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2 State´s foreign policy within the narratives

2.1 Narratives

https://doi.org/10.4135/9781849209502

16 WILSON, Ernest J., 2008. Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science [online]. 616(1), 110–124. ISSN 0002-7162.

17 NYE, Joseph S., 2021. Soft power: the evolution of a concept. Journal of Political Power [online]. 14(1), 196–

208. ISSN 2158-379X. https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2021.1879572

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books and articles by Alexander Sergunin, Valery Konyshev, and Marlene Laruelle with support of the official Russian Federation and Arctic Council web pages, documents, and articles.

Lastly, the follow-up chapter will be dealing with the Russian foreign policy concerning the Arctic region. At first, the Russian Arctic policy will be analysed through the chosen official Arctic strategies and subsequently identify their goals. The subchapter concerning the Soviet Arctic will be interpreted by analysing the Soviet song March of the Happy-Go-Lucky Guys, folktale Tale of the Pole, and poem Arctic Illness. The first two given narratives were chosen because of its Soviet Union´s Arctic origin and the association with the then Arctic. These narratives were provided by the collection of narratives made by James Von Geldern and Richard Stites. The Poem Arctic Illness differs in comparison to those two. However, it is an essential factor because of its connection to Russian national identity and perception. The narratives will be afterward identified by their basic elements and simultaneously implemented on chosen Arctic strategies.

The limitations of the work are a lesser sample of narratives because of the scope of the thesis and a limited number of available Soviet and Russian poems, stories, legends, etc., translated in English.

The author chose this topic because of the rising importance of the Arctic in the international community and possible future developments either in cooperation or conflict. And more importantly, the author was drawn into the (Russian) Arctic topic due to the opportunity to interact and attend courses of excellent lecturers, Eeva Kuikka from the Tampere University and Amanda Graham from the University of the Arctic.

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1 State actors in international relations

Actors in international relations are defined as subjects that influence and form international relations and as primary agents and instigators of international politics. Moreover, it is possible to differentiate between a state actor or a non-state actor. The liberalists considered among the important actors, besides the state, even state ones such as international organizations, non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, international organized crime groups et al. For the purpose of the thesis, it is essential to explain a state-centric perspective which comes from the (neo)realism theory. It considers the state the most pivotal player with specifically defined national interests and foreign policy by which they try to achieve their national or power goals.18

There are five basic features of the nation-state. Firstly, the state is sovereign. He exercises absolute and unlimited power because the state stands above all other associations and groups in society. Secondly, state institutions are public, in contrast to private civil society institutions.

Public authorities are responsible for taking and enforcing collective decisions, while private services exist to meet individuals’ interests. Thirdly, the state has legitimacy in its hands.

Fourthly, the state is a tool of control. Coercion supports state´s authority. That means that the state ensures compliance with its laws and punishes those who act contrary to them. The monopoly of “legitimate coercion” is, therefore, a practical manifestation of state sovereignty.

Lastly, that the state is a territorial organization. The jurisdiction of a state is geographically defined and applies to all who live within state borders, whether or not they are citizens of that state. Therefore, in the international arena, the state is considered an autonomous unit.1920 A state is a unit with a defined territory, population, and state power (functional government), which other international actors mutually recognise. According to Smolík, the state has two

18 HOBSON, John M., 2000. The State and International Relations [online]. Cambridge University Press. Themes in International Relations. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612442

19 KREJČÍ, Oskar. Mezinárodní politika. Praha: Victoria Publishing, 1997. ISBN 80-7187-034-X.

20 TAYLOR, Phillip, 2019. Nonstate Actors in International Politics: From Transregional to Substate Organizations [online]. ISBN 978-0-429-04902-6. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429049026

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functions: the inner (juridical, security, economic, social, and cultural) and the outer one (organizing relations with other states and regulating foreign trade).21

In this case, essential actors within Russia due to the Arctic are the Russian Federation’s ministries. Firstly, the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment of the Russian Federation, which includes the environmental protection of the Arctic, natural resources management, and international and legal issues related to the continental shelf.22 Secondly, other actors concerning the Arctic are the Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation. These are primarily interested in the Arctic region because of the Northern Sea Route’s expanding economic power and enormous strategic resources situated in the Arctic.23 Thirdly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, which publishes the Russian Federation’s foreign policies officially. Fourthly, the latest established Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and the Arctic is responsible for economic and social development in the Russian Far East and the Russian Arctic areas. This Ministry is in charge of Russia’s offensive Arctic policy and has authored its new Arctic Strategy - Strategy for Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security through 2035. It is believed that the Ministry will play a key role in Russia’s upcoming Chairmanship period of the Arctic Council. Their already second Chairmanship falls into years 2021 - 2023. It is believed that Russia plans to focus on economic, social, and environmentally sustainable development in the Arctic region.24

21 SCHECHTER, Michael G., 1985. Nonstate Actors in International Politics: From Transregional to Substate Organizations. Westview Press, 1984. Pp. xvii 247. American Political Science Review [online]. 79(4), 1256–

1257. https://doi.org/10.2307/1956341

22 STAALESEN, Atle, 2018. Russia’s new natural resource minister opens an Arctic office. ArcticToday [online]

https://www.arctictoday.com/russias-new-natural-resource-minister-opens-arctic-office/

23 Ministry of Economic Development may manage Northern Sea Route. TASS [online]

https://tass.com/economy/940486

24 The Russian Federation. Arctic Council [online] https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/russian-federation/

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1.1 Presumptive power of a state

Although it is possible to talk about other actor’s positions in world politics, the state’s capacity to promote the chosen goals remains unrivaled in the world political system. Power and strength give the state a unique position on the international stage. Therefore, the state’s functional and organizational characteristics also make other actors in world politics dependent on the state.

In its development, it is primarily the state that produces a set of rules and patterns of behaviour that have a decisive influence on the functioning of the system and the behaviour of other actors.

The power potential of the state determines its exceptional and decisive position among the actors of world politics. Even the position of a particular state in the world’s structure depends on its power potential. Political power is seen as an opportunity to achieve the balance and harmony in individuals’ and groups’ political-practical activities. And so forth is possible to ensure peoples’ and group’s required behavior.25 State’s capacity determines primarily the option’s scope, which affects the position in the system. The power potential of a state is its capacity and the real or potential result of a confrontation with the capacities of other states.

Nevertheless, legal norms or such components of political culture as morality, traditions, and stereotypes, social factors can also serve as a limit of power and strength, but also public opinion. These factors can increase or decrease the quality of decision-making by holders of power and, after all, the willingness and ability to use force.26

However, when evaluating the power potential, it is necessary to clarify the absolute state power. The absolute power can be afterward divided into material (geographical location, natural resources, population) and absolute spiritual power (level of foreign policy, which sets a national interest, national strategy, diplomacy).27 An important specification for this topic is the role of the territory. Defining the state’s position today does not take the form of the size of the state, but the will to define its interests in various regions and within reach of actual

25 THOMSON, Janice E., 1995. State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research. International Studies Quarterly [online]. 39(2), 213–233. ISSN 0020-8833.

https://doi.org/10.2307/2600847

26 KREJČÍ, Oskar. Mezinárodní politika. Praha: Victoria Publishing, 1997. ISBN 80-7187-034-X.

27 Ibid.

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influence on decision-making and behaviour in these regions and maintaining an appropriately chosen level of control.28

The state’s power in international relations is described as one actor’s ability to force another actor to perform an activity that he would not usually be willing to do. Hard power and soft power divides into the phenomenon of power. The content of hard power consists primarily of economic and military power. In contrast, soft power consists of culture, ideas, and foreign policy.

As Joseph Nye says, power is like the weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few understand it.29 Power influences everything in the international community, from basic relations to the international system and world politics.30 In international relations it means making someone do something that you want them to do.31 Joseph Nye coined the concept of soft power within international relations to its opposite hard power concept. As designation follows, hard power is considered as a more aggressive way to treat and interact with other actors by identifying ourselves and our national interests and goals.32 Usually, hard power is composed of economic (coercive) and military capability, which can be used in military intervention, economic sanctions, and coercive diplomacy. Currently, it is used by actors who purposely violate international law or threaten common security.33

On the other hand, the soft power presents a more acceptable way by voluntarily creating an attraction based on the specific international image and prestige of a particular country, nation, and others. Influence is a part of the soft power that makes it possible to regulate other political entities’ behavior without force. Nye “defined it as the ability to get what one wants through

28 KREJČÍ, Oskar. Mezinárodní politika. Praha: Victoria Publishing, 1997. ISBN 80-7187-034-X.

29 NYE, Joseph S., 2021. Soft power: the evolution of a concept. Journal of Political Power [online]. 14(1), 196–

208. ISSN 2158-379X. https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2021.1879572

30 OHNESORGE, Hendrik, 2019. Soft Power: The Forces of Attraction in International Relations [online].

ISBN 978-3-030-29921-7. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29922-4

31 Ibid.

32 WAGNER, Christian, 2005. From Hard Power to Soft Power? Ideas, Interaction, Institutions, and Images in India’s South Asia Policy. No. 26, March 2005; Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, ISSN:

1617-5069.

33 WILSON, Ernest J., 2008. Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science [online]. 616(1), 110–124. ISSN 0002-7162.

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persuasion or attraction rather than coercion.”34 It could be done by appropriate diplomacy, economic, cultural, political values, policies,35 and related instruments by which a country is promoted.36 Moreover, Nye adds that “winning hearts and minds has always been important, but it is even more so in a global information age,”37 which is seen as a powerful soft power tool.

Besides others, smart power is seen as a combination of both. Thus the subject can more effectively achieve its goals. 38 As Gallarotti says, only the optimal combination of soft power and hard power can allow the leaders to maximise their impact and importance in the world.39 The amount of power the particular state has, distinguishes, besides others, between the superpower, great power, or regional power. The state needs to be accepted as a superpower by other international community actors to receive the superpower title. The superpower must have first-class military-political capabilities and a prime economy. Mainly, a state must be capable of global military and political reach. For a state or designated limited territory to be called a great power, it must meet several aspects, which Hurrel best explains. According to him, a great power can be a state that has the ability to actively participate in the creation of an international order, opinions, and decisions and to act in line with them. Besides, it also has excessive economic and military power. The necessary condition is also that this country must be accepted

34 WILSON, Ernest J., 2008. Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science [online]. 616(1), 110–124. ISSN 0002-7162.

https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207312618

35 NYE JR., JOSEPH S., 2009. Smart Power. New Perspectives Quarterly [online]. 26(2), 7–9. ISSN 0893-7850.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5842.2009.01057.x

36 SERGUNIN, Alexander a Valery KONYSHEV, 2014. Russia in search of its Arctic strategy: between hard and soft power? The Polar Journal [online]. 4(1), 69–87. ISSN 2154-896X.

https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2014.913930

37 NYE, Joseph S., 1990. Soft Power. Foreign Policy [online]. (80), 153–171. ISSN 00157228.

https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580

38 WILSON, Ernest J., 2008. Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science [online]. 616(1), 110–124. ISSN 0002-7162.

https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207312618

39 GALLAROTTI, Giulio M., 2015. Smart Power: Definitions, Importance, and Effectiveness. Journal of Strategic Studies [online]. 38(3), 245–281. ISSN 0140-2390. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.1002912

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as a great power both outside and within its region.40 Buzan said that whereas the great power works at the global level, the regional power only works in his specific region, which is most likely his own as well. The state becomes a regional power, whether it also meets four preconditions.41 The state must be part of a geographically clearly definable region. Then it supposes to strive for a dominant role in this region and have the necessary preconditions for material and ideological dominance in the region. Lastly, the state has to possess an apparent influence in regional international relations.42

40 HURRELL, Andrew, 2006. Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?

International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-). 82(1), 1–19. ISSN 00205850, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00512.x

41 BUZAN, Barry and Ole WÆVER, 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security [online].

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cambridge Studies in International Relations.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491252

42 HURRELL, Andrew, 2006. Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?

International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-). 82(1), 1–19. ISSN 00205850, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00512.x

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1.2 State as a shaper in international relations

So far, the complex definition of the shaper within international relations does not exist.

However, it is possible to create a definition from different fields for this thesis purpose.

A vital attribute of the so-called shaper is the (limited) possibility to shape a specific region in the world, such as in this thesis, the Arctic.43 In these shaped regions, shapers tend to shape and form them based on their own rules, motives, and incentives. It goes hand in hand with so-called moderation. “Moderation enforces platform policies regarding what is permissible. The process is made up of many elements, including the policies, affordances, algorithms, content they want removed, and moderators making decisions about what stays and what goes.”44 Shapers use their power and politics to “reinforces their own status”45 and simultaneously are decisive actors.

Moreover, shapers, such as politically independent entities, possess significant influence on politics, security issues, and economic development. Being a shaper is always a game, and the only key variable is the distribution of capabilities.46 Within the security, the field is the

“shaperism” related to securitization. Shapers possess enough security power to securitize within the political system.47 It is needed to have an actor in securitization who determines that a specific object or area is seriously and critically threatened. “Then, that actor demands the right to take extraordinary countermeasures to deal with that threat. Lastly, it convinces an audience that rule-breaking behavior to counter the threat is justified.”48 Securitization is fulfilled by breaking the rules or existential threats. As mentioned, the shapers act mainly and

43 SOLEY, Lawrence C, 1992. The news shapers : the sources who explain the news. New York: Praeger.

ISBN 0275940330.

44 TIIDENBERG, Katrin a Emily VAN DER NAGEL, 2020. Social Media Platforms as the Shapers of Sex. In:

Sex and Social Media [online]. Emerald Publishing Limited, s. 51–78. ISBN 978-1-83909-406-4.

https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-83909-406-420201010

45 SOLEY, Lawrence C, 1992. The news shapers : the sources who explain the news. New York: Praeger. ISBN 0275940330.

46 BUZAN, Barry, 2004. The United States and the Great Powers : world politics in the twenty-first century.

Cambridge: Polity Press. ISBN 0-7456-3374-9

47 Ibid.

48 KILROY, Richard J., 2018. Securitization. In: Anthony J. MASYS, ed. Handbook of Security Science [online].

Cham: Springer International Publishing, s. 1–19. ISBN 978-3-319-51761-2. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51761-2_11-1

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most effective in a specifically designated area. Thus the closer the area, the stronger security interaction. That impacts the most the environmental, political, military and societal spheres.49

These actors have their capacities to shape the economic, sociological, environmental, and military forces. So it can be said that shapers possess an economic power within the economic field, which could then be used as a shaping tool. Economic capacities may be the size and quality of the gross domestic product (GDP), per capita income, the level of technology, natural and human resources, political and legal institutions for markets, and a variety of shaped resources for particular domains, such as trade, finance, and competition. However, this economic power may attract as much as a scare in the hands of shapers.50 Generally, power directs attention to how individual states can be controlled internally and pursue their competitive interests within the state system. Shapers seek to guide these states to play the game of international relations in such a way as to maximise their advantage.51 Thus, shapers use their political and economic power to retain their positions at the top of the specific areas’ political and economic hierarchies.

According to Hitchcock, in a current world, which can be labeled as “multipolar or independent, these states will have a decisive influence on their geopolitical

“neighbourhoods” and on international relations over the world. Thus, they can be rightfully called shapers since they shape current and possibly even the future world order. Besides, these states are able to shape the outcomes related to their region52and in the extremity to contest regional dominance “because of their geopolitical prowess”53 Hitchcock also claims that shapers have own national strategy to achieve their regional or international goals. Developing a strategy to achieve national ends requires thoughtful consideration of all aspects of national

49 BUZAN, Barry, 2004. The United States and the Great Powers : world politics in the twenty-first century.

Cambridge: Polity Press. ISBN 0-7456-3374-9

50 CARMINATI, Daniele, 2021. The economics of soft power: reliance on economic resources and instrumentality in economic gains. Economic and Political Studies [online]. 1–24. ISSN 2095-4816.

https://doi.org/.1080/20954816.2020.1865620

51 BUZAN, Barry, 1984. Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations.

Journal of Peace Research [online]. 21(2), 109–125. https://doi.org/10.1177/002234338402100203

52 HITCHCOCK, William I., Melvyn P. LEFFLER a Jeffrey W. LEGRO, 2016. Shaper Nations: Strategies for a Changing World [online]. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-66021-2.

53 Ibid.

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power, from military capabilities to economic potential, diplomatic influence, and considerations of ideology and domestic politics, as well as strong national leadership. A tool of the national strategy is, besides others, the foreign policy. These attributes from absolute spiritual power, foreign policy, and diplomacy are essential tools. With wise FP and well-played diplomacy, nations could achieve their national interests thanks to the allies’ support of cooperation.54

54 HITCHCOCK, William I., Melvyn P. LEFFLER a Jeffrey W. LEGRO, 2016. Shaper Nations: Strategies for a Changing World [online]. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-66021-2.

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2 State´s foreign policy within the narratives

2 State´s foreign policy within the narratives