, interfering with free speech, and spying on students. Perhaps the most concerning are allegations that CIs wield their influence on campuses to censor speech on topics deemed objectionable by the CCP.¹⁵ While the Hanban, the branch of the Ministry of Education which oversees CIs has denied the accusations, party members have described them as an important part of China’s overseas propaganda setup.¹⁶

In June 2014, the American Association of University Professors issued a statement encouraging institutions hosting Confucius Institutes to stop doing so, claiming them to be an arm of the Chinese state.¹⁷ Two months later an incident at the European Association for Chinese Studies conference in Portugal led to further backlash when the Hanban’s Director General ordered her staff to remove pages from the conference program which mentioned Taiwanese academic institutions. As a result, several universities in North America and Europe closed their CI branches. In 2019, amid the escalating trade war with China, the US passed a

15 Paradise, James F. “China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power.” Asian Survey 49, no. 4 (July 1, 2009): 647–69. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2009.49.4.647.

16 “A Message from Confucius.” The Economist, October 24, 2009. https://www.economist.com/special- report/2009/10/24/a-message-from-confucius.

17 “On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes.” American Association of University Professors, June 2014. https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes.

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law blocking universities from receiving federal funding if they host Confucius Institutes, which led to a large number of additional closures.¹⁸

Of the CI closures, by far the largest number have been in the US. Other countries whose universities have expelled their CI are Canada, Australia, Sweden, Germany, France, Belgium, and Japan. China has reacted to the closures with allegations of Western paranoia and hypocrisy and vowed to continue its efforts to promote the Chinese language and culture. Regardless of their reputational challenges, CIs provide access to resources for learning the Chinese language, a skill which has undeniably become more valuable as China’s global influence expands, to which their continued expansion and popularity in developing nations attests.

1.3. Political Values

The naming of the CI, in line with Spain’s Instituto Cervantes and Germany’s Goethe-Institut, honors one of the most recognizable figures of its nations culture. Both at home and abroad the CCP has co-opted Confucius as a symbol of national unity, emphasizing his teachings which support its idea of ‘harmonious society.’ Western critics point to CIs as a testament to the moral bankruptcy of China’s brand of communism, which view the institute’s naming as a deliberate attempt to distance it from the state, pointing out the party’s efforts to eradicate Confucian beliefs during the Cultural Revolution during which Confucianism was perceived as an outdated relic and obstacle to social progress.

While CIs and have been met with skepticism in the West, they have been much better received in the developing world. Similarly, while it is hard to imagine China’s repressive regime winning over many citizens of liberal democracies, Chinese values have found some footing in elsewhere in Asia and Africa, and to a lesser degree in Latin America.

Since establishing the China Dream, it has places the idea of peaceful development at the core of its foreign policy, emphasizing the strides the country has made in recent decades and the hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens it has lifted out of poverty into a prosperous middle

18 Fuchs, Chris. “U.S. Colleges Face Tough Choice: Take Money from China and Lose Federal Funding.” NBC News, September 19, 2019. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/u-s-colleges-face-tough-choice-take- money-china-lose-n1055871.

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class. By China’s calculations, most residents of the Global South, who are accustomed to living under undemocratic regimes, are more concerned with improving their standard of living than being able to vote and critique their governments. This message has not fallen on deaf ears and China has been more than happy to contrast the fates of its citizens with those of Syrians, Iraqis, Afghans or Libyans and their experiences with Western-backed efforts to promote democracy to drive it home.¹⁹

Another major objective for Beijing is projecting the idea that China is not a threat to other nations. For this it leans heavily on developing nations’ not-so-distant memories of Western colonialism.²⁰ This strategy is epitomized by an international performance tour commemorating the 600^th anniversary of the voyages of Zhang He. The eleven-nation tour, dubbed the “Voyage of Chinese Culture to Africa” tells the tale of the 15^th century Chinese admiral who sailed across Asia, the Middle East and Africa encountering but never conquering other peoples. Zhang He, as the communications official present at the event’s launch told reporters, “treated other countries with friendship and respect instead of occupying a single piece of land, establishing a fortress, or seizing any treasure.” Like Zheng He and unlike his Western counterparts, China stresses that it is an ally not a colonizer, with a relationship built on friendship and symbiosis rather than exploitation. (Say what you will of China’s actions in Tibet and Xinjiang, or for that matter of historical accounts of Zhang He’s journeys, which are not as devoid of violence and subversion as Beijing likes to suggest)²¹

1.4. Diplomacy

The tour is part of a broader push to increase diplomatic engagement, sponsoring networks of formal and informal summits, as well as sending top-level government officials to international

19 Kurlantzick, Joshua. Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.

20 Sverdrup-Thygeson, Bjørnar. “The Chinese Story: Historical Narratives as a Tool in China’s Africa Policy.”

International Politics 54 (February 1, 2017): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0014-3.

21 Federl, Patrick. “The Instrumental Use of Zheng He’s Travels in Official Sino-African Relations’ Discourse.”

Asiadémica, no. 11 (January 2018). https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/6256886.pdf.

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events and meetings. China now has the largest diplomatic network in the world,²² and has been investing heavily in its diplomatic corps, increasing the number of employees at its manifold embassies and consulates. Rather than being moved around, embassy officials are assigned posts in the same country or region, enabling them to improve their knowledge of the local language and culture and develop deeper ties in the political and business communities.

Another goal of its soft power push has been to increase its presence in international organizations and develop strategic bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Its aim is to incrementally extend its influence and acquire leadership roles in these organizations to steer them in a direction more favorable to the CCP and shield it from international criticism for its actions. Mr. Xi has stated that China intends to work within the international system with the UN at its core by “contributing Chinese wisdom and strength to global governance.”²³ It has three main objectives in in international organizations: to redefine democracy in terms of

‘economic and social rights’ rather than inalienable civil and political rights, to strengthen state sovereignty and lastly to support the efforts of developing countries to increase their representation and strengthen their voice in international affairs and take an active part in reforming and developing the global governance system. In doing so, China hopes to legitimize its persecution of dissidents and ethnic minority groups in the name of societal progress and shield itself from repercussions for actions on its own soil. It hopes its push to grant developing nations more representation in international affairs will help curry favor with them which it can then co-opt to further embed its values into international institutions. This appeals particularly to leaders of non-democratic nations in the developing world, who happily sign on to the prospect of increased international representation and decreased accountability.

China has been steadily increasing the number of international organizations it joins, assuming leadership positions in them and making efforts to change their structures from within.²⁴ One

22 “China Now Has More Diplomatic Posts than Any Other Country.” BBC News, November 27, 2019, sec.

China. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50569237.

23 Lee, Kristine, and Alexander Sullivan. “People’s Republic of the United Nations: China’s Emerging Revisionism in International Organization.” Center for a New American Security, May 1, 2019. JSTOR.

https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep20431.5.

24 Goddard, Stacie E. “Embedded Revisionism: Networks, Institutions, and Challenges to World Order.”

International Organization 72, no. 4 (May 2018): 763–97. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000206.

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of the most visible ways it has used this leverage has been in its assault on Taiwan, which it considers to be a rogue province rather than an independent state. Both the PRC and the Republic of China (Taiwan) claim to be the legitimate government of both territories and therefore refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognizes its rival. As a result, Taiwan lacks representation in the UN and all of its affiliated organizations despite having all the trappings of a well-run modern sovereign state.

Here Beijing uses a combination of hard and soft power measures, backing up its diplomatic efforts with economic leverage. Faced with the prospect of losing access to Chinese goods and markets, all but fifteen countries have switched their allegiance to Beijing since the founding of the PRC. The only countries that remain are small nations both physically and economically far removed from China that have concluded they benefit more from generous Taiwanese aid in exchange for recognition than they stand to lose in trade with the mainland.²⁵ An additional 57 countries maintain unofficial relations with the ROC through Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Offices (TECROs) which act as de facto embassies, with most of them being in the Americas and Western Europe (see Figure1). No country in Asia recognizes has diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and in Africa, where China’s charm offensive has been perhaps the most effective, only the tiny Kingdom of Eswatini recognizes Taiwan’s sovereignty with a mere three further countries hosting TECROs.²⁶

25 Rawnsley, Gary. “Approaches to Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in China and Taiwan.” The Journal of International Communication 18, no. 2 (August 1, 2012): 121–35.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13216597.2012.695744.

26 Shattuck, Thomas J. “The Race to Zero?: China’s Poaching of Taiwan’s Diplomatic Allies.” Orbis 64, no. 2 (April 6, 2020): 334. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2020.02.003.

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Figure 1: International Position on One China Policy. Source: Taiwan Embassies & Consulates. EmbassyPages.

2020. https://www.embassypages.com/taiwan

China’s marginalization of Taiwan extends beyond the UN, with Taiwanese organizations forced to withdraw from a vast array of formal and informal multinational bodies or participate under various alternate names suggesting its dependence on Beijing. Its Olympic athletes for example are forced to compete under a different flag and adopt the name ‘Chinese Taipei’ due to Beijing’s pressure on the International Olympic Committee. Since 2008, international airlines which fly to the island must list their destination as ‘Chinese Taiwan’ or ‘Taiwan:

province/region of China’ lest they face disciplinary action by the Chinese aviation authorities.²⁷ In September 2020, Taiwan’s China Wild Bird Federation was even expelled from an international wild bird conservation group after to acknowledge China’s sovereignty over the island under pressure from Beijing, dealing a blow not just to Taiwanese ornithology enthusiasts but also to endangered migratory birds disinterested in the island’s political status.²⁸

27 Bryan, Ed. “China Is Dragging International Airlines into the Dispute over Taiwan’s Sovereignty.” City Monitor (blog), August 8, 2018. https://citymonitor.ai/politics/china-dragging-international-airlines-dispute- over-taiwan-s-sovereignty-4119.

28 Blanchard, Ben, and Simon Cameron-Moore. “Taiwan Conservationists Say Kicked out of Global Bird Group in China Row.” Reuters, September 18, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-environment-politics- idUKKBN2661G4.

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Another stated goal of the CCP has been to transition away from the post-war unipolar world centered around the United States to a multipolar one. A tool helping China achieve this objective has been entering into so-called ‘strategic partnerships’ with other countries and regional organizations. It often uses these as a basis for critique of behavior it doesn’t like as being in breach of the partnership, demanding countries make concessions or increase cooperation to show their commitment to the partnership. These also serve as basis for cooperation on lower levels of government and frequent contact between China and its partners.

In these bilateral settings, China again leverages its economic might to pressure its partner into doing Beijing’s bidding and aligning with its objectives in multilateral settings where China has a harder time imposing its will.²⁹

1.5. Media

Besides its diplomatic efforts, China has also been working to amplify its soft power message to international audiences. It has made major efforts to extend the international reach of its media. The People’s Daily, the country’s largest newspaper now has over dozen diffenet international editions and CCTV, the Chinese state television network broadcasts in six different languages, partnering with network providers all over the world to make Chinese TV channels available to international audiences. Both platforms have also developed a strong online presence with a more polished appearance.

But perhaps its biggest success in shaping its messaging has come in the form of the Xinhua news agency. It originally directed its reporting to the CCP and the on to Chinese newspapers, but now distributes to an array of publications across the world and is often picked up by news aggregation sites such as Google. It is now the world’s largest news agency boasting 31 bureaus within China and over 170 abroad as well as the largest global network of correspondents. Since its reports are published newspapers worldwide, they make their way into scholarly articles and are cited as a real news source, giving the agency unmerited credibility.ⁱ This has led to Xinhua adopting a role similar to that of Reuters or the Associated Press, despite lacking any editorial independence. The agency takes direct orders from the CCP’s Publicity Department, which hand-picks its reporters and ensures that reports align with the party’s official point of view. It

29 Saunders, Phillip. “China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools,” October 1, 2006, 68.

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effectively functions as an organ of the Chinese government, even continuing to provide classified internal reference reports on sensitive subjects to party officials.³⁰ In 2020 as part of the escalating US-China trade war, Washington designated Xinhua a ‘foreign mission,’

requiring it to register their properties and employees with the government.³¹ The move highlighted Xinhua’s role as an arm of the Chinese state, and although its reports still fail to clear editorial standards of the more reputable publications, less reputable ones as well as newspapers in developing countries with less scrutinous views of China continue to publish them and thanks to this Xinhua articles continue to crop up in online search results.

Emblematic of the CCP’s top down approach, the soft power push has until very recently been centered largely around these traditional and easily controllable forms of media. However (despite Beijing’s best efforts) a nation’s culture is formed by its people more so than its government and China’s initiative to propagate its culture could therefore be more effective by incorporating social media, particularly since its state-controlled outlets face major credibility issues in the West. This has proven to be a difficult undertaking since China blocks access to nearly all social networks popular in the rest of the world behind it’s so-called ‘great firewall’.

The social networks which are allowed in China, most prominently WeChat and Weibo meanwhile are subject to strict censorship, with algorithms automatically flagging and removing content which Beijing deems too sensitive. For this reason, despite their sleek design, manifold features, and potential positive network effects, virtually the only users of Chinese social networks outside of China are emigrees or people with direct connections to the country, effectively creating two parallel online ecosystems.

It seems to have finally broken the barrier in 2018 with its launch of TikTok to global audiences.

The app developed by the Chinese company ByteDance has since been downloaded over two billion times worldwide as of October 2020. It won over international audiences with its sleek, easy to use platform, and promotion of attractive engaging content. The app features 15 second videos which have been shown to be the most engaging type of content and require sound, most

30 RSF. “Xinhua: The World’s Biggest Propaganda Agency | Reporters without Borders,” September 30, 2005.

https://rsf.org/en/reports/xinhua-worlds-biggest-propaganda-agency.

31 Lee, Matthew. “US Designates 5 Chinese Media Outlets as Foreign Missions.” AP NEWS, February 18, 2020.

https://apnews.com/article/46d34436b76c7d131f01b224c509bfc8.

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often music, a broad selection of which is available directly in the app. Users’ feeds are based on aggressive data collection with a central algorithm recommending all content based on their interactions and time spent watching individual videos rather than on a network of friends. It emphasizes viral memes and challenges over promoting established content producers and constantly adds new addictive features and ways to interact with existing content.³² ByteDance allegedly lured influencers to join and produce content on the platform with financial rewards, which along with helped app achieve critical mass outside of China. It has spawned numerous viral trends and helped popularize new songs, which have contributed to its snowballing user numbers.³³

The company still runs two parallel platforms – its Chinese version, called Douyin, which is subject to the censorship directives of the CCP; and TikTok, which is available outside the country. Douyin has a number of features that are unavailable on TikTok, most notably its in- video search function what allows users to tap on a person’s face and find more videos featuring them. Chinese users can also utilize it in tandem with e-commerce features, allowing viewers to purchase a handbag spotted in a video with just a few clicks or to book a hotel spotted in the background thanks to the clip’s geotag.³⁴ Although these features are not available on TikTok, both apps are run by the same company so there is no reason to believe it is not collecting these data on its international users as well as its domestic ones.

Besides data collection, another concern about the app revolves around content moderation. As the app’s popularity was skyrocketing in 2019, pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong were dominating global headlines. Yet if users got their information solely from the platform, they would have no indication that anything out of the ordinary was even taking place. The same conspicuous absence can be noted in regards to the Tibetan independence movement, events in

32 Limm, Aleksandr. “Why and How TikTok Became Popular, We Know the Details.” Medium, June 23, 2020.

https://medium.com/@limm/why-and-how-tiktok-became-popular-we-know-the-details-85e52dc90aab.

33 Wodinsky. “An Inside Look Into How TikTok Could Attempt to Win Over Influencers.” Adweek, November 19, 2019. https://www.adweek.com/digital/an-inside-look-into-how-tiktok-could-attempt-to-win-over-

influencers/.

34 Broderick, Ryan. “Forget The Trade War. TikTok Is China’s Most Important Export Right Now.” BuzzFeed News, May 16, 2019. https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanhatesthis/forget-the-trade-war-tiktok-is-chinas- most-important-export.

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Xinjiang, and other topics sensitive to the CCP. Some users reported that their videos were being removed from the platform, while others found their content was not receiving any engagement. They allege the platform engages in so-called ‘shadow banning’, a practice which involves suppressing or erasing users’ contributions without making it appear as though they have been banned.³⁵ TikTok bans ‘highly controversial topics’ and in general tends to favor dance videos and makeup tutorials over more serious topics like politics, in order to maintain a

‘safe positive environment.’ It claims that only videos in violation of its community standards are removed and denies allegations of shadow banning creators of politically sensitive content.

In September 2019, The Guardian released internal ByteDance documents detailing its censorship policies, providing a list of which topics would result in removal and which would be marked as ‘visible to self,’ essentially confirming the allegations.³⁶ The company responded with a statement saying the documents obtained by the Guardian were rough guidelines aimed at minimizing conflict during the app’s development phase and are no longer accurate, acknowledging only the need to improve how the app’s developers communicate with its community. They further insist they are a private company in no way beholden to the Chinese state. The standards have indeed been updated since the incident received publicity with posts on sensitive topics now visible on the platform, but only when they are explicitly searched for.

This creates plausible deniability that the company is not engaged in censorship and that the videos in question are simply not engaging enough to be picked up by the app’s mysterious algorithm.

1.6. China’s defensive soft power

As ByteDance is a Chinese-owned company, the government’s broad executive power and its tendency to micromanage practically all of the country’s public and private assets means the CCP undoubtedly exerts some level of authority over the company’s inner workings, whatever

35 Harwell, Drew, and Tony Romm. “TikTok’s Beijing Roots Fuel Censorship Suspicion as It Builds a Huge U.S. Audience.” Washington Post, September 15, 2019.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/09/15/tiktoks-beijing-roots-fuel-censorship-suspicion-it- builds-huge-us-audience/.

36 Hern, Alex. “Revealed: How TikTok Censors Videos That Do Not Please Beijing.” the Guardian, September 25, 2019. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/sep/25/revealed-how-tiktok-censors-videos-that-do-not- please-beijing.

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its claims about its independence. In TikTok, China has a direct line to millions of users all over the world, crucially including in the West, which it is eager to utilize to its advantage.

Unfortunately for the CCP however, its soft power messaging in developed democratic states has fallen on deaf ears, and it knows that bombarding TikTok users with pro-Chinese propaganda would likely result in a mass-exodus of users from the app and deal further damage to its reputation. It has chosen therefore the much more subtle approach of manipulating algorithms to muffle narratives it doesn’t like and steer the conversation away from politically awkward topics. In doing so China is pioneering the use of soft power for defensive purposes.

Besides the recent popularity of TikTok, China doesn’t have strong cultural exports that would project a benign image to international audiences. It lacks an entertainment industry that would expose the world to modern Chinese culture in the way that Korea’s K-Pop, Japanese Anime or even India’s Bollywood do. Few outside the country could name any Chinese artists or a single Chinese author, and if they can, they are usually exiled dissidents such as Ai Weiwei, who’s art and films regularly criticize the regime and its dismal human rights record, or Liu Xiaobo, who most only became familiar with after China refused to allow him to travel to Stockholm to collect his Nobel Prize in literature. This lack of benign cultural exports is usually attributed to the CCP’s deep discomfort with portraying anything other than the successes of its economic development or the greatness of its ancient dynasties. Its heavy-handed approach to content moderation has stifled creativity and blocked any content which might capture foreign audiences behind its strict censorship laws.³⁷

Nor despite its colossal manufacturing sector does China have many easily recognizable global brands. While almost everyone has encountered countless items stamped with the words ‘Made in China,’ the label is widely perceived as a sign of cheap, mass-produced, and low-quality goods. It does boast an incredibly developed tech sector, but primarily develops hardware, rather than software, which carry the brands that consumers recognize. Chinese brands are rarely ‘conspicuously consumed’ abroad and although China features heavily in the supply chains of many that are such as Nike or Apple, their cultural symbolism and soft power value counts almost entirely towards the United States. What’s more, consumers in China wishing to

37 Osnos, Evan. “Why China Lacks Gangnam Style.” The New Yorker, October 3, 2012.

https://www.newyorker.com/news/evan-osnos/why-china-lacks-gangnam-style.

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flaunt their wealth and sophistication wear clothes by Italian or French designers, drive German cars, watch American cinema, play Japanese videogames, and listen to Korean music rather than their domestic equivalents. For this reason, it’s been using its defensive soft power not just to protect its own image abroad but also to protect Chinese citizens from undue influence of other countries.

To build its soft power defense, China has used its foreign direct investment (FDI) to acquire shares of global multimedia companies. Chinese companies have invested $52 billion since 2012. Notable purchases include Dalian Wanda’s acquisition of Legendary Entertainment (the studio responsible for movies like Jurassic World, Interstellar and Christopher Nolan’s Batman films), AMC Theatres and Odeon Cinemas, making it the owner of the world’s largest theater chain, or Tencent’s investments in the videogame industry, becoming the majority shareholder of Supercell, Riot Games and Epic Games, along with purchases of shares in Universal Music, Snapchat, Spotify and more.³⁸

Its spending spree has made Tencent the world’s largest gaming company, giving it control over massively popular online games like Fortnite, League of Legends, PUBG and Clash of Clans. China was quick to spot the rise of the videogame industry and swooped in to capitalize on their soft power potential. The videogame market was valued at $104.7 billion in 2017 and was projected to grow 32% by 2021 even before the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated its growth. League of Legends boasts 100 million active monthly players and Fortnite has amassed a whopping 350 million registered accounts. A 2017 estimate puts the proportion of active videogame players in the US at 65% and 43% in China.³⁹

Videogames are a very effective soft power tool thanks to their interactive nature. The users’

active engagement gives it greater influence than art, literature or cinema and are a cheaper tool to wield than cultural institutes and other traditional soft power instruments.⁴⁰ China has promoted competitive gaming by hosting international tournaments with eight-figure prize pots

38 Scissors, Derek. “China Global Investment Tracker.” American Enterprise Institute - AEI (blog), 2020.

https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/.

39 Yıldırım and Aslan. “China’s Charm Defensive.”

40 ibid

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that attract tens of millions of viewers. It has made efforts place e-sports’ recognition on par with traditional sports by passing its 2008 Olympic torch to a pair of its star e-athletes, winning the country plaudits among the gamer community.

Much like with TikTok, China uses its control over videogame makers to censor discussion on topics it doesn’t like. Players of PUBG will find that any mention of Taiwan will be censored with asterisks, and messages containing references to Uyghurs on League of Legends disappear before they are ever delivered, no matter which country they are sent from. A top player of Heartstone, another Tencent-owned game, found his account suspended after making comments in an interview in support of the Hong Kong protests, prompting the American based developer Riot Games to issue a statement urging players to refrain from discussing ‘sensitive topics.’⁴¹ With the exception of this incident though, China has been successful in its censorship endeavors in the industry. Because its interventions involve protecting its image from negative views by discretely removing content rather than pushing its values on users, its presence has avoided any meaningful backlash in the videogame community. Thanks to China’s early buy- in to e-sports and videogames, nearly all of the top 25 gaming companies are now subject to its censorship guidelines to some extent.

The growth of Wanda Group’s global cinema empire meanwhile has generated some concerns about China’s potential editorial involvement, though Wanda insist that it is purely focused on profits. While its acquisitions have generated profits, data on Chinese FDI beg the question why Chinese investment in entertainment grew so substantially in 2016, when Chinese companies poured over $22 billion into the sector, a fivefold increase on the previous year. This does not correspond with any discernable increase in economic incentives; the entertainment industry is not among the most profitable and while it is somewhat more developed and profitable in the West, it seems disproportional that 91.6% of China’s FDI outflows over the last decade have gone to the United States and Europe.⁴²

41 Dong, Joe. “Chinese Censorship Affects Games Everywhere — and It’s Getting Bigger.” VentureBeat (blog), November 16, 2018. https://venturebeat.com/2018/11/15/chinese-censorship-affects-games-everywhere-and-its- getting-bigger/.

42 Scissors. “China Global Investment Tracker.”

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In the case of cinema this investment rush could be explained by China’s restrictions of foreign movie imports. Allegedly to protect and promote its domestic studios, China caps the number of international films it screens in its theaters at 34 per year. The films that make the cut receive 25% of net box office revenue, while those that don’t can still enter the country through the so called buy-out system, wherein a Chinese distributor pays the creator a nominal flat fee for the film’s rights and then keeps any proceeds for itself. Films that are co-produced by Chinese companies may be shown in Chinese cinemas and don’t count towards the quota. China’s expanding middle class has made the country the world’s largest box office and the largest international revenue stream for Hollywood films. In 2009, the Chinese market accounted for only $910 million of the US film industry’s box office sales but has since risen to $8.66 billion in 2018 and is poised to overtake its domestic market by in the next decade if current trends continue.⁴³

While fears that Western subsidiaries of Chinese companies would become little more than an arm of Beijing’s propaganda apparatus have so far proven overblown, China urges its companies not only to improve their brand’s image but also China’s, and it is safe to assume that they have been using their newfound assets to protect the country’s image in the content they release. Specific examples of this are difficult to pinpoint since studios rarely publicize their editorial processes and don’t produce parallel versions for Chinese and international viewers, but several instances of self-censorship have come to light, underscoring the depth of China’s influence over foreign film studios.

The lucrative Chinese market has led film producers to increasingly cater to Chinese audiences and put pressure on studios to do their utmost for their movies to make the much more profitable list of 34. Leaked emails from Paramount Pictures revealed how writers edited the script of World War Z in order to better its chances of selection, and in 2015 the animated movie Pixels even cut a scene of aliens blowing a hole out of the Great Wall of China from a montage of

43 World101 from the Council on Foreign Relations. “Big in China: The Global Market for Hollywood Movies,”

2019. https://world101.cfr.org/global-era-issues/globalization/big-china-global-market-hollywood-movies.

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world landmarks being destroyed so as not to anger Chinese censors in an act of self- censorship.⁴⁴

It has attempted to promote this self-censorship in other areas as well, notably in the world of sports. One of the most popular sports in China is basketball. While the country has its own league, the American National Basketball Association (NBA) remains the most popular league in China with half a billion fans who generate $500 million in annual revenue.⁴⁵

In October 2019, Daryl Morey, the general manager of the Houston Rockets NBA franchise tweeted his support for the protest movement in Hong Kong, drawing the ire of Chinese social media users. This prompted The Chinese Basketball Association to suspend its cooperation with the team and its China-based partners and sponsors to issue statements severing their ties.

The NBA briefly distanced themselves from Mr. Morey, but quickly reneged on its statement and asserted the organization’s support of free speech after its original remarks prompted their own domestic media firestorm. This back-and-forth continued to escalate for several days, with the league in the awkward position of having to assert its independence from China and its members’ rights to civil liberties while minimizing damage from Chinese retaliation. By the end, Rockets merchandise had disappeared from Chinese shelves, the team’s planned China preseason tour was cancelled, and CCTV vowed not to air its games.⁴⁶

The incident prompted widespread condemnation of China’s censorship attempts. The controversy led newspapers and pundits to devote more content to the Hong Kong protesters’

plight and the spotlight on China’s authoritarian tactics generated more international awareness and support for the movement. However, it would be erroneous to write the incident off as a failure. The high-profile incident also demonstrated the costs of getting on China’s bad side.

The COVID-19 pandemic would have cancelled the Rockets’ tour if China hadn’t already;

44 Baldwin, Clare, and Kristina Cooke. “How Sony Sanitized the New Adam Sandler Movie ‘Pixels’ to Please China.” Reuters, July 24, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-film/.

45 Zillgitt, Jeff, and Mark Medina. “As Impasse over Pro-Hong Kong Tweet Simmers, What’s at Stake for the NBA in China?” usatoday, December 18, 2019. https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2019/10/09/nba- china-hong-kong-whats-at-stake/3912447002/.

46 Perper, Rosie. “China and the NBA Are Coming to Blows over a Pro-Hong Kong Tweet. Here’s Why.”

Business Insider, October 23, 2019. https://www.businessinsider.com/nba-china-feud-timeline-daryl-morey- tweet-hong-kong-protests-2019-10.

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when the NBA eventually restarted, the ban on airing Houston’s games was quietly reversed and Rockets’ jerseys are back in Chinese stores. While the costs and benefits of starting its row with the NBA cannot be easily quantified, it is safe to assume that companies which care about their bottom line will think twice before getting on China’s bad side and Beijing seems to calculate that the protection that affords it is worth the short-term reputational hit.

In Nye’s descriptions of the concept, he focuses largely on America’s offensive use of soft power, which revolves around the production and distribution of cultural goods and the commandeering of international institutions to disseminate it values co-opt others into doing its bidding without the use of hard power. However, as showcased by backlash to it Confucius Institutes, China’s soft power offensive has proven ineffective in the West when not accompanied by economic incentives or threats. For this reason, China has adopted a more delicate approach to its soft power struggle with the west of using traditional soft power instruments to protect its own image. It does so through the acquisition and promotion of platforms such as TikTok, Legendary Entertainment, AMC and e-sports, which it can influence to prevent others from tarnishing China’s image. Its vast censorship apparatus is another tool in China’s soft power arsenal, not only preventing other countries from getting Chinese citizens from doing their bidding but also creating editorial standards which content producers must comply with if they wish to enter the increasingly lucrative Chinese market, thereby creating financial incentives for self-censorship. In assessing China’s soft power capabilities, it is therefore important to consider not only to co-optive power of the content which is produced, but also of that which isn’t thanks to China’s soft power defense.

1.7. China’s New Silk Road

In cinema and basketball as with its bilateral diplomacy, China props up its soft power efforts with its economic might. It couples traditional soft power instruments with the incentives of Chinese investments and threats of losing access to its enormous market. While these carrots and sticks are considered hard power instruments by Nye’s definition, they are so inextricably fused with China’s soft power strategy that they feature in nearly all academic literature on the subject. This two-pronged approach has become emblematic of the CCP’s soft power strategy,

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and perhaps no single project demonstrates that better than its signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The BRI, launched by Xi Jinping in 2013 is a massive development and investment initiative aimed at better connecting China to its economic partners around the world and thereby expanding its economic and political influence. It involves massive infrastructure projects in more than sixty countries which have already racked up a bill of over $200 and could reach as high as $1.3 trillion by its projected end date in 2027. Its aim is to build a massive network of railways, ports, highways and pipelines as well as develop special economic zones, thereby reducing physical and bureaucratic barriers to trade.⁴⁷ The project has been dubbed the ‘New Silk Road,’ drawing parallels to the ancient trade routes built by ancient Chinese dynasties and remaining consistent with China’s peaceful development messaging which promises to yield economic prosperity while maintaining moral neutrality.

The BRI’s ambitions are that China’s building of hard assets will also expand its soft power.

The strategy predicts that eye-catching infrastructure projects will project an image of China as a technically adept and generous business partner and highlight the successes of the country’s state capitalism model.⁴⁸

Reception of the project initially split down the usual lines, with developing nations in Asia and Africa viewing it relatively positively, while being met with skepticism in the West with some going as far as labeling the project as a trojan horse. The project still maintains immense favorability ratings in some countries such as Pakistan, one of the largest beneficiaries of the project, but others have grown weary of its lack of transparency, inefficiency and cronyism and complain that the projects have not delivered the jobs it promised with China largely importing its own workers. The projects are also financed by loans rather than grants, leading some countries including Malaysia and Myanmar to reconsider taking on BRI projects amid concerns about so-called Chinese debt-trap diplomacy. The practice describes a phenomenon wherein

47 Chatzky, Andrew, and James McBride. “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 28, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.

48 Crabtree, James. “Making (Limited) Inroads: Why China’s Belt and Road Struggles to Deliver Goodwill.” The Soft Power 30. Portland Communications, 2019. https://softpower30.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Soft- Power-30-Report-2019-1.pdf, 69-71.

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country is straddled with insurmountable debt, forcing it to give China control of strategic assets in return.⁴⁹

While China incorporates elements of soft power into its Belt and Road initiative it remains a colossal government project running on top-down government directives and sits largely outside of traditional definitions of soft power. Soft power is ultimately the pulling power of a country’s culture and ideas, and China consistently traps those behind its rigid censorship regulations. So long as the government continues to insert itself into every facet of Chinese culture, a large government initiative like the BRI is unlikely to be perceived as anything other than a buttress for the towering colossus of its state apparatus, no matter how much it is dressed up with romanticized tales of ancient China. While the dozens of countries have signed onto BRI projects and more will likely be added, countries will do so on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis of economic and political factors and not out of any loyalty to Chinese ideals or admiration of its culture, and in this regard there is little that China can do soften its harsh international image. Nevertheless, the CCP’s centrally planned soft power push and its Belt and Road initiative lumber on.

i It bears noting that due to China’s tight grip on media reporting within its borders, this paper as well as many of the sources cited within it rely to a significant degree on reports by Xinhua for accounts of events in Xinjiang as described in Chapter 2. Taking into account its implicit biases, efforts have been made to examine competing reports by Uyghur organizations to obtain a more complete perspective of the events examined, and place Xinhua reports into an appropriate context when cited.

49 Brautigam, Deborah. “A Critical Look at Chinese ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’: The Rise of a Meme.” Area Development and Policy 5, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2019.1689828.

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2. History of Xinjiang and China’s Uyghur Policy

The BRI, officially called Silk Road Economic Belt and 21^st-century Maritime Silk Road consists of two parts. The ‘road,’ somewhat counterintuitively is the networks of ports around the world connected by global shipping lanes, while the ‘belt’ represents the overland routes enabling transportation of goods between China and its trade partners in Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

The lynchpin in its Silk Road Economic belt is China’s western province of Xinjiang, which serves as the gateway for China’s international ambitions and reaps a large portion of the economic dividends of China’s westward development. The vast region borders eight different countries (Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India) and serves as the main transit corridor for trade with its western neighbors and beyond.

Xinjiang is the starting point for six of the eight Sino-European railways, as well as the Karakoram highway which links China with the Pakistani port of Gwadar, the nation’s foothold on the Indian Ocean.

One of the stated goals of the BRI is to promote economic growth in the region and using its infrastructure projects in the province facilitate sloser economic integartion with the Chinese heartland. The region possesses an abundance of natural resources which China is keen to exploit including 38% of the nation’s coal deposits, 25% of the petroleum and natural gas reserves, an variety of minerals and rare earth metals as well as a vast untapped renewable energy potential.⁵⁰ For China’s geopolitcal strategy, besides being key to China’s territorial integrity, Xinjiang also serves as an important buffer zone protecting the China’s core and also plays a key role its ambitions to develop Central Asia as a sphere of influence.⁵¹

50 Yin, W. (2016) ‘The Natural Resource Curse in Xinjiang’, CEU Political Science Journal, (10(1):112-140), p.

44.

51 Tukmadiyeva, M. (2013) ‘Xinjiang in China’s Foreign Policy toward Central Asia’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 12, pp. 87–108. doi: 10.11610/Connections.12.3.05.

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Figure 2: Xinjiang and its strategic importance. Source: Mitchell, T. (2015) China’s Great Game: New frontier, old foes. Financial Times. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/60f33cf8-6dae-11e5-8171-ba1968cf791a

2.1. Who are the Uyghurs?

Xinjiang is a mostly desert region located in the west of modern-day China. It covers an area of 1 664 900 km² making it bigger than Great Britain, France, Germany and Spain combined.

Despite covering one sixth of China’s land area, its population amounts to less than 2% of China’s total.⁵² It is comprised of the Tarim and Zhungharian Basins with both divided and surrounded by vast mountain ranges. It contains the geographical center of Asia, as well as both the Earth’s second highest and second lowest points.

52 Millward, James A. Eurasian Crossroads: A History f Xinjiang. Columbia University Press, March 1, 2007.

https://books.google.com/books/about/Eurasian_Crossroads.html?id=8FVsWq31MtMC.

Hlavní práce68897_wank00.pdf, 1.6 MB Stáhnout

UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS, PRAGUE FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BACHELOR’S THESIS

2020 Kai Wangle

UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS, PRAGUE FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International and Diplomatic Studies

The Impact of China’s Uyghur Policy on its International Soft Power (Bachelor’s Thesis)

Author: Kai Wangle

Supervisor: Jeremy Alan Garlick, M.A., Ph.D.

Author’s Declaration

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

Introduction

1. Soft Power and How China Wields It

1.1. China’s Soft Power Prowess

1.2. Culture

1.3. Political Values

1.4. Diplomacy

1.5. Media

1.6. China’s defensive soft power

1.7. China’s New Silk Road

2. History of Xinjiang and China’s Uyghur Policy

2.1. Who are the Uyghurs?