3 Russia as the actor in the Arctic region
3.1 Presumptive power of a Russia
3.1.1 The military dimension of Russian power in the Arctic
The most significant change within the use of hard power in the Arctic circle happened in 2007 under the leadership of President Putin. It deals with two different acts carried out by Russia in the Arctic region. Firstly, Moscow “chose a highly public way to show that it was undeterred:
two mini submarines completed a record-breaking descent of more than two and a half miles beneath the North Pole and planted a titanium Russian flag in the seabed,”125 which was seen as an unlawful act to land grabbing. Secondly, there was an overflight across the Arctic with Russian strategic bombers for the first time since the Cold War. No wonder that it caught the eyes of the rest of the Arctic five and also the rest of the world, and wasn’t it accepted cordially.
At that time, the rest of the Arctic five was afraid of Russia preferring the hard power and, more precisely, military-coercive instruments. The suspicion has been even restored and growing since the Ukraine crisis in Crimea caused by military acts from the Russian side. On the grounds of the assertions, the Kremlin issued a statement saying that they would use military coercive instruments in the Arctic “only as a last resort and primarily to protect its legitimate interests in the region.”126
Unfortunately, there is no updated number of Russian armed forces deployed in the Arctic.
Nonetheless, there is at least information about progress, modernizations, and new deployments of these forces and bases. Straightforwardly, most of the investments, new bases, and forces concern the RF. Kremlin has been ambitiously flexing the muscle in the Far North more than ever since 2014 with the modernization of its military programmes and capabilities. More precisely, President Putin established a new strategic command called the Northern fleet, which is supposed to guard the AZRF. Furthermore, in the same year, Kremlin stated that they will be restoring and reopening fifty age-old arctic military bases built by the Soviets.127 By the end of
125 KONYSHEV, Valery a Alexander SERGUNIN, 2014. Is Russia a revisionist military power in the Arctic?
Defense & Security Analysis [online]. 30(4), 323–335. ISSN 1475-1798.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2014.948276
126 SERGUNIN, A. a V. KONYSHEV, 2016. Russia in the Arctic. Hard or Soft Power? [online]. Ibidem-Verlag.
ISBN 978-3-8382-0753-7.
127 CONLEY, Heather A., Matthew MELINO, 2020. America’s Arctic moment : great power competition in the Arctic to 2050 CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (WASHINGTON, EUROPE PROGRAM a D.C.) [online].
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2019, about 59 % of Russians modern arsenal was supposed to be located in the Arctic zone of the RF, as the defense minister Sergei Shoigu said in April 2019.128
So not only Russia located, exercised, and tested new weapons in the Arctic (it has been a Russian nuclear and missile tests site since the Soviet era), but in the first place, they have extensively invested in restoration and building military bases in the High North. In 2017, the RF had more military bases based in the Arctic than the rest of the countries of the Arctic five altogether, which permanently maintain these bases there. There is a more highly visible modernization of the bases and military forces over the period between 2015 and 2020 compared to other states.129 Moreover, there is also a concerted Russian “effort to establish an integrated network of air defence and coastal missile systems, early warning radar and electronic warfare equipment. A new Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) system, has been built up, covering the northern part of Scandinavia and the sea area to its north.”130 Currently, in the Arctic ocean is the Russian fleet of icebreakers, the largest one. It counts up to more than 40 ships, a few of which are nuclear ones. So far, it is known that Russia plans to expand it despite having the superior number already.131
The most likely explanation of the assertive Russian approach is that the Far North’s protection belongs to Russia’s number one goal and mission since Putin’s ascension. Secondly, due to the inheriting the dedication to the Far North from the old Soviet dream.132 It is essential to mention that other Arctic five actors invest into military capabilities and the Arctic as well. The numerical superiority of the military facilities can be seen in Figure 4. As though they have been spending more and paying more attention to it after the Russian awakening. However, they have not such deep in the pocket concerning the Arctic as the RF. In other words, enormous costs play a significant role on account of being a great power within the Arctic area.133
128 ALIYEV, Nurlan, 2019. Russia’s Military Capabilities in the Arctic. ICDS [online]
129 WALSH, Nick Paton, 2021. Satellite images show huge Russian military buildup in the Arctic. CNN [online]
130 ZANDEE, Dick, Kimberley KRUIJVER a Adája STOETMAN, 2020. The future of Arctic security: The geopolitical pressure cooker and the consequences for the Netherlands. Netherlands Institute of International relations. Clingendael Report.
131 ALIYEV, Nurlan, 2019. Russia’s Military Capabilities in the Arctic. ICDS [online]
132 ARBUGAEVA, Evgenia, 2020. In Russia’s far north, legends and lives are frozen in time. Magazine [online]
133 CONLEY, Heather A., Matthew MELINO, 2020. America’s Arctic moment : great power competition in the Arctic to 2050 CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (WASHINGTON, EUROPE PROGRAM a D.C.) [online].
34 Figure 4. Military facilities in the Arctic region
Source: ROSTON, Eric, 2017. How a Melting Arctic Changes EverythingPart II: The Political ArcticBloomberg [online] Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-arctic/the-political-arctic/
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute then defined three factors making Russia invest countless money in this region. Firstly, to protect their land (including with the nucelaforce) and the national security. Secondly, “to challenge the free use of ocean spaces by the USA and its allies, who have assumed for three decades that sea lines of communication in the Atlantic Ocean will be unchallenged.”134 In other words, Russian arctic armament and investments suppose to send a message to the world, precisely speaking the other Arctic states,
134 SU, Fei, Ekaterina KLIMENKO a Ian ANTHONY Dr., 2021. A Strategic Triangle in the Arctic? Implications of China–Russia–United States Power Dynamics for Regional Security [online]. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
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that the USA will not be able to reinforce them in case of Arctic conflict.135 Thirdly, Russia will be investing and protecting the AZRF because of strong involvement of the local economy, since the AZRF represents the main extractive industries on which Russia depends today and will be in the future. 136