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UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS, PRAGUE FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Master ’s Thesis
2020 Vitalii Oliichuk
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UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS, PRAGUE FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
International and Diplomatic Studies
The change of tendencies in the German-Russian relations: The case of Ukrainian crisis.
(Master’s Thesis)
Author: Vitalii Oliichuk
Supervisor: Markéta Votoupalová
4 Author’s Declaration
Herewith I declare that I have written the Master’s Thesis on my own and I have cited all sources.
Prague, ___________
………
Author’s Signature
5 Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Ms. Votoupalová who supervised me during the whole process of writing. Without her help I would never finish my work. I am gratuful for the time she spend advicing and helping me at these times of pandemic that changed our lives.
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Table of Contents
Introduction. ... 7
Chapter 1. Logic of Appropriateness and Logic of Consequences ... 9
Logics of appropriateness ... 9
Logics of consequences ... 12
Two logics. ... 14
Intervention success ... 17
Chapter 2. Ukrainian crisis. ... 20
Crisis background ... 20
Reaction of the West. ... 24
Europe’s and Russian involvement. ... 25
German position. ... 28
Chapter 3. Analytics of cases ... 31
Pre-crisis analysis. ... 31
The annexation of Crimea and the imposition of sanctions. ... 33
Malaysia airlines flight 17 ... 35
Minsk agreement and Norman Format... 36
Kerch Strait incident ... 38
Nord Stream 2 ... 39
Conclusion ... 41
Reverences. ... 43
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Introduction.
Nowadays, during the globalization period, unfortunately, international conflicts still remain an integral part of international relations. One of the main characteristics of international disputes is the participation of several actors whose interests are affected by events. One of such conflict is the so-called ‘Ukrainian crisis’ between Ukraine and Russia, which became the foundation for my master’s thesis. The conflict in Eastern Ukraine does not only include Ukraine and Russia but has also become a severe problem for Europe. Armed conflict in the Eastern Ukraine created a security crises in the EU and escalated the German-Russia relations that were in a cool-off period for a long time.
In my thesis I am focused on the relations of Germany towards Russia. I consider this topic crucial as Germany is the regional power in the EU and Russia, in its turn, is an influential actor among post-soviet states, were connected during decades and maintained beneficial partnership.
However, the different approaches of domestic and foreign affairs often created an issues in their relations. Annexation of Crimea by Russia and the following Ukrainian crisis created a clash between them. It caused transformations of the relations between actors.
As a result, Germany became one of the most important actors in this conflict. Together with France, they have tried and continue to take part in regulating the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. The analysis of German actions is an essential aspect in understanding of the Ukrainian crisis, as Germany (being a leader in its settlement) strongly influences the course of events not only in Ukraine but also in Europe.
Thus, the main goal of the study is to analyze the actions and relations of Germany towards Russia based on the Ukrainian crisis. The purpose of investigation will help to understand German approach and its behavior in the conflict. The final information could be used as a background for the future research about prediction of German behavior. This is necessary in order to realize the possible framework that the Ukrainian crisis may develop in, as today it is in the so-called ‘freezing stage.’
In my thesis, I will use two logics for analysis - logics of consequences and appropriateness.
The logics have been developed by March and Olsen. They brought a new dimension to the recognition of actors’ behavior at the international arena. In the context of the thesis, it is crucial to understand the course that Germany is on. Applying logics to German actions will help to determine the Germany approach in its relations with Russia. In the end, I will be able to answer the question: ‘Which logic characterizes the actions of Germany in the Ukrainian crisis?’
First of all, I will need to conduct a comprehensive analysis. Qualitative research (as the main research method) will help me with this. Case study analysis, as more focused research, will
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help me focus on the most crucial aspects of the conflict, and in the case of theories, to highlight the necessary features. I will highlight the most essential cases of the Ukrainian crisis and will apply logics to them. Also, the discursive analysis will be used to gain a deeper understanding of the Ukrainian crisis. In the context of the topic, it is important to research no only academic works but to get knowledge of the atmosphere of the cases. I will resort to social media analysis, including speeches, thoughts, etc.
The thesis is structured in a way to define the German position in the conflict as clearly as possible and to assess its reaction to specific events. The first chapter is based on the analytics of the theory of logics of consequences and appropriateness. Since this information is mainly developed by two authors, their works will serve as a basis for my study. However, I will also resort to the researches of other scholars, who have added new knowledges. The second chapter directly highlights the main stages of the conflict and its causes. This is necessary for a more accurate understanding of the German reaction. The final chapter consists on direct analysis of selected cases from the second chapter and the application of logics to determine the specificity of German behavior.
Throughout the thesis, I use a number of resources of an academic nature, such as works of March and Olsen, articles about logics and their application to various cases. Moreover, I have reviewed a number of scientific papers directly related to the Ukrainian crisis, which helped me to identify possible reasons for its outbreak and the involvement of actors such as the EU and Russia.
Besides academic literature, I also use chronological documents and articles from authoritative media resources. In my work, I often appeal to sources such as Deutsche Welle and BBC. In my opinion, these resources describe events as accurately as possible. However, it does not mean that I have not processed other sources. I have done a deep analysis to avoid fake news. Finally, I tried to make the final judgment as objective as possible in order to answer the research question accurately.
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Chapter 1. Logic of Appropriateness and Logic of Consequences
In this chapter, I will consider two logics that were worked out by two scientists March and Olsen. They are the pioneers of this kind of knowledge and discourse about logics of appropriateness and consequences. After the creation of knowledge about logics as such, quite a lot of authors induced their aspects both to support or criticize this idea. As the author of this thesis, I will be based on cumulative knowledge and a comprehensive understanding of this topic. I do not deny the fact of tremendous investments in the development of this topic by March and Olsen;
however I cannot ignore the work of other authors who have contributed in one way or another as well. I want to note that the idea of March and Olsen has a key position in the thesis, but it is not the only one here.
The concepts of logic are based on an institutional approach to the formation of an actor itself and his actions in the environment. Thus, logics act as concepts of behavior analysis of an actor in a given context. They play an essential role in understanding and predicting the potential actions of an actor in a given situation. Considering the fact that actors still act as independent and individual ‘players’ in institutional environment, it is essential to clarify all details. (March, and Olsen, 1996)
Thus, the purpose of considering logics is to highlight the direct factors that can be applied to the actions of Germany according to topic of this thesis. In the end of the section, I will be able to appeal with some information and apply it, in order to answer the research question.
Logics of appropriateness
I would like to start a discussion of the thesis with the logic of appropriateness. For a general understanding, I will use the term proposed by Schulz (2014) in his article based on March and Olsen’s theory on two logics (March and Olsen 1998). He aims to consider the main idea as:
‘An action which follows a logic of appropriateness when it is shaped by rules relevant to the current situation’ (Schulz,2014). In other words, there are a number of rules, morals, and norms that are generally accepted and binding for execution or are followed by actors at a subconscious level.
Since the logic was first created by March and Olsen, all the information will be based on their research. However, quite a lot of other researchers subsequently used these logics and introduced additional knowledge. For example Esen (…) is sure that the actors who follow the logic of appropriateness are confident in the existence of rules which are ‘natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate’. It means that an actor is likely to make a decision, which will be acceptable by the general actor’s environment, as internal, as external. Moreover, it could happen
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even if the action is economically or politically unprofitable to an actor, which he will still have to do because it is ‘right.’
Nalbandov (2009) in his article stated: ‘The concept, levels, categories and types of (un)relevance are established by the subjects/actors themselves, either alone or together, in institutional settings that establish norms and standards for all their members’. Moreover, according to March and Olsen (1998): ‘In accordance with the institutionalized practice of collectivity, based on a mutual and often tacit understanding of what is true, reasonable, natural, right and good.’
Thus, we can conclude that the rules and norms are often inherent in a certain number of actors (in the case of my work, states are the actors). They are usually united in separate institutions or organizations. It is confirmed by the fact that the concept of morality is entirely subjective and can be viewed differently by different actors. For instance, such rules and norms are often formed inside institutions or alliances and inherent to specific regions. As a result, conflicts of standards and values appear in the world. The EU and its promotion of democracy and human rights could be a great example. These norms are fundamental for all member-states. On the other hand, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, or North Korea do not share such views at all.
Before continuing, it is quite essential to understand the concept and meaning of ‘the rule’
in interpreting the logic of appropriateness. Since such term is used as a description to a rule itself but also to morality, norm, value, generally accepted opinion, etc. According to March and Simon (1993), they perceive ‘the rules’ as:
‘…relatively fixed answers to certain situations. The concept of rules is broad and includes both silent and explicit forms of programming actions, such as intuition, roles, habits, skills, routines, abilities, experience, knowledge, agreements, politics, bureaucratic rules, norms, laws, institutions, and technologies.’ (Schulz, 2014).
Thus, we can summarize that the actions of actors are dictated by rules, both internal and external, as well as moral values that are inherent directly to the state. As a result, guided by this spectrum of tools, an actor can take a relatively wide range of actions, which are most effective in routine repetition, but face difficulties during entirely new situation/issue. In this case, it is rather difficult for an actor to make a decision, because there could be not enough practices in using the rules or their number is not enough. (Schulz, 2014).
According to March and Olsen’s logic of relevance, ‘... they strive to fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of roles, identities and membership in the political community. The rules are respected because they are considered adequate for the task and have regulatory justification.’
(Nalbandov, 2009).
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Due to the fact that the actor believes in the correctness of his actions, (which, by the way, can be considered by other actors/alliances in exactly the opposite direction), he (the actor) can take actions that, as I mentioned above, could have a negative impact for the actor itself.
Nevertheless, these actions could be useful for association/organization as such.
However, the formation and following of rules take place not only at the level of international relations but also directly at the national level of an individual state. Goldmann (2005) Is convinced that in addition to the rules and norms of the international format, national identity is quite interconnected. It affects the formation of state behavior at the level of acceptance of different rules and values. Thus, the logic of relevance ‘essentially leads us to the conclusion of actions from given identities’ (Goldmann, 2005). Therefore, the state compares its values and norms of potential partners before joining any agreement or alliance. If the actors find consensus, such agreements are signed. Hence ‘state alone can act on the basis of its own sense of relevance, which may differ from the feelings of others.’ (Nalbandov, 2009).
It could be said that the actor decides on his actions taking into account the specific situation in the international arena. He applies his range of opportunities (position, status) to the case. Moreover, he considers it from his point of view of his moral values and norms. As a result, the actor has several options for action, and it is evident that the state makes a decision that is closer to its principles and previous practices. Thus, Goldmann (2005) described this situation quite clearly - state’s own society or ‘rules and practice determine that it’s normal, what state has to expect, what it can rely on, and what makes sense in the community.’ (Nalbandov, 2009).
In my work, I will apply the logic of appropriateness and logic of consequence to Germany actions towards Russia, based on the Ukrainian crisis. As I said in the introduction, Germany plays a leading role in resolving this conflict. So I will consider German position in terms of involvement and intervention in other countries in case of international relations. It is crucial to understand how the logic of appropriateness could be applied in this term.
The states that follow the logic of appropriateness have two options: to intervene or not to interfere in relations/conflicts of other countries, etc. If an actor considers the situation in the target country as a threat and violation of his own norms, rules, or values, then following ‘the right of intervention,’ they will be involved. (Goldmann, 2005).
Nalbandov (2009) claims that after state has considered options for action in terms of its values and rules, it determines the range of its acceptable actions and take steps so that the situation in the target country does not go further beyond the framework of ‘ethical and regulatory admissibility’ (Nalbandov,2009) of the actor. Moreover, as mentioned above, the state can intervene even if it is unprofitable for it, following purely its own norms and the feeling that it is doing something ‘right’.
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According to Weinstein (1969), ‘... no matter what the specific situation will dictate in the light of national interests.’ It means that the state, intervening in some situation, does not follow selfish goals. Instead, it aims to help and solve problems that are unacceptable in comparison with its own norms and rules. In other words, It cannot stand aside, since it is unacceptable for it to do otherwise. However, the degree of involvement and the nature of the action depends directly on the decision-making country. As mentioned above, concepts of morality, norms and rules are quite subjective. It could be perceived as true and correct but could not be at the same time.
It is also worth noting that for the same reasons, countries may not intervene in conflicts and will not influence other states if they are sure that the situation is in the zone of their moral standards, rules and values. It will not have anything to do, even if other actors ask for a help. It happens because initially the actor does not see the threat and violation in a specific case situation.
Logics of consequences
As in case of the logic of appropriateness, I will follow main idea of the logic of consequences according to knowledge of March and Olsen. For a primary understanding of which interpretation of logic of consequences is applied to the case in the thesis, I will use the conclusion of March and Olsen (1998). In which they characterize the logic of consequences in following way:
‘Those who consider actions to follow logic of consequences believe that actor chooses among alternatives, evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective goals, recognizing that other actors are doing the same’ (March and Olsen, 1998).
To fully understand the logic, it is necessary to understand its foundation. I am convinced that a crucial background is a format actor’s positioning in the environment and how exactly he communicates with the other actors.
The relationship between actors following the logic of consequences occurs as a result of the signing of contracts/agreements. Such contracts satisfy each other’s personal interests and are respected (or not) for the personal profit of an individual actor. March and Olsen (1998) argue that world politics consists of a series of coalitions that are created by the method of ‘combining individual preferences into collective actions through certain negotiation, negotiation, coalition and exchange process’ (March and Olsen, 1998). Subsequently, these associations clash with each other’s interests, and thus a relationship between them occurs.
The next step in understanding the concept of logic is how the actor understands that action is beneficial or disadvantageous for him in a particular situation? March and Simon (1993) in their work indicate that before taking any action, an actor uses the ‘analysis-based’ method. It means
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that before making a decision, the state clearly calculates certain alternatives in digital format, other words calculating the possible ‘utility’ or loss. The choice in this case ‘based on preferences’
enables the actors to make the most effective decision for him (Schulz, 2014).
However, it is worth noting the fact that, to the extent of certain limits (such as lack of information, experience, tools, capabilities, etc.), the actor cannot predict and calculate all possible options for action. It leads to the idea that, in this regard, states participate in some (imperfect) analysis in the process of analyzing alternatives for their actions. As a result, it may have completely different results for an actor.
‘Thus, the action after the logic of consequences includes a noticeable (but ultimately limited) degree of information processing. It can make him dependent on the actors’ limited cognitive abilities and generate outstanding forms of imperfectly rational actions, such as
‘satisfaction’ (Simon, 1955), ‘sequential attention’ to goals (Cyert and March, 1992) or ‘myopic learning’ (Levinthal and March, 1993)’ ( Schulz, 2014).
As I mentioned above, the actor, before making a decision, conducts an analysis. He compares his desires with his capabilities and chances of implementation. As a result of the calculation, the actor chooses the most advantageous solution. However, this does not exclude the fact of existing of some desire for impossible action. It could be in state discourse, but not be realized nor in the short term, nor in a long one.
For better understanding of the applicability of logic of consequences to the case study of the thesis, I am sure, it is necessary to consider the aim by which state is guided while deciding on intervention to the conflict. In this case, the actor considers the situation from an individual point of view and a subjective understanding of the usefulness of the action (Hechter, and Kanazawa, 1997). However, at the same time, he is limited in his alternatives both from the side of limited information and the signed contracts and agreements.
According to the results of the analysis, states decide for themselves how profitable it will be for them to intervene, what benefit they will have from this, as well as possible losses from their actions.
‘Interveners, thus, according to Regan, evaluate carefully ‘… the cost and benefits of alternative action along with their estimations of the probability that any action will achieve the desired outcome.’ (Werner, 2000) also observed the role of rationality in state actions when stating that third party’s ‘…decision to intervene… is often assumed to be based on his value for the target, the expected costs of war, and his marginal contribution to the probability of victory’
(Nalbandov, 2009) .
Obviously, if the benefit exceeds the losses and actor is ready for action, then he will implement a calculated plan. It is also worth noting the fact of faith in the correctness of the actions
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of the actor. When analyzing statements of Werner (2000), an actor can initially invest a lot on interference, but later or sooner, he will get back everything that he invested in the beginning.
However, how successful will it be implemented? Due to the fact that such analyses are rather subjective, it is unknown whether the intervention will really bring the actor the benefits that he expects. (Nalbandov, 2009).
Two logics.
By now, we disassembled two logics separately. However, a direct comparison will help to understand what is similar in these logics and what is fundamentally different. This is done in order to determine the features that will be used during the analysis of the German actions in the case of this thesis.
There are different opinions about logics as such. Someone believes that they are completely different from each other and should be applied only separately. Others argue that the analysis of the situation would not be possible without the consolidation of the two logics. Since they are essentially not independent full-scale algorithms of actions, they are just a general set of factors for understanding and predicting the actions of an actor in a specific situation.
As will be seen in my case, I will use consolidation approach to simplify the analysis.
However, in the end, I still single out one specific logic as the leading approach. I will use logics in a mixed context. Analyzing the situation according to the selected factors, I will draw a conclusion about the action and logic that most closely matches the chosen solution. In other words, after analyzing the case, I will select the logic that characterizes the actions better and more accurately than the other.
Subsequently, having reviewed all the cases and summing up the relationship between the logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness, I will come up with an idea of what kind of logic dominates in the actions of Germany. I do not exclude the fact that in some of its activities, Germany resorts to two logics at the same time and in others - to only one. Moreover, logics are quite widespread and do not have clear ‘frames’ of understanding. The absence of such a
‘framework’ makes the result of the work, unfortunately, not as accurate as possible. Despite this, it is not possible to discard the importance of the significance of these logics for the development of international relations. In order to make the analysis of the thesis more accurate, I will list below a number of factors that I will use to understand more fully the applicability of logics.
Although logics have a similar background, the manner of making decisions and processing information is different. However, it is worth considering that they are not mutually exclusive, and
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the state, to one degree or another, can use, if not two logics at the same time, but at least mixed actions. Although in this case, the inclination to some specific logic will take place in any case.
The reality, as such, shows that international actors have not the ability to act adhering to one logic because of the limits mentioned above (the vastness of the term, the absence of clear factors, etc.). For this, I will resort to an analysis of Goldmann (2005). In his work on the study about logics, he proposes to consider them as follows in Figure 1:
Figure 1. Three Ways of Reasoning
Source: Goldmann (2005)
Based on Goldmann’s (2005) work, we can conclude that he distinguishes not two logics as such, but three. He considers an actor ‘in the system.’ This actor is influenced by the formation of the perception of ‘himself’ in the environment. The most crucial factor here is how the actor relates to his environment. The author emphasizes the ‘ideal’ first actor who chooses the most profitable actions for himself without any thoughts on the rules and limits of the system. Goldmann calls this behavior ‘the logic of egoism’ and claims that it is just a part of the logic of consequences.
On the other hand, there is a second ‘ideal’ actor who selects actions from the spectrum of system- acceptable solutions based on following rules and norms. The so-called ‘logic of deontism’ which Goldmann calls part of the logic of appropriateness.
However, in practice, as mentioned above, this is almost impossible. Almost all actors use this or that logic to a greater or lesser extent. Thus, a mixed group appears. It includes, as well as the choice of systemically relevant actions and pursuing a personal interest.
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Thus, having figured out the application of logics, I still would like to return to highlighting specific factors of logics separately. Based on all information that was covered, I created the following table 1:
Table 1. Logics of consequences and Logics of appropriateness factors.
Questions Logics of appropriateness Logics of consequences Relationship with
other actors and activity in general:
It is based on following
generally accepted rules, norms, morals, standards, regardless of the interests of the actor.
It is based on following (or deviating from) the signed contracts and agreements for the personal goals of the actor.
Key concepts: Values, Standards, Membership Interest, security, personality
Nature of action: More collectivist More individual Efficiency: More effective in routine
repetition
More effective while taking a new action
Actions are performed because:
The actor is confident in their adequacy, correctness and regulatory soundness
The actor is confident in their real personal benefits.
The action is performed after:
Correlation of alternatives, application of values and rules to the case.
The correlation of alternatives, the application of analytical
calculation of the benefits of the case.
The actor believes in: The correctness of their actions The effectiveness of their actions The actor intervenes
in the conflict because he considers the situation as:
(Potential) Threat to security and violation of established norms, rules, values or rights.
(Potential) Threat to their security, as well as possible subsequent benefits (economic, political, etc.).
Best examples: EU, NATO Chinese ‘belt and road’ initiative
The actor is limited by:
Norms and rules that provide fixed options for action.
In their cognitive abilities (Lack / lack of information, experience, resources)
Having summarized and compared logics, we can confidently confirm the fact that logics are not mutually exclusive in their basis, and are relatively recommendatory in nature. Moreover,
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taking into account that there are almost no actors who followed only one logic, it makes to focus as much as possible on the mixed part. Nevertheless, it is essential to make a final judgment of the thesis by referring to which logic dominates the behavior of Germany in the chosen case.
I would like to mention also the not popular judgment that actors, acting in one way or another, can be misleading and use the opposite logic to achieve their chosen goal. However, since the work is based on facts that have taken place in history, it makes it a kind of limited analysis.
Initially, as an author, I do not know the true intentions of states' actions.
In addition, I would also like to consider that as a result of comparisons, there may be a false impression that the actor using one logic behaves correctly, and the second using the other - does not. That the first acts as ‘good’, and the second as ‘evil.’ It is impossible to separate ‘black and white’, ‘good and evil’ in the realities of human life. It is simply physically impossible to do due to the fact that each actor’s perception of his actions, his position, his values, and his sense of security is unique and is relatively ‘right.’ Each approach has both his supporters and opponents.
What will be the norm for one actor will go beyond the acceptable frame for the other. That is why I try to analyze the situation as objectively as possible in order to find the optimal answer to the research question
Intervention success
In order to better understand the position of Germany regarding Russia and Ukraine, I suggest returning to a recognition of the term ‘interference.’ I already mentioned it during description of two logics. Still, I would like to concentrate on the brief definition in order to better analyze the actions of Germany in the current situation. Particularly, I want to focus on the superficial meaning of ‘successful intervention’ (Nalbandov, 2009). It will help determine more precisely which logic will be suitable for the selected case in the thesis on the example of the Minsk agreements and the Norman format. These negotiations were held mainly thanks to Germany. Thus, how the state positions the results of such cooperation will provide the necessary factors relating to the chosen logic.
Ergo, states intervene in the conflicts of other countries because of their own free will, or not wanting to do so. In general, there are several factors that can help determine the position(used logic, etc.) of the actor. The most important factor is the exact position of the state in the conflict.
It defines its approach to the solution, is the state is neutral to the parties of the conflict, or, on the contrary, is biased towards any particular actor, supporting any specific side, etc. (Nalbandov, 2009).
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Nowadays, in addition to actively developing conflicts, there are those where the solution is complex to find out, so-called ‘frozen conflicts.’ Based on this, a second factor can be distinguished - this is the interest of the intervening actor in resolving the conflict. There are actors who strive to resolve the disputes as quickly as possible, often investing huge amounts of money.
Such actors are most interested in quick settlements. But on the other hand, there are those who have prolonging conflict as their primary aim. Such actors will intervene in order to maximize the benefit from the situation. Of course, it is just a brief meaning, but it is not that necessary to dig dipper.
Countries interfere in the affairs of other actors and their relationships for a number of different reasons (Morgenthau, 1966). Depending on the factors above, their final goals may also change. Countries can follow their personal goals, intervening in conflicts, thereby achieving their aims and spreading their influence in the international arena. Others may be sincerely interested in resolving the dispute and want to act as neutral arbitrators or to carry out peacekeeping functions. Some actors, pursuing their goals, can not only do nothing but aggravate the conflict between the parties (by contributing their own armed forces, for example). Others will intervene to protect the oppressed, as well as take measures to prevent the conflict. Thus, analytics of the actor’s actions will make it clear what goals and what strategy the actor uses in the target countries.
In order to better understand the subject of the topic, it is necessary to separate the actors interfering in conflicts. The most accurate and effective is the consideration of actors from two positions. The first part includes those about biased actors who ‘decide to intervene based on their own vital national interests that are affected or threatened by events in the target countries.’ Such actors can take a wide range of actions and actively influence conflicts. However, in this case, the state risks being criticized by the world community, for intervention which could be carried out against international law. (Walter, 1997).
On the other hand, neutral actors can also intervene in conflicts, but at the same time, it takes an entirely different position. Such actors do not actively support any side. In turn, they can act as an arbitrator in resolving the conflict, trying to solve the dispute between the actors in the most acceptable way. Today, the regulation of conflicts through third actors is a common practice.
I will mention this in the case study of the Minsk agreements and the Norman format. Neutral actors can also provide humanitarian assistance to those who are in need, which is generally permitted by international law. (Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel, 1996).
The final frame of the concept of intervention used in this thesis will be an understanding of the success of actions. How does the state recognize that this or that action brought the expected results? There are many parameters for evaluating interventions, but from my point of view - Nalbandov (2009) offers the optimal option for the development of this topic. In this case, it is
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assumed that the success of the intervention will indicate the comparison of the initially proposed plan with the real consequences of the actions. It means this factor will be objective since a subjective view can alter the state of affairs.
Summing up, intervention parameters, or rather the answers to questions related to the perception of intervention and involvement by the actor will be applied to the German policy towards Russia and Ukraine. It will perform a crucial function in recognition of which logic is more acceptable to German foreign policy in this situation.
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Chapter 2. Ukrainian crisis.
After the concepts of logics of consequences and appropriateness have become more transparent, and before applying the concepts to the selected cases, it becomes necessary to understand what directly happened from the period of 2013 to today. It is necessary to highlight the factors that played a crucial role in the fact that the conflict between Ukraine and Russia became not only a two-sided enmity but also involved Europe, as well as the United States and other actors globally. To do so, in this chapter, I will provide a timeline to identify such points (Security council report, 2020). In this chapter, I want to consider the crisis background. I will indicate the peculiarity of Western reaction and particularly German involvement. Since Germany, being one of the leading states of Europe, is highly influential actor in the crisis.
This conflict subsequently influenced and continues to influence not only Russia-Ukraine relations but also the EU relations towards these states. Being ambiguous in its nature (Russia maintains hybrid and information warfare), the conflict caused the destruction of the economies, more than 13,000 deaths, and instability in South Europe. It caused the conflict to attract the attention of many researchers around the world. (BBC, 2019).
The situation associated with the aggression of Russia against Ukraine received the name
‘Ukrainian crisis’ in the western scientific literature (Wilson, 2014). ( In my thesis, I use the term
‘West’ and ‘Western states.’ Using this definition, I mainly mean states of Europe. However I also add the US to this meaning, but depending on the context). However, some Ukrainian scientists do not support this term, Matsievsky (2019) is one of them. They argue that this term focuses on the internal problems of the state. Still, it has been settled in the scientific literature as the most convenient for determining such a complex phenomenon that has both external and internal causes.
Sakwa, (2014) agrees that this crisis goes beyond Ukraine, which was at its epicenter. It reflects the strategic changes that have occurred in the world since the beginning of the twenty-first century. In my thesis, I will use the generally accepted term ‘Ukrainian crisis’ for a general understanding of the situation.
Crisis background
In this section, I will explain what exactly the Ukrainian crisis involves. I will adhere to the chronological order and highlight the most important events that occurred during the process.
I will also try to explain the involvement of Europe and Russia and why this conflict is so important.
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Historically, Ukraine is located between the countries of the West, on the one hand, and Russia on the other. This situation gives both strategic benefits and brings enormous problems for the development of the state and the maintenance of independence. Since the days of Kievan Rus, the territories of nowadays Ukraine have not had a long experience of independence as such, being influenced either by Western countries or the Russian Empire. It is also worth noting the important fact that Ukraine is highly dependent on Russian gas and oil reserves. Russia is aware of this imbalance and has often used it for its own purposes. This position gives Russia a significant influence on its neighbor (Wilson, 2019).
After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine, for a long time, remained under the strong influence of Russia. However, over time, the discourse of the pro-Western mood among the population began to maintain a leading role. It started as an internal crisis in November 2013, when ex-president Viktor Yanukovych rejected an agreement on more comprehensive integration with the European Union, taking instead 15 billion US$ assistance from Russia (Matlack, 2019). Many Ukrainians wanted to sign an Association because of several beliefs about Ukrainian political and cultural proximity to Europe. The refusal to sign the Association provoked massive protests, which Yanukovych tried to suppress forcibly. This decision, on the contrary, exacerbated the situation.
It led to the deaths of hundreds of people during the protests. The second important aspect is that the population (mainly protesters and those who supported them) began to consider Yanukovych as a corrupt person and being under the strong influence of Russia.
‘Thus, the decision to reject the Association with the EU felt, to many Ukrainians, as Yanukovych had sold out his state to Russia.’ That is why protesters so quickly expanded their demands from ‘signing an Agreement with the EU’ to ‘Yanukovych must resign’.’ (Vox, 2014).
This phenomenon was later called as ‘Euromaidan.’ Afterward, Russia supported Yanukovych in the crisis, and the United States and Europe supported the protesters. By February, anti-government forces overthrew Yanukovych’s regime, and he fled the state.
However, the day before the escape of Yanukovych (February 20, 2014), Russia began the annexation of Crimea (Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 2019). Russia, trying to save its lost influence in Ukraine, as well as using the moment of political instability in the state, annexed Crimea. This moment was a turning point for Ukraine. Russian justification for such actions was the assertion that Crimea was once part of Russia before the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transferred it to Ukrainian control in 1954. Crimea, in turn, is a strategically important facility.
Besides the fact that it provides Russian access to the Black Sea and full control over the Kerch Strait (from Bleak Sea to the Sea of Azov), the peninsula has the strategically important military bases for warships and submarines. Afterward, the so-called ‘Referendum on the status of Crimea’
was held there. It is still not recognized in the world but is supported by Russia. According to its
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results, Russia officially confirmed the transfer of the territory of the peninsula under its control.
Such images provoked intense criticism of the world community as a violation of international law. (Vox, 2014).
The next crucial point was the actions in the territory of Donbas. In April, pro-Russian separatist rebels supported by Russians began taking areas in Eastern Ukraine. Ukraine, in turn, launched an ‘Anti-terrorist operation’ in response to Russian aggression. According to BBC (2019), in the result of the conflict in the Donbas by 2019, nearly 13,000 people died, including passengers on flight MH17. An international investigation accuses pro-Russian militants who allegedly got air defense weapons – ‘BUK’ installation from Russia (Government.nl, 2020). Until nowadays, it has not been proved whether it was done by accident or there were direct instructions on this subject.
After the fighting between the rebels and the Ukrainian military intensified, the rebels began to lose. Afterward, in August, Russia was urgently involved in a much larger format in the conflict to support the rebels, with so-called ‘humanitarian aid.’
According to BBC (2014) : ‘President Poroshenko said that column of more than 100 vehicles entered Ukrainian territory without a customs inspection, without border control or International Red Cross escort, which is a flagrant violation of international law.’
In fact, it is about involving not only arms support but also military personnel without identification marks. It led to the point that relations between Russia reached the most critical point not only with Ukraine but also with Western states. It directly threatened not only Ukrainian independence and security but also European states as well. It led to subsequent negotiations between the parties.
As a result of the escalation of the conflict in August 2014, a tripartite contact group (OSCE, Russia, Ukraine) signed the Minsk Agreements on the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a contact line in September 2014 (Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, U.S. Department of State, 2019). The Minsk Protocol was an agreement to end the war in the Eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas. However, this agreement did not bring the desired success. People continued to die in the conflict zone. Although it significantly reduced the hostilities in the conflict zone for months until January 2015, when the situation began to sharpen again. It subsequently led to the fact that in February 2015, the leaders of Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia as a result of negotiations conclude new agreements under the Minsk Agreements (Minsk 2). They agreed on a ceasefire set of measures to mitigate the war in the Donbas area from February 15. Unfortunately, the agreement was violated by sides during the time. However, it became a foundation for future negotiations (Federal Foreign Office, 2020).
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The next turning point in the conflict was the incident in the Kerch Strait of 2018 when Russia seized three Ukrainian ships. During this period, Ukraine introduced martial law for one month term for the first time since the declaration of independence of the state. The Kerch Strait, which connects the Sea of Azov with the Black Sea, is a crucial entry point for the import and export of Ukraine from the Sea of Azov. After the Russian occupation of Crimea, and gaining full control of the strait, the situation for Ukraine in this area has deteriorated significantly. Moreover, in May 2015, Russia began construction of the Kerch Bridge. After three years in May 2018, the bridge was built, connecting Russia with the occupied Crimea and restricting commercial shipping in size and volume. (The Guardian, 2019)
All this could not be without consequences, and already in November, the Russian military captured three vessels after Ukrainian crews tried to reach the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait. Quite remarkable is the fact that the strait is the only one maritime access point to the two largest ports of Ukraine - Mariupol and Berdyansk. During the events, Russia accused the Ukrainian Navy of attempting to provoke and illegally enter Russian territorial waters, while Ukraine describes the incident as an act of Russian aggression (DW, 2019).
Russian troops opened fire during the incident, and one of their ships rammed a Ukrainian vessel. Several Ukrainian crew members were injured. The Russian authorities ultimately arrested all 24 sailors and subsequently brought them to court for ‘illegal border crossing.’ The incident caused criticism from Western countries and became one of the reasons for the extension of sanctions towards Russia. (Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, U.S. Department of State,2019), (DW, 2018).
Final in chronology, but no less significant is the meeting in the Norman format (Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia), which took place in Paris in December 2019. The Minsk agreements remained the basis of the negotiations. Afterward, sides adopted a document on the redeployment of forces in the new points in Donbas by the end of March 2020. Moreover, they agreed on improving the monitoring of the ceasefire in the region and extending its special status. During the summit, Ukrainian President Mr. Zelensky and Russian President Mr. Putin held bilateral negotiations, during which they agreed to exchange prisoners by the end of December 2019 (Federal Foreign Office, 2020).
Thus, nowadays, the conflict is in a stage of uncertainty. The states did not come to a consensus. However, the last summit and the decision to attend and speak may be factors of actors’
position to be ready for negotiations and a further settlement of the conflict.
24 Reaction of the West.
The actual reaction and direct involvement of Western actors in resolving the conflict started from the moment of the annexation of Crimea. The response was not long in coming. In a short period, in addition to criticism and condemnation towards Russia by West, they used a number of actions aimed at restraining Russia from further involvement in Ukrainian affairs.
First of all, we are talking about the rounds of imposing sanctions against Russia (European Council, 2020) . They were initially focused on Putin and his entourage. However, over time, they covered almost the entire economy of Russia. Sanctions explicitly tumbled on the Russian economy, but as practice showed, they did not force it to abandon its interests in Ukraine. Although it is difficult to reject the deterrence factor. Also, Europe and the United States tried diplomatically isolate Russia, its exclusion from the G8 (Acosta, 2014), for example, and also the expulsion from OSCE. However, this aspect was partially revised over time (Russian return to OSCE).
In the sanctions case, it should be noted that the damage from their introduction applied to the European Union as well. The EU is heavily dependent on Russian exports, primarily in the energy sector. The EU is a significant exporter of Russian gas. Such actions are detrimental to the EU economy, but it does not prevent Western actors from abandoning them. Although, on the other hand, not all EU member states support these actions.
It is also worth mentioning that since the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine has received multimillion-dollar financial support, as well as humanitarian assistance (Federal Foreign Office, 2020). However, there is a crucial moment - the EU and the United States are doing nothing to force Russia to leave Ukraine alone and return Crimea physically (DW, 2018). Western actors made it clear that they did not consider their military intervention as an option at all. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas is sure that communication with Russia is essential:
‘Even though we currently have fundamentally different views on many issues, dialogue with Russia remains necessary. We will not find answers to urgent international issues without Moscow. What is more, we can only achieve lasting peace in Europe if we work together.’ (DW, 2019).
And there are reasons for this - in case of aggressive actions, it will create an escalation of the conflict and may entail irreversible consequences. Since Russia has a large army and a nuclear arsenal. Moreover, the EU’s norms exclude physical involvement in conflicts at all.
Western involvement in conflict remains at the level of economics and political actions.
The EU conflict-solving model itself is mainly about negotiation. As a result, the EU is making considerable efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully. The main goal here is to fulfill the role of arbiter or judge in this dispute.
25 Europe’s and Russian involvement.
For a better understanding of the crisis, it is crucial to consider the reasons for the West’s and Russian involvement directly. It will help to recognize the causes of specific actions in the period 2013-2019. Consideration of actors’ positions will take place in a combined format. Since the goal of the work is not a detailed analysis of the interests of actors in Ukraine, this chapter has an additional function that will help to understand better and analyze the actions of Germany towards Russia.
I will resort to the analytics of several researchers who investigated the Ukrainian crisis.
They put forward various options for the causes of conflict. However, the main idea is quite the same - Ukraine locates between two strong actors and their areas of interest.
The first concept that will be considered suggests that Russian actions towards Ukraine in 2014 were its rational response to Western attempts to cooperate with Ukraine, thereby reducing Russian influence. Therefore, they consider responsible for the Ukrainian crisis, not only Russia but also the EU and the USA.
Mearsheimer, (2014) argues that the cause of the crisis is the Eastward enlargement of NATO and the EU. In addition to their support of the democratic movement in Ukraine since the Orange Revolution of 2004. It is argued that these were the central elements of a broader strategy for withdrawing Ukraine from the Russian sphere of influence. As the main reason, the author sees the following idea: ‘The West was moving into the Russian backyard and threatening its main strategic interests.’ However, the Russian government has clearly stated, in recent years, that they will not stand aside when their strategically important neighbor turns into a ‘bastion of the West.’
‘The overthrow of the power of a democratically elected and pro-Russian president,’ as noted, was
‘the last point’ for them. As a result, the Russian response was the annexation of Crimea and further destabilization of the situation in Ukraine. Moreover, Russia feared that a NATO naval base could be deployed in Crimea (as I stated above, Crimea has a strategically important location and already existing navy bases).
Cornell, (2014) regarded the Crimean scenario in the context of the Russian strategy of manipulating of internal problems in neighboring states and creating unresolved ‘frozen conflicts’
to weaken them and deter them from rapprochement with the West. The first application of this strategy was the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Later, Russia successfully implemented it in Moldova (Transnistria) and Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
The reasons for Russian aggression in the Donbas are regarded as the same. For example, Galeotti, (2014) considers it a driving force as: ‘Russian deep fear of losing control of Ukraine - its long-term client, in favor of Western states.’ The conflict in eastern Ukraine, in his opinion,
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serves the purpose of Russia - to prevent Ukraine from becoming a member of NATO, the EU, or another Western alliance.
The second concept includes the Ukrainian crisis as a result of the conflict between Russia and the West. Sakwa, (2014) is convinced that the foundation of the crisis was laid asymmetrically, in not a balanced way by the end of the Cold War, in which one side declared victory, and the other was not ready to accept defeat. He considers the Ukrainian crisis in the context of the confrontation between the great powers due to their different understanding of the post-bipolar world order. It includes conflict between the concepts of ‘Wider Europe’ which was implemented by the EU and ‘Greater Europe’ which was supported by Russia. The crisis, in his opinion, was the result of NATO’s Eastward movement and the failure of Europe to form an independent European security system, as well as a consequence of the competition between the EU and Russia for Ukraine. ‘If Russia was weak to defend its interests at the beginning …(collapse of the USSR)… over time, it became much stronger to protect its interest.’
It is worth noting that the main explanations for the causes of Russian aggression against Ukraine is connected with response to NATO expansion, as Russia sees it as a threat to national security. However, there is a relatively different approach. The reason for Russian actions is not NATO Eastward movement, but the EU policy towards Ukraine. Some researchers are sure that Russia was prompted by aggression against Ukraine through negotiations on Ukrainian Association with the EU and the creation of a free trade regime between them. (Wood, Pomeranz, Merry, and Trudolyubov, 2015), (Menon, and Rumer, 2015).
Menon, and Rumer, (2015), believe that tensions in relations between Russia and the West existed before the events of 2014 in Ukraine. The reason for the crisis was the rapprochement between Ukraine and the European Union. Mainly it is connected with the implementation of the European Partnership policy (since 2004) and the Eastern Partnership policy (since 2009). The Eastern Partnership program included negotiations on EU Association and free trade with the participating states. Although Europe was limited in its policy regarding Ukraine through its own internal crises and the diverse interests of European states. In any case, as a result of the implementation of such a policy, the EU’s influence in Ukraine increased significantly through institutional reforms, harmonization of standards and legislation. If applied successfully, European policy would lead to a decrease in Russian influence in Ukraine. All this happened in the context of the advancement by Russia of its own integration projects. From Russian point of view, the Eastern Partnership policy was an EU maneuver to strengthen its sphere of influence in the territory of the former USSR.
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Menon, and Rumer, (2015) highlight several factors that led to the Ukrainian crisis. Firstly, Russian long-term dissatisfaction with the geopolitical expansion of the West in the territory of its
‘traditional’ dominance (mainly the countries of the former USSR). Secondly, Russian concern about promoting Western democracy in the post-Soviet states was seen as a form of Russian geopolitical surrounding and even as a policy aimed at its internal destabilization. Thirdly, Eurasian integration, which received a new inspiration in the 2010s. In addition to economic advantages, Russian integration projects were supposed to provide it with additional security tools against the ‘surrounding’ by the West, to strengthen its influence in the post-Soviet space and, accordingly, the global role of Russia as a great power.
Menon, and Rumer, (2015) argue that a crisis was inevitable as Ukraine has fallen into the trap between the Association with the EU and the Customs Union with Russia. These were two competing projects that forced Ukraine to make a choice. Russia did not agree to admit defeat, and the EU did not have a strategy in case of Russian disagreement. Russian actions testified that Russia would not tolerate an ‘invasion’ in its sphere, according to Dmitry Medvedev, of ‘privileged interests’ (kremlin.ru, 2008).
The final concept is described by Wood, Pomeranz, Merry, and Trudolyubov, (2015). They argue that in analyzing its origins, various aspects should be taken into account. For example, the historical perspective of the development of Russian-Ukrainian relations, the long-term deterioration of economic and political conditions in Ukraine, domestic Russian political factors, the development of relations between the EU and Russia before the crisis, competition between them for Ukraine, Russian relations with other states, the role of America in the development of the crisis, etc.
One of the significant factors of the crisis, Merry, (2015) considers as an alternative and even incompatible philosophies of state sovereignty in interstate relations: the Russian concept of
‘statehood’ and the European model of joint sovereignty. Thus, Russian approach is based on its desire for the status of great power. A key element of Russian philosophy is the concept of
‘statehood.’ It includes faith in the primacy and greatness of the Russian state, what became a serious consequences for international relations, especially for post-Soviet states. According to this idea, there is only a small group of ‘truly’ sovereign states (one of them is Russia). Moreover, most of the post-Soviet neighbors of Russia are considered from the perspective of ‘older brother’
and ‘younger brother.’ Such relations practiced by Russia in relations with Ukraine during the entire post-Soviet period.
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The EU, in turn, uses a model of joint sovereignty, which is fundamentally different from Russia. It is based not so much on common European values as on the establishment of common standards and the introduction of joint regulations over a wide range of public policy issues.
The main problem in the negotiations between Ukraine and the EU regarding the Association Agreement, according to Wood, Pomeranz, Merry, and Trudolyubov, (2015), was that Ukraine fell under the sphere of influence of the EU (by signing the Association). From the Russian point of view, it was impossible, since Ukraine was already seen under Russian influence. It turned out that the agreement with the EU forced Ukraine to choose against Russian interests. Additional problems were created by the nature of relations between Russia and Ukraine, based on ethnic, cultural, and even psychological factors that were absent in Russian policy toward Georgia, Moldova, and other countries - the popular Russian point of view of ‘brother nations.’
Unfortunately, most of the Russian elite is not able to think about Ukraine other than ‘younger brother.’ Therefore, Russia considers the challenges to Ukraine-Russia relation from the EU and NATO as a threat not only to the interests of Russia but also to its own national and historical identity. The influence of such an attitude on Russian policy was not taken into account in Europe, which caused subsequent events.
Thus, the Ukrainian crisis was a turning point for the countries of Europe, but Ukraine was not its cause. It was a symptom of the greater problem of relations between Europe and Russia, which had deteriorated significantly even before the events within Ukraine. Therefore, according to most authors, the EU should develop a new strategy in relation to Russia in the political, economic, and security sphere, built on a realistic understanding of Russia, but not on expectation as Western states would like to see it.
German position.
In this subchapter, I will describe the position of Germany in the Ukrainian crisis, its attitude to this. It will provide the necessary basis for the subsequent analysis of its actions in the Ukrainian crisis. To begin with, Germany, along with France, obtains a leading role in resolving the conflict nowadays.
Speck, (2015) identifies three main factors by which Germany began to take a leading position in resolving the conflict. Firstly, the author emphasizes the German economy, which has significantly strengthened since the Cold War and today holds one of the first positions in Europe.
Additionally, a population plays an essential role in the perception of the actor as well. Secondly, the Ukrainian crisis, as such, plays a vital role in Germany. It is about the geopolitical order in the east of the state and energy security, which significantly depends on the situation in Ukraine.
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(Germany exports Rusian gas and oil). The third factor Speck, (2015) indicated as the absence of states that could, at that time, take control of the initiative. Taking into account Trump’s policy of
‘America first’ as well as the situation with Brexit; and, according to the author, the impossibility of the EU to maintain a clear foreign policy, adding German interest in the quick settlement of the conflict; all this led to the creation of German role as arbitrator in this conflict.
Peace in the eastern regions is also crucial because the key partners of Germany are located there. For example, Russia for Germany is not only an important energy supplier but also a major market for German exports. If we consider the EU framework, then the East European states are strongly connected with Germany. For example, Poland is one of the largest German trading partners in the EU.
Germany is confident that the conflict can only be resolved through diplomatic means. It is mainly due to the position of Germany formed after the Second World War, and the ‘culture of military restraint’ (Koeth, 2016). It is an explanation of the fact that Germany now occupies the role of arbiter and tries to solve conflict without taking any sides. Germany, together with France, initiated the Minsk agreements both in 2014 and in 2015. Moreover, due to the involvement of Germany and France, a summit in Norman format was held in December 2019. It was stated that this meeting was a factor of the ‘warming of relations’ between stated and is essential for future negotiations. (Gorchinskaya, 2019).
Speck, (2015) also identifies two key components of the development of a joint position of the West concerning the crisis. The first aspect includes coordination with the United States about the most important cases. The influence of the United States in Europe was strong, and it is impossible to deny the existence of such actor. The author emphasizes the second aspect as importance for Germany of gaining a critical mass of support directly among the countries participating in the EU. Closer relations with France gave Germany the necessary support, as France mainly represented countries that were more skeptical of sanctions
As mentioned above, in order to resolve the conflict, Germany chose the path of diplomacy and negotiations. However, when it realized that it has not been possible to achieve results by attempts of criticism and ‘talking,’ a series of sanctions against Russia were introduced. At the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, a considerable disagreement arose among the EU member states about the necessity of sanctions. Each round of sanctions went through long negotiations within the EU. In other words, EU unity during the crisis was built around a sanctions policy (European Council, 2020). The purpose of the sanctions was to limit the opportunities for Russia to be involved in Ukraine. In fact, it was not enough to force Russia to abandon its actions. However, it seems as sanctions slowed down Russian activity in Ukraine.
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Nevertheless, despite the sanctions and other limiting measures towards Russia, Germany still did not refuse to terminate relations completely. The most remarkable example of this is Nord Stream 2. Nord Stream 2 is a project, which includes a gas pipeline that runs from the Russian coast through the Baltic Sea to Germany. According to several European countries and the United States, which introduced additional sanctions on project participants, Nord Stream 2 will create excessive dependence on Russian gas. This, in turn, is seen as a threat to EU security. It is worth noting that gas import to the EU is about 40% nowadays (Keating, 2019).
Thus, Germany, for several reasons, has become one of the leaders among Western states in attempts to resolve the Ukrainian crisis. It managed to unite the EU countries and create a common policy of relations in the realities of the dispute. However, it is still difficult to say how successful German actions are since the conflict is still ongoing. Although what could be said is that these actions have a positive effect on the course of events. Further application of logics will help to figure out which approach can be attributed to the German actions.
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Chapter 3. Analytics of cases
By this chapter, I have processed all the necessary aspects for the analysis and application of logics to the actions of Germany. The difficulty for review is the complexity of the case. This chapter is built in the way of gradual highlighting of the most crucial cases one by one. The final decision will be made based on the ratio of cases based on logics of appropriateness and consequences.
Initially, it is possible to single out the specifics majority of a particular logic in each case.
It has also been described in the comparison section of the two logics. Coming out of the fact that logics are not mutually exclusive, I will analyze the cases applying two logics at the same time, and using the processed material, build my judgment on this matter.
I want to emphasize that the following analysis and use of logics (in the context of the Ukrainian crisis) is not aimed to criticize somehow or condemn certain actions. As I mentioned above, there may be an impression of understanding of ‘right’ and ‘false’ actions. However, this study has a purely academic aspect about the application of a particular logic. Moreover, an individual’s perception of logics can be completely different.
Pre-crisis analysis.
Under this term, I distinguish the entire period before the annexation of Crimea. The general characteristic of this period for Germany is characterized by the comparative German interest in relations between Russia and Ukraine. It is hard to deny the fact that in comparison, German-Russian relations are more important for Germany in terms of state development.
However, Russian-German relations are complex because of clash of interests and values (Adomeit, 2012). Federal Foreign Office (2020) provides article about German-Russia relations where ‘The Petersburg dialogue’ is highlighted as ‘…an important bilateral forum for German- Russian dialogue … which includes ten working groups on various aspects.’ In the second chapter, I mainly pointed out energy and trade cooperation, but this is not enough during applying logics.
There is a cultural component as well. It is worth mentioning the Russian diaspora in Germany (so-called Russian Germans) on the basis of the post-war period. As a result actors ‘…enjoy lively exchange in the cultural and educational sectors’ (Federal Foreign Office, 2020). This factor significantly affects the perception of Russia by Germany and visa versa.
Comparing the statement of Federal Foreign Office(2020) towards bilateral cooperation with Ukraine, the 'importance' of partnership is not key. Of course, the fact that the partnership (Ukraine is an important transit state) took place and was developing cannot be denied. Still, in
