The year 2018 for the Republic of Moldova was outstanding in terms of democracy.
The Chisinau government continued to launch and implement controversial initiatives that ruined relations with the EU. Simultaneously, attacks on the opposition and human rights violations worsened, and the budget was used for pre-election matters.
41 On February 24, 2019, parliamentary elections were held in the Republic of Moldova, and four political parties have access to the legislature, three of them with a practically equal number of votes. The Democratic Party, led by Vladimir Plahotniuc, the Socialist Party, and the ACUM (NOW) Bloc. These elections have been the least geopolitical in recent years. The Socialists were passive, to the displeasure of the Russians. Pro-Europeans were divided between the Party of Democrats and the NOW bloc, whose message was more about corruption and democracy.
The real scenario of what happened in the Republic of Moldova after the parliamentary elections followed an atypical narrative chain contrary to the predictions, expectations, and recommendations made to the NOW Bloc. After the convening of the first sitting of parliament on March 9, 2019, due to the lack of a parliamentary majority capable of establishing a government, the next sitting was canceled until such a majority was formed and able to assume the government. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, the legal term in which the government can be established is 3 months from the date of the parliament's first sitting. In case of exceeding this term, the country's president reserves the discretion to dissolve the parliament and may call early elections. Through its commitment, the NOW Bloc stated that for the moment, their primary objective is the fight against the oligarchic regime Plahotniuc and they are ready to assume the process of removing it from power to start later the reforms necessary for the reconstruction of the rule of law.
In the existing format, the only party with which it could have aligned itself was the Socialist Party, led by pro-Russian leader Igor Dodon. As much as the persons of NOW would have wanted to eliminate Plahotniuc, the only chance for action at the time was to accept a sacrificial coalition with the Socialists, with the risk of compromising and failing in the long run. The compromise, however, was eventually identified as a temporary pro-Russian-pro-European political alliance.
However, to understand the real stakes of the events in Chisinau and the factors that contributed to the formation of such a surprising alliance, it is necessary to report on June 3, 2019, when three important representatives came to Chisinau: Johannes Hahn, EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Policy, Dmitry Kozak, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Moldova, and Bradley Freden, Director of the Eastern European Business Office of the US State Department, which was an unprecedented event.
42 This meeting was the catalyst for the process attested in Chisinau. The collaboration initiated against the nature and ideological, moral, and political principles of the two parties is a temporary political agreement with a common goal, removing Vlad Plahotniuc from the state's power. Another nuance that must be taken into account refers to the geopolitical stake of these external implications, aiming at the subsequent configuration of the eastern neighborhood. It will probably be discussed at some point a type of settlement of the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova and a solution to the conflicts in Ukraine. The area will acquire a deep strategic connotation, which must be a compromise between Americans, Europeans, and Russians, who currently seem the most favoured by the Republic of Moldova's situation.
The state of affairs in Chisinau is very unpredictable. The evolution of events in a predetermined direction is difficult to anticipate because no one wants to give up their position, considering it legitimate. Even if the great Western powers such as the USA, the EU, but also the national governments of several European states have recognized the parliament and the established government as legitimate, showing their support and willingness to cooperate in respecting the position expressed by voters on February 24, to ensure a peaceful, calm and democratic transition of power, many experts are sceptical about the risky step taken by pro-Europeans who have embarked on a dangerous coalition with the Socialists, Russia's direct exponents in Moldova.
Particular attention must also be paid to the consensus between the European Union, the United States, and Russia, which have agreed on a new majority and its government. If it is a strategic agreement for a sanitary cordon in the region, represented by the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, this will result in irreconcilable geopolitical consequences, such as the federalization of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, the weakening of European influence in the region, the emergence of new conflicts (D. Popescu 2019).
Certainly, the current conflict in Ukraine, the causes of which are related to the process of Kyiv's political and economic association with the European Union, but also to the pressures to which the Kremlin regime is subjecting Moldova, cannot be ignored. It reflects a profound and serious limitation on how the European Union exercises its smart power vis-à-vis third parties. The most problematic remains the fact that it is uncertain to what extent these challenges will lead to the adaptation of the Eastern Partnership initiative to the new regional political and strategic realities and the efficiency of how the exercise of smart power will achieve its goal
43
CONCLUSION
The European Union is an atypical player in international relations, which determines alternative research methods. The European Union's foreign policy action's determination and conceptualization have highlighted the limits of competence of the European institutions and the Member States in the European foreign policy framework, including the differentiated system of instruments - common positions, sanctions policies, enlargement strategies, association agreements.
The vocation of the European Union is to create in the international system a space dominated by trust, complementarity, consensus, democracy, values, and peace. Among the impediments to creating an autonomous external dimension of the European Union are the following: 1) Member States do not always share common views on the international situation, because the perception of external dangers and challenges is different; 2) Some Member States, such as Poland and the Baltic States, want to intensify their relations with the EaP states, especially with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, and to become stronger and tougher concerning Russia.
Relations between Russia and the West have a special impact on Eastern Europe's security, which needs to be constantly monitored, evaluated, and planned. The Eastern European region's specificity lies in the fact that it is between the EU / NATO and Russia between two poles of power, between two civilizational spaces with specific value systems.
Through military control over Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, the Lugansk, and Donetsk regions, the Kremlin is reconfiguring Eastern Europe's space as it sees fit. Through its ongoing conflicts, Moscow has expanded its territory to which directly controls it and ensures that the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine will not be able to advance towards accession to the EU and NATO. And through this, the mentioned states remain in a buffer zone, in which Russia has a opinion and exerts a rather great influence. Both Brussels and Moscow accuse each other of using hybrid warfare to confront the two geopolitical entities.
The Republic of Moldova and other post-Soviet states' specific situation is that by opting for European integration, these states are hindered by the Russian Federation, which refuses to expand European and especially Euro-Atlantic structures in the post-Soviet space of Eastern Europe.
44 Constrained by the geographical location, the historical course, and an unstable internal political environment, the Republic of Moldova has always been caught in the net of geopolitics, which dictated its steps. With the change of political power and external vector after 2009, the Republic of Moldova for 10 years obtained only an Association and Free Trade Agreement and a Visa-free Movement Agreement with the European Union. These are two key agreements, but not enough to guarantee a progressive accession agenda. After the Twitter Revolution 2009, Moldova became even more vulnerable than ever. For 10 years, 9 governments have changed, the number of Moldovan migrants abroad has increased, the theft of one billion has destabilized the financial-banking system, negotiations on resolving the Transnistrian conflict have stopped, the fight for interests between party leaders has intensified, and the country has become even poorer.
The Republic of Moldova is located at the contact of three important political-geographical areas: Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and South-Eastern Europe is involuntarily transformed and imposed into a buffer zone, which Russia is ready to take advantage of to oppose between the two rival politico-military groups: NATO and the CIS military alliance.
The European perspective of the Republic of Moldova, after long consolidation efforts, was sabotaged by the representatives of the political class in Chisinau who manipulated with external partners and abused the trust given. The reality of the Republic of Moldova after 2009 was marked by the gradual seizure of final control over the instruments of power in the state by various political actors, who come from dubious and illicit business backgrounds and who managed to establish an oligarchic regime to capture the state.
The struggle for interests was the biggest stake of Moldovan politics, which blew up the entire state system. Moldova has come to be called a European state-captive official. The fight between Vlad Plahotniuc and Vlad Filat led to the disappointment of Moldovans in the pro-European forces and the intensification of poverty in the country. Once he took power from Filat and condemned him for influence peddling, Plahotniuc concentrated his political power in his hands, striking hard at state institutions. Plahotniuc's political monopoly was the brake on the country's reform; EU powers (smart and normative) had minimal effect. The state institutions were not fully involved in Europeanization and in implementation of the conditions stipulated in the Association Agreement signed in 2013.
From 2009 until now, the European Union has also changed its vision of the Eastern Partnership. The EU does not have that open and optimistic approach to the Eastern Neighborhood states to integrate into the European family. After the Russian Federation
45 annexed Crimea in 2014, European foreign policy has been reoriented. Moreover, Russia's aggressive intervention has shown that the EU is not a force in Eastern Europe. Last but not least, the Western countries of Europe do not warmly welcome this Eastern Partnership.
Why has European Foreign policy failed in Moldova? A common problem with the exercise of the European Union's smart power is that although the national interests of its members are facilitators of effective action by European foreign policy, they are often obstacles to its implementation. European foreign policy is often criticized for its inefficiency in reconciling members' divergent interests over the future of the Eastern Neighborhood. For Germany, France, the Netherlands, this Partnership is not an essential pillar in their foreign policy. They do not agree to offer the status of potential candidates for accession to the Eastern Partnership countries.
Another distinctive feature that led to the failure of EU foreign policy in Moldova is the corrupt system inherited from the Soviet period. The political class in Moldova since 2009 and until now has failed to assume the implementation of political and economic conditions on the European agenda. Thus, mediocre and corrupt politicians managed to compromise the European discourse in Moldova, and illegal and anti-reform actions further intensified people's disappointment with the country's development.
The Moldovan political class is not yet ready to firmly register the Republic of Moldova in a European way. Due to a position that was always in the middle of geopolitical interests, there were no prerequisites for a true political class configuration. Thus, due to the lack of vision regarding the future of the Eastern Partnership, the clear offer of future EU membership, and a failed political class, the European foreign policy failed to register tangible results in Moldova. Smart and normative power being the straightforward tools in the exercise of European foreign policy, has proven ineffective in states that oppose Western transformation.
As an essential idea, the leaders in Brussels do not seek Moldova's accession to the European Union but rather create a buffer zone between them and Russia. They are ready to provide financial and technical support only so that there is peace in the Eastern European area;
these states are inclined towards Western values and be the first line that will block a possible attack by Russia.
Due to the European Union's explicit interest in the Eastern European space, Brussels can and must monitor the situation in the Republic of Moldova, including through collaboration with local experts, who better understand the internal situation and the causes that led to the emergence of domestic problems and vulnerabilities in the Republic of Moldova.
46
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