• Nebyly nalezeny žádné výsledky

Human Capital

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2023

Podíl "Human Capital"

Copied!
35
0
0

Načítání.... (zobrazit plný text nyní)

Fulltext

(1)

Human Capital

Labor Economics VSE 27.04.2011

(2)

The Concept of Human Capital

Human Capital is the abilities and skills of any individual, esp those acquired through investment in education and training, that enhance potential income earning.

Sources of HC:

formal schooling,

on-the-job training,

experience,

abilities the individuals are born with.

(3)

Human Capital

Highly mobile,

Cannot be inherited,

Cannot be sold or used as collateral for a loan,

Yields a rate of return (higher earnings) like physical capital,

Risky.

(4)

HC Investment

Forms of HC Investment

Education

Costs: direct costs and opportunity costs,

Benefits

On-the-Job Training

General

Specific

Migration

Search for new jobs

Evaluating Investment in HC T

t

t t

T r

B B B

PV

1

1,..., ) (1 )

(

(5)

Age-Earnings With and Without College

High School curve is age- earnings profile if a person does not attend college.

College curve is age-earnings profile if attends college

Total cost of college :

direct costs, tuition (1)

indirect costs, lost earnings (2)

Benefit of attending college is increase in earnings (3).

Age Annual

Earnings

22 65

Future Extra Earnings (3)

High School

College

Indirect Costs (2)

Direct Costs (1)

(6)

The Demand for Schooling: Predictions

Present-oriented people are less likely to go to college than forward-looking people (other things equal).

Ex.: Health, life expectancy

Most college students will be young.

College attendance will decrease if the cost of college rise (other things equal).

College attendance will increase if the gap between the earnings of college graduates and high school graduates widens (other things equal).

(7)

The Wage-Schooling Locus (W-SL)

W-SL gives the salary for every level of

schooling.

Properties:

Upward sloping.

Slope of W-SL ( w/ s):

increase in earnings

from extra year in school

Concave.

(8)

Diminishing Returns to Education

The increases in

knowledge decline with each additional year of schooling.

Rate of return schooling

= % change in earnings from extra year in school

Return to 13th year of schooling =

$3,000/$20,000  15%

Return to 14th year of schooling =

$2,000/$23,000  8.7%

(9)

The Schooling Decision

People get education until the point where the

benefit of one more year equals its cost

Benefit of schooling

(return)

Cost of schooling Marek

(10)

Schooling Decision: different rates of discount

(11)

Statistical Problem

Hard to measure returns to education

Those with more ability (i.e., intelligence, motivation, and self-discipline) are more likely to go to college.

Even without a college degree, they would have earned more than those who decided not to go to college.

High earnings of college graduates reflect both

greater ability

Schooling

rate of return to schooling is overstated

(12)

Different Abilities

(13)

Why Does Schooling Vary?

Discount rates are different

Different abilities

Credit constraints

Returns to college are uncertain

(14)

Life Cycle and HC Investment

Why people invest to HC throughout their life cycle?

HC depreciates

Returns to HC change over time

People update their preferences

(15)

The age-earnings profile implied by HC theory

Upward-sloping and concave

(16)

The age-earnings profile (real data)

(17)

Properties of age-earnings profiles:

Highly educated workers earn more than less-educated workers.

Earnings rise over time, but at a decreasing rate.

The age-earnings profiles of different education groups diverge over time.

(18)

On-the-job training

Types:

General HC

Skills used in various firms

Accounting, word processing, college degree

Firms will offer higher wage for this training

Firm-specific HC

Training useful to the firm that provides the training

Will firms provide general training to their workers?

(19)

On-the-job training: Who pays?

General HC

Trainee willing to bear the cost since higher wages offered for these skills

Firm-specific HC

Costs split by the worker and the firm

(20)

Implications

In case of specific training

Both worker and firm share returns

Firm pays worker less than MRP.

Worker received more than in other jobs.

Neither worker nor firm want to terminate contract

Worker granted lifetime tenure.

Lower overall turnover.

“Last hired, first fired” in bad times, lower turnover among senior workers.

Specifically trained workers often go on temporary layoffs, wait to be recalled.

(21)

Criticism of Human Capital Theory

1. Human capital theory:

education improves work productivity

2. Signaling and screening hypothesis:

education does not improve worker’s productivity, employees “signal” their high productivity/ability with higher level of education

Education is less costly for higher ability workers

Low ability do not get education

If an ability test could achieve the same ends, then education is a waste of resources

(22)

Gender Differences in HC

(23)

Gender Differences in HC

11% 8,8%

6,9%

5,3%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

work all years no work, age 25-29 no work, age 25-34 no work, age 25-39

Internal Rate of Return for a Woman's College Education with Different Workforce Patterns

(24)

The Gender Gap in Earnings:

Explanations

If HC is different between men and women then there must be differences between men and women in education and experience.

How to measure HC?

Education - # of years of completed schooling,

Experience - # of years of work experience.

(25)

A. Education gap

(26)

A1. Percent College Graduates by Gender &

Age, 2002

33

28 29

22

29 28,5

32 32

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64

Male Female

(27)

B. Occupation choice

a. Degrees in this category are largely doctor’s degrees in law, medicine, and dentistry

(28)

B1. Occupation choice

(29)

B. Gender Differences in Experience

Year Age

25 35 45

1920 5.6 11.8 16.4

1950 5.9 10.6 17

1980 6.2 11.7 18.3

1986 6.5 13.5 19.3

max 7 17 27

Table: Average Years of Work Experience for Working Women by Age and Year

(30)

Evidence

(31)

Choice or Discrimination?

Part of the gender wage gap is the result of rational choices made by women?

To work fewer/flexible hours

To choose safer less effort-intensive occupations

Occupational segregation may be due to women choosing occupations, such as nursing and teaching, with skills that are useful in home production.

To take time off for childcare

Due to shorter work careers, it is rational for women to invest less in education and training.

Their stock of human capital will deteriorate when they are out of the labor force.

(32)

Alternative Explanation of Gender Gap

Do women invest less in human capital because of discrimination?

Women stay out of the labor force because of the low pay in the labor market.

If discrimination declined, then more women may decide to remain single or childless.

(33)

Homework

Borjas (5e): Chapter 6

HW#3 due Wednesday, April 27 before the class!!!

(34)

Education and health (US)

(35)

Education and Life Expectancy

Back

Odkazy

Související dokumenty

The estimated elasticities of substitution are further used to calculate occupation- time speci…c relative productivities of college and high school graduates –the measure of

This concept does not mean the same school or the same model of education for everyone, but quite the contrary – education which fulfils the individual needs.. This

In the second period both groups simultaneously choose g j and a propor- tional tax, τ on capital earnings finances spending. If groups demands are not compatible with total

The real rental rate adjusts to equate demand for capital with supply. Units of

social surplus, we need to know the shape and position of the demand curve for park entry4. – Assume demand for park entry

Notes: Y is the monthly household income per person; C is the monthly household consumption exclusive of a rent, also per person; age is the age of the household head in years; educ

An aggregate market on which local and foreign agents with a surplus of funds save (supply capital), while those with a deficit of funds borrow (demand capital).... Why Does

We find that it is efficient to have positive human capital wedge as long as it is optimal to increase the agent’s non-leisure time and labor supply relative to schooling over