CHARLES UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES Institute of Political Science Master thesis 2020 Louise Savalov Syberg

CHARLES UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Science

Master thesis

2020 Louise Savalov Syberg

CHARLES UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Science

Louise Savalov Syberg

The resecuritization of Russia: an analysis of the assertive shift in Norwegian security policy in the aftermath of the Russian annexation

of Crimea

Master thesis

Prague 2020

Author: Bc. Louise Savalov Syberg Supervisor: Dr. Aliaksei Kazharski

Academic Year: 2019/2020

Bibliographic note

SYBERG, Louise S. “The resecuritization of Russia: an analysis of the assertive shift in Norwegian security policy in the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea”. 2020 p. 60 Master Thesis. Charles University. Fakulty of Social Sciences. Institute of Political Science.

Supervisor Dr. Aliaksei Kazharski

Abstract

The relationship between Russia and Norway is one dictated by the asymmetric nature and ideological differences among the two states. Ever since the Cold War, the relationship has been one of cooperation and communication, characterized by Norway’s dual policy and constant balancing between assertiveness and reassurance. After the Russian annexation of Crimea, the Norwegian security policy seemingly shifted in an assertive direction. Russia was once again lifted from the politics of normal to the politics of extra through a securitization.

This thesis aims to demonstrate how Russia became resecuritized after the Russian annexation of Crimea. The empirical evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that this assertive shift that came after the resecuritization of Russia is a result of the Russian demonstration of its modernized military, rather than a natural consequence of the hostile act the annexation was. It seeks to demonstrate that the changing security climate with Russia’s new ways of war, or so-called hybrid warfare, coupled with a diminishing US interest in the Alliance, is the reason for this change in Norwegian security policy.

Keywords:

Range of thesis: 60

Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that she compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.

2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.

3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague 31.07.2020 Louise Savalov Syberg

Institute of Security Studies

Master thesis proposal :

Introduction:

In February 2014 Russia began its annexation of Crimea, interpreted in the West as a Russian disregard of international laws and rules, and marking it the first time since the second world war that one European country had annexed or invaded another one. This shift in Western countries attitude towards Russia will in this thesis be thoroughly examined from a Norwegian point of view.

The relationship between Norway and Russia represents an interesting dynamic in several ways. Norway is the only country that never has had a war with Russia, even managing to resolve their territorial dispute in the Barents Sea peacefully. The two states have a long tradition of balancing opposing elements to keep their good relations and cooperation intact (Rowe, Fornuft og følelser: Norge og Russland etter Krim, 2017). At the same time, Norway is painfully aware of the powerful neighbor in the East, and there has existed a fear of Russia in Norway since the Cold War. Russia, a great power, is the main power when it comes to the development in the two countries relationship, however, Norway’s NATO membership changes this dynamic. Norway, not only one of the founding members of NATO, but also with a Norwegian representative as the secretary general of the Alliance, creates a complicated dynamic. One of the claims the thesis will make will be that this, once again has made NATO more prominent in Norway. The threat of Russia has long traditions in Norway.

The idea of an expansionist, powerful and dangerous Russia is well established among the public in Norway. The annexation of Crimea established these fears, and more or less confirmed that Russia left the principles of territorial sovereignty. In the wake of the annexation, the military activity in the north has increased substantially. Cyber-attacks, military training activities such as Trident Juncture, espionage and provocations exemplify this, and the latest threat assessment from Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste (PST) states Russian activity as the main threat for the Norwegian Security (PST, Trusselvurdering 2019, 2019). In other words, the annexation of Crimea manifested this traditional fear, leading to increased military activity in Norway, both from Norwegian and their allied forces, and from Russian forces. In this thesis this, by now, well known shift in Western states’ attitude towards Russia

that the annexation led to, will be analyzed through a Norwegian point of view. The thesis aims to, through an explanatory framework explain, the changing attitudes in Norwegian security policy following the Russian annexation of Crimea.

The annexation put a strain on the Russian relationship with the West, also true for the

bilateral relationship between Russia and Norway. This thesis will aim to explain the changes in the Norwegian security policy following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2015. It will show the impact the Russian actions had on the Norwegian security policy and how it affected its role in NATO.

The thesis has both political and social relevance. The political relevance is of the thesis is best explained through the relationship between Russia and Norway, and in a bigger picture the old cold war tension between the west and the east. A research into this dynamic is also interesting since Norway has a great interest of keeping good relations with NATO, but also with Russia. The research can provide insight to the newer member states in the east, and former Soviet states, and how they can and should react towards Russia now that they are members of NATO. The scholarly relevance of the thesis lies on the fact that the thesis can contribute to the field of research on Russia/West relations, and can be generalized to several other countries comparable to Russia. The thesis will tighten a gap existing in the literature. In addition to this, not a lot of social scientific work is done with white papers as a primary source.

Research target, research question:

The primary concern of the research conducted in this thesis is to explain how the Russian annexation of Crimea has changed the security policy in Norway. Since the thesis will conduct a quantitative content analysis of the Norwegian defense white papers, the research question should be formulated as” how”. Therefore, the research question twill be as

following:” How has the Norwegian security policy changed after the Russian

annexation of Crimea”. Since the thesis seeks to explain how the annexation of Crimea has c the hanged the Norwegian security policy, and therefore has an explanatory function, the research question has an underlying causal relationship. The annexation of Crimea, or the actions made by Russia, is understood to have an effect of the Norwegian security policy, making the security policy the dependent variable in the research question, while the annexation is the independent variable.

Literature review:

The relationship between Russia and Norway is one that is heavily researched. Cooperation among the two states, and how it remains functional in a seemingly dysfunctional relationship is well covered in research. How Norway’s relationship with NATO, and its function as the closest allied neighbor to Russia is also covered in the literature. The news discourse has been researched several times, but in many ways it seems like the always-changing dynamic between the two neighbors has led to a decreased interest in official responses to various actions taken by the states. Therefore, it seems that this thesis will be able to fill a void in the literature. The thesis will draw on several different articles, some of them covering topics close to the topic of the thesis, and others providing a background and historical context for the thesis. The relationship among the two neighboring countries, Russia and Norway, has been widely researched before. A lot of the literature is concerned with the various

cooperation between the two countries. Several reports have looked into the discourse and the construction of threats in the two countries. There does however, exist a gap when it comes to the official documents concering the security policy in Norway. A gap the thesis aims to cover. In this paragraph, I aim to present some of the material I will use in the thesis. Julie Wilhelmsen, a senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs have written a lot about the Russia Norway relations. In her article “Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination”, she explains how the standoff between Russia and the West over the issue of Crimea as obstructed cooperation between Norway and Russia,

particularly in the Arctic (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination, 2018). This is a common trait among the literature about Russian and Norwegian relations, they often concern themselves with the cooperation in the Northern areas, an area where the two countries see the importance of cooperation. She is not only concerned with how Norway views its powerful neighbor, but also with how Russia views Norway and NATO as their neighbor. This article, like many others, focus on official statements and documents such as press releases and speeches (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination, 2018). Not many studies of the relationship between the two countries focus on analysis of white papers, in fact analysis of white papers are lacking among scholars. They are often referred to by scholars, but rarely analyzed specifically. This is also the case with the white papers of Norway regarding the Russian annexation of Crimea, a gap the thesis hopefully will tighten. In addition to this, a bulk of the research focus on the discourse in the two respective countries, however rarely in

official documents. The White Paper” Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defense Policy: Unified Effort” from Norwegian Ministry of Defense is the data that will be subjected to Qualitative Document Analysis in this thesis, and is there for an important source of literature. This White Paper was issued following the annexation of Crimea, outlining Russia as the main enemy for Norway. The document is created by a panel of experts established by the Minister of Defense, and marks a shift in Norwegian security policy as it was issued as a result of the annexation of Crimea marking a shift in Europe as this was the first time since the second world war that a European country has invaded another one and annexed parts of it (Tamnes, et al., 2015). The document aims to identify the changing security environment that Norway faces following this act from Russia, not only as a small nation neighboring Russia, but also as a member of NATO. This document is public, and the main goal is to present and explain the policy and changes in policy within this field. Nina Græger address the discourse regarding post-Cold War security and defense in Norway with a main focus on the role of EU and NATO. The article explains really well the role Norway has in-between Russia and NATO, and how the EU affects this. She explains just how anchored Norwegian defense policy is in NATO, and how their geopolitical position affects this. The article is outdated, and overly focused on the EU, but she has some great points on the

US/NATO obligations that strain Norwegian behavior towards Russia. Fernandes and Correia write about the (Re)securitazion in Europe: The Baltic States and Russia. The authors argue that the instability in Ukraine has brought significant changes in the Baltic states (Fernandes

& Correia, (Re)securitisation in Europe: the Baltic States and Russia, 2018). Even if this article does not provide any direct relevance, it proves how the concept of securitization can be translated to the thesis. Illustrating how the Ukraine crisis has led to a re-securitization and thereby policy changes.

Theoretical/conceptual framework:

Power transition theory is a systemic realist theory generally classified as a part of the realist school, however it is concerned with more than just power and differs from other realist schools of thought in its conceptual content (Lemke, 1997). The theory considers state’s satisfaction with the international system and the status quo it produces (Lemke, 1997).

The theory considers the international system more ordered than anarchic as a result of habits and patterns established over time (Lebow & Valentino) The theory distinguishes between

states that are satisfied with the status quo and those who are not, the so called revisionist states. Power transition theory argue that the probability of war and the change of status quo is based on two assumptions: 1) when a state experience increased power-equalizing to the other state in question, and 2) the states’ dissatisfaction with the status quo (Hebrone, 2007). This can explain the reasons for states to go to war, and depending on what degree these two factors are true, it determines the probability of a possible conflict since the state in question want to change the power relationship in the international status quo. Dealing with the changing relationship of power, the theory provides a probabilistic tool that allows a forecasting of events that are likely to happen in the future (Tammen, Kugler, & Lemke, 2011). In the assignment, the power transition theory will be used to investigate how the annexation of Crimea, induced by Russia, changed the status quo of the system, and the various roles the two respective countries have in the theory.

Securitization theory will be included as a contrast to the previous two theories. Within this line of thought security issues are not natural given, but are created through policy, thereby making it a theory within the constructivist line of thought. More than being concerned about whether or not the threat is “real”, it is concerned about the success of the articulation of the threat (Fernandes & Correia, (Re)securitisation in Europe: the Baltic States and Russia, 2018).

The securitizing process involves an securitizing actor and a referent object where the actor refers to a threat for the referent object, allowing extraordinary measures to take place (Fernandes & Correia, (Re)securitisation in Europe: the Baltic States and Russia, 2018). The securitization is successful if the audience it is communicated to accepts it as a threat to the referent object (Fernandes & Correia, (Re)securitisation in Europe: the Baltic States and Russia, 2018). An important component within this theory is the “self” and “other”, very apparent in the Russia and Norway relations. This theory will be applied in the thesis in several ways. It will highlight the Norwegian effort of de-securitize Russia up until the annexation of Crimea, even if this falls outside the scope of the thesis it is useful to include to provide some context. In addition to this, it will be used mainly to highlight the

(re)securitization of Russia following this Russian act in Crimea, and how this securitization is communicated through the Norwegian defense White Papers.

Methodology and data:

The thesis should be viewed as a case study as a whole, while the method that will be used to extract data in this thesis is document analysis of the defense white papers of Norway. This

method is also known as qualitative content analysis. The White Papers will be analyzed through the guidelines of general document analysis. The paper as a whole is a single comparative case study that can be used to illustrate how international variables have interacted to produce the Norwegian security policy presented in the White Papers that are analyzed. This means that the White Papers functions as both data to support the theories and to demonstrate the outcome of the various variables at play. By systematically analyzing the Defense White Papers, the assignment will use that data to answer the research question asked. In addition to these white papers, various official documents such as the PST risk analysis will be looked into. To collect the data, the thesis will follow a set of categories to analyze. Since the aim of the research is explanatory, this means that the categories in the content analysis will focus on how the Russian actions, the dependent variable, has changed the independent variable, namely the Norwegian security policy. Some of these categories are what the White Papers say about Russia, Norway, Putin, Ukraine and some IR strategic remarks. This will be further developed throughout the research, but it is important that these categories answer to the research question asked (Grønmo, Samfunnsvitenskapelige Metoder, 2011). When doing a qualitative content analysis it is important to consider the source of information and do a contextual consideration (Grønmo, Samfunnsvitenskapelige Metoder, 2011). The Norwegian Defense White Papers are available to the public, and were issued as a response to the dependent variable, making them relevant and a reliable source of

information.

Planned thesis outline:

 Introduction

 Literature Review

 Conceptual/theoretical framework

 Data

 Methods

 Empirical-analytical section 1

 (possibly Empirical-analytical section 2)/Discussion of results presented in previous paragraph

 Conclusions

Contents

1.0. Introduction...1

1.1. Background and Rationale:...1

1.2. Research Topic and Aim of Thesis...2

1.3. Thesis contribution and Limitations:...2

1.4. Thesis Outline...3

2. Background...4

2.0. Chapter outline...4

2.1. Turbulent History of Norway-Russia Relations...5

2.2. The Russian Annexation of Crimea: A Display of a New Type of Warfare...10

2.3. Norwegian reactions to the annexation of Crimea...13

3. Theoretical Framework...16

3.0. Chapter Outline...16

3.1. Constructivism...16

3.2. Theory of Securitization...17

3.3. Desecuritization...20

3.4. Resecuritization...21

3.5. Relevance of Securitization Theory...22

3.6. Criticism and Limitations of Securitization Theory...24

4. Methodology...25

4.0. Chapter Outline:...25

4.1. Research Design and Methodological Approach...25

4.2. Weaknesses and Limitations:...28

4.3. Data:...29

5. Empirical Analysis...31

5.0. Chapter Outline:...31

5.1. Analysis of Norwegian Media after the Russian Annexation of Crimea: Two Narratives of the Russian Threat...32

5.2. The Conventional Threat in the Media:...34

5.3. Analysis of Ine Eriksen Søreide’s Speeches...40

5.4. Qualitative Content Analysis of Norwegian Defense White Papers...44

6. Discussions...49

6.0. Chapter Outline...50

6.1. The Re-securitization of Russia in Norway:...50

6.2. A New Framing of the Russian Threat:...51

6.3. The Assertive Shift in Norwegian Security Policy:...53

7. Conclusions...55

7.0. Chapter Outline...55

7.1. Summary...55

7.2. Main Findings...57

7.3. Implications and Suggestions for Further Research...59

References...60

1.0. Introduction

1.1. Background and Rationale:

“We are faced with a different Russia. I want to warn against the fact that some people see this as something that is going to pass. The situation has changed. And it has changed profoundly. There is no going back to some sort of normality or some sort of back to normal business. Because that normality does not exist” (Søreide, 2015). This is how the Norwegian foreign minister addressed the situation shortly after Russia annexed Crimea. The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 sent shockwaves through the world. The West interpreted this as Russian disregard of international laws and rules, and reacted strongly to the first

annexation of a European Country since the Second World War. The West interpreted this as a reappearance of Russia’s Great Power ambitions, and feared that the expansionism had returned. Norway, who share a border and several strategically important areas with Russia, was once again in the forefront of the tension line between the West and The East known from the Cold War. The fear of Russia has long traditions in Norway. The idea of an

expansionist, powerful and dangerous Russia is well established among the public in Norway.

The annexation of Crimea established these fears, and more or less confirmed that Russia had left the principles of territorial sovereignty. In the wake of the annexation, the military activity in the north increased substantially. Norway is once again facing an uncertain situation with its powerful neighbor to the East. But the hostile acts have changed. What is this “changed”

situation that the Foreign Minister speak of in her speech? Since the Russian annexation of Crimea, hybrid warfare has become the new buzzword. Russian involvement in foreign elections, cyber warfare and other means of unconventional methods of war has become an issue at the top of the list in the West. This happens simultaneously with another dangerous trend, namely the diminishing US interest in NATO. At the same time as Russia is showing old patterns of expansionism, the most important security guarantor for Norway is less concerned with the region. Was it in fact the Russian annexation of Crimea that led to the securitization of Russia in Norway, which in turn led to an assertive shift in Norwegian foreign policy? Or were there other factors at play? This thesis will explore the various causes of the securitization of Russia in Norway, and look at how the assertive shift in Norway’s foreign policy happened in the wake of the Russian annexation of Crimea.

1.2. Research Topic and Aim of Thesis

The thesis will address the following research topic: “The re-securitization of Russia: an analysis of the assertive shift in Norwegian security policy in the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea”.

The research question will be addressed through an explanatory framework. In order to

address the assertive shift in the Norwegian security policy, the thesis will conduct an analysis of the Norwegian Defense White paper, the blueprint of Norwegian defense policy. In order to address the resecuritization of Russia, an analysis of media articles and two important speeches held by the Minister of Foreign Policy, Ine Eriksen Søreide. The thesis aims to demonstrate how, and through which events securitization was achieved as well as it will look into the framing of the threat that became securitized. In the attempt to do so, the thesis will build on the existing framework of securitization theory and aim to develop the understanding of re-emerging threats, in this case in the border area between the East and the West. In other words, one of the objectives of the research topic is to address how re-emerging threats are dealt with. The thesis therefore has a theory-building ambition. Together with this, the thesis aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of how the Russian foreign policy and the

Norwegian NATO-membership dictates the Norwegian security policy. The contributions of this study may have implications for developing a more profound understanding of how Norwegian security policy is influenced by Russia, NATO and the power struggles between the two. The main focus of the thesis will be the relationship between Russia and Norway in the period after 1990, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist. However, it is important to establish the long tradition of the relationship, so some background-info on the period before is also included. An important reason for this is the fact that the Russian neighborhood with Norway is unique, given that Norway is the only country with a physical border to Russia, that it never has tried to take.

1.3. Thesis contribution and Limitations:

This thesis aims to uncover the causes of the resecuritization of Russia in Norway, whether they are obvious or underlying. It seeks to emphasize that the narrative of the threat matters in a securitization process, and that the most obvious reason might overshadow the real reasons

for a securitization. It also seeks to highlight the practical implications of lifting an issue from the politics of normal to the politics of extra through the study of the assertive shift of the Norwegian security policy that the securitization of Russia led to. The research topic of this thesis is of both social and political relevance. The explanatory framework aims to explain how changes on the world scene affects states individually. The relationship between Norway and Russia is a unique one in several ways, but the dynamic is familiar to several states. The thesis gives insight into Norway’s unique approach towards Russia with regards to the dual policy of assertiveness and reassurance, but it also gives insight to the difficult situation several states has of sharing a border with the Great Power of Russia and at the same time being a member of the Western Alliance of NATO. Critical security studies are often

concerned with unconventional threats. The buzzword and phenomenon of hybrid warfare is looked further into in this thesis. Other issues such as the diminishing relevance of NATO and the United States’ diminishing interest in Europe is also explored. All in all, many of the issues Norway was facing in the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea, are relevant to several other states. The thesis explores an issue relatively close in time. This is also an indication of some of the limitations the thesis is facing. Even if several years have passed since the Russian annexation of Crimea, it is not a long time since in the bigger picture. A lot of the suggestions from the defense white paper is still not followed through, and the practical implications of the defense white paper is therefore not subjected to the analysis. In addition to this, one must separate between overt and covert securitization processes. The thesis is limited to analysis of documents available to the public. This means that a lot of the securitization processes that have been covert are excluded. When it comes to theory, the thesis has theory building ambitions. It aims to build on the concept of resecuritization, which is not written a lot about in academia.

1.4. Thesis Outline

The thesis consists of seven chapters. In this first chapter the thesis is introduced by

explaining the research topic, the aim of the thesis, limitations and scope and the outline of the thesis.

In the second chapter the background of the relationship between Norway and Russia, and the various periods where Russia has been securitized will be presented. This in order to support the claim the thesis makes, that Russia became resecuritized, and that Norway had an assertive shift in their security policy towards Russia in the aftermath of the Russian

annexation of Crimea. The Russian military activity in Ukraine will be briefly discussed, as well as hybrid warfare in order to support the claims the thesis will make in the empirical analysis. The objective of this chapter is to outline the previous responses Norway has had to Russian actions, and how previous rounds of securitization has led to extra measures in the security policy of Norway. It also aims to explain the long standing Norwegian tradition of framing Russia as a threat. A short outline of the annexation is also presented for context, but is not discussed in detail as the thesis is concerned with “how” Russia became resecuritized, and not “why”.

In the third chapter the theoretical framework of the thesis is presented and explained. In order to explain the securitization theory, the chapter is introduced with a contextual

paragraph of its origin; constructivism. The theory is explained, followed by a critical look on its relevance and limitations. Desecuritization, a component in the process of securitization is also explained due to its relevance to the thesis. The chapter also introduce the potential third step of the securitization process, namely resecuritization, in an attempt to build on the existing literature.

In the fourth chapter the thesis’s methodological framework is laid out and explained. The research design, the relevance of the method as well as limitations and weaknesses is laid out in this chapter.

In the fifth chapter the empirical analysis is conducted. This consists of three elements relevant for the thesis. First the empirical evidence of the media analysis is discussed. This is followed up by the analysis of two speech acts conducted by the foreign minister, before the assertive shift in Norwegian security policy is analyzed in the Defense White Paper.

In the sixth chapter the findings are analyzed and discussed in light of the theoretical framework and the findings in the background. The discussion is divided into two parts to explain the two dimensions of the research topic, namely the resecuritization and the assertive shift.

The seventh and final chapter consists of the conclusion of the thesis and suggestions of areas of further research that this thesis lay the grounds for.

2. Background

2.0. Chapter outline

This chapter will outline the turbulent history between Norway and Russia throughout the years, with an emphasis on security policy and established strategies central for the various time periods. It will give a brief overview of the Russian annexation of Crimea and the Russian actions in Ukraine and then explain the immediate reactions to this that followed in Norway. In addition to this, the thesis will offer an explanation of the term hybrid warfare, and how this became a buzzword after Ukraine. The objective of this chapter is to provide the reader of the thesis with the relevant contextual information needed for the analysis.

2.1. Turbulent History of Norway-Russia Relations

In order to understand the situation between Russia and Norway today it is necessary to put the topic of research in some type of context. European states’ perceptions of Russia tend to be shaped by historical events, collective memories and identities. This is also true for the Norwegian perception of Russia. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the historical

relationship between the two nations, and how this has been affected by various events. Some playing out on the world scene, others between the two nations. Throughout the history, Norwegian and Russian relations have been through several phases. What makes Norway a unique case in the study of Russia and its neighbors, is their long standing tradition of peace and their peaceful dealings in areas of mutual interests. An historical assessment on

Norwegian and Russian relations paints a clear picture of a relationship with significant trade and other forms of contact between Russian and Norwegian settlements in the north well before the Russian revolution in 1917, which even continued with the establishment of the USSR, however somewhat reduced (Vanaga & Rostoks, 2018). The attitude towards Russia is more positive in the Northern part of the country, where the geographical distance is smaller, and where the trade has the longest traditions of interactions. This proves that the historical events, collective memories and identities are crucial in the perception of Russia, and it underlines the local differences in Norway.

Politics between the two nations in the period after the Cold War tended to end up in the realm of security policy, regardless of the matter. The risk of military confrontation between

the two ideological camps that grew out of the Cold War was considered so big that other matters had to wait, and they were therefore pushed aside (Åtland, Russisk

Nordområdepolitikk etter den Kalde Krigen: Forholdet Mellom Næringsinteresser og Militærstrategiske Interesser, 2003). Even to this day, the security policy in the Russian northern policy is still important, but not as filled with tension as before. The absence of the bipolar world order and the integration of Russia in various areas of cooperation has led to a lower degree of tension, also in the previous forefront between the West and the East (Åtland, Russisk Nordområdepolitikk etter den Kalde Krigen: Forholdet Mellom Næringsinteresser og Militærstrategiske Interesser, 2003).

The Norwegian and Russian relationship has always been characterized by the asymmetric nature of relations between the two states. Russia is, as a Great Power, far less preoccupied with Norway than what Norway is on Russia. Due to this asymmetry, it becomes obvious that Russian actions are responsible for the development of the bilateral relationship between Norway and Russia, and not vice versa. The narrative of the great and powerful Russia has also created a perception of threat among the people in Norway, with a rather long tradition.

The Russian representation in the public discourse plays a crucial role in Norwegian policy formulations (Vanaga & Rostoks, 2018). In addition to this there has been a clear Norwegian goal to help Russia in the direction of other democratic countries (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination?, 2018). Political prestige, and also monetary aid, has been invested in keeping good relations with Russia on all levels (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination?, 2018), and Norway has been in the forefront of this attempt to push Russia in a more

“western” direction. In other words, the relationship between the two states is characterized by changes, sometimes for the worse and others for the better. It is not a static, but a dynamic relationship often characterized by the two different ideological camps the states belong in. In the coming paragraphs the thesis will touch on various periods that have been defining for the relationship between Russia and Norway. The objective is to create an idea of how Russia is objected to securitization, desecuritization and resecuritization and which factors contribute to this.

During the Second World War, the relationship between the two states can be characterized as a good and stable one, with a perception of the threat of Russia being close to non-existent in

Norway. Soviet troops liberated Northern Norway from Nazi occupation in 1945, with a un- problematic withdrawal to pre-war borders shortly after (Vanaga & Rostoks, 2018). This is quite unique, since this makes the only front during after the second world war that the Soviets withdrew from (Vanaga & Rostoks, 2018). It is worth to notice that this was a crucial time for Norway in other regards. The German occupation of Norway represents a period of deep scars in the Norwegian history. The main interest of the period of the Second World War lies in the fact that Norway realized that it would not be able to withstand a military attack on its own and had to seek security from powerful actors in the international system due to the German occupation. Norway therefore decided to join NATO. It was not a perceived threat of Russia that led to the Norwegian NATO membership, rather the realization that it was too small to stand alone. This decision created headaches in Moscow, who feared allied presence near its physical borders. A problem that still exists in the relationship between the two states.

Norwegian NATO-membership meant that the security policy in Norway would be largely dictated by that of the Alliance in the years to come.

During the Cold War, the Russian policy towards Norway was highly influenced by Norway’s role in the Alliance, and Norwegian military strategy was more or less blueprints of NATO’s military strategy (Åtland, Russisk Nordområdepolitikk etter den Kalde Krigen: Forholdet Mellom Næringsinteresser og Militærstrategiske Interesser, 2003). For Russia, Norway was allied with the main enemy, and Norway characterized its Communist neighbor as the main threat to Norwegian security. The two states were placed in each ideological camp. The policy developed in these years would come to define Norwegian security policy in the years to come (Vanaga & Rostoks, 2018). The physical border between the two states became the front line of the division between the West and the East. Among the Norwegian public, there existed a consensus that Russia needed an ice-free harbor-alternative, and that a Russian annexation of Norway was a real threat (Rowe, Fornuft og Følelser. Norge og Russland etter Krim, 2018). The Russian fear was therefore, naturally, at its highest point during the Cold War Years. It was also within this period that Norway began their development of their

“deterrence and reassurance” strategy on Russia. Also known as the Norwegian dual strategy.

Norwegian deterrence, which even to this day is an important part of their strategy, is obviously a lot more focused on Russia than the other way around (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination?, 2018). Norway has attempted to influence Russian, and previously Soviet, intentions by finding the balance

between deterrence and reassurance (Brusgaard, 2018). Norwegian deterrence policies has historically been matched by policies of reassurance when dealing with Russia (Wilhelmsen

& Gjerde, Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination?, 2018). When Norway agreed to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, they recognized the Soviet concern about Western presence in the North, and therefore announced the base policy where they promised that there would not be permanent allied bases in Norway during peacetime (Vanaga & Rostoks, 2018). This reassurance element of Norwegian strategy was originally a flexible security policy tool, allowing Norway to change it upwards or downwards depending on Soviet military actions and behavior (Brusgaard, 2018). In other words, Norway can unilaterally determine whether to limit or increase allied presence on their soil. This base- policy turned out to become a pillar of the Norwegian defense policy and has later become a crucial part of the combined “deterrence and reassurance strategy” where Norway sought to balance deterrence with reassurance (Vanaga & Rostoks, 2018). This has been the obvious strategy ever since they joined NATO, where they agreed to avoid a permanent presence of foreign forces on Norwegian soil to reassure the Russians in the rather assertive decision of joining the Alliance. However, to compensate for this reassurance to Russia, Norway agreed to host significant allied exercises, demonstrated by the Trident Juncture training in NATO in September 2019. This creates several interesting situations for Norway and Russia, even to this day. Because of this asymmetry Norway has always been inclined to support cooperation and compromise when dealing with Russia, and has through its NATO membership pursued deterrence (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War

Contamination?, 2018). This underlines the long tradition of the Norwegian strategy of a balancing strategy through diplomatic management. Bilateralism is an important part of the Norwegian-Russian relations preceding the annexation of Crimea. Norway and Russia has reached several important bilateral agreements in several areas of shared importance, such as fish resources in the Barents Sea, delamination line in the Barents sea and the establishment of the Euro-Arctic Council in 1993 (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, Norway and Russia in the Arctic:

New Cold War Contamination?, 2018). In 2010, Norway and Russia reached a diplomatic breakthrough, and finally settled the over 40 yearlong border dispute in the Barents Sea. This breakthrough signaled shared interests in good relations on both sides of the border. The areas of mutual interests are therefore of crucial importance for the bilateral relationship between the two countries. The Norwegian-Russian relationship has been characterized by a duality, a duality with long traditions of balancing opposing elements (Rowe, Fornuft og Følelser.

Norge og Russland etter Krim, 2018), or balancing assertiveness and reassurance. Norway has always had a clear bias towards Moscow due to its placement in the western hemisphere, but it has also had clear intentions of good neighborly relations and cooperation (Rowe, Fornuft og Følelser. Norge og Russland etter Krim, 2018). The dominant position in Norway therefore became that Russia was on the path to liberal democracy (Vanaga & Rostoks, 2018).

However, this was about to change in 2014. These are examples of how Russia and Norway have been concerned of preventing several issues from being securitized in the public debate, and thereby also placing it outside the orbit of East-West confrontation (Wilhelmsen &

Gjerde, Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination?, 2018).

The end of the Cold War marks the beginning of a new era in the whole international community with the end of the bipolar world structure. This also marks the beginning of a new era of relations between the NATO member Norway and the former Great Power Russia.

In the period after the Cold War, Norwegian and Russian cooperation increased in several sectors, also defense. Norway attempted to find a balance between being a NATO member and continue the now long tradition of cooperation with Russia (Vestvik & Rosenby, 2019).

In 1995, Russia and Norway signed a treaty on defense related cooperation (Forsvaret, 2002).

This continued up until 1998, but came to an abrupt halt due to the Russian actions in

Yugoslavia, which led to increased tension between the two states again. During the Russian war in Georgia, the cooperation and good relations between the two states was once again put to the test making cooperation difficult (Vestvik & Rosenby, 2019). The Norwegian Defense Ministry issued a press release that informed the world about the Russian decision to freeze military cooperation with NATO and allied countries (Moskwa & Solem, 2008). Interestingly, a spokeswoman from the Ministry could inform that they had acquired this information from Moscow, due to warm relations between the two countries (Moskwa & Solem, 2008). It was the Norwegian side that attempted to pick up the pieces and continue the cooperation in 2001, once again demonstrating how Norway is willing to use dialogue and cooperation when dealing with Russia. This proves that the periods leading to a decrease in the temperature between the two states largely is due to reasons outside their bilateral relationship (Vestvik &

Rosenby, 2019). In the period after Putin’s presidency, relations between the two states have been far from stable. Norway followed the radical modernization of the Russian military

issued by Vladimir Putin in 2008 with caution. The modernization led to a more credible and professional Russian army (Nilssen, 2019 ).

The Norwegian strategic culture changed in the period after the Cold War from one of grand strategy and practice, to one of alternative grans strategic representations focused on

international operation rather than on invasion defense (Græger & Leira , 2014). The strategic culture of Norway changed due to internal and external changes in discourse and changes in practice (Græger, et al., 2014). The main elements in Norway’s defense policy has had broad consensus, which has been of significance due to the geopolitically instable corner of the world that Norway exist in. (Græger & Leira , 2014). The geopolitical location of Norway has been one of the main defining factors of Norwegian defense policy since the second world war (Græger & Leira , 2014). So has the Norwegian membership in NATO. The grand strategy in Norway is defined by the loyalty to the Alliance, particularly the United States of America (Græger & Leira , 2014). However, it has also been defined by its goal to be a nation of peace and an urge to emphasize the particular geopolitical situation of the state (Græger &

Leira , 2014). Norwegian foreign policy has had a dualistic nature which has led to a lack of tradition in thinking about military matters in military terms (Græger & Leira , 2014). In other words, the Norwegian armed forces have figured as one of many institutions in the society in Norway (Græger & Leira , 2014). Norwegian military doctrines was during the Cold War almost blueprints of NATO doctrines and lacked a national strategic component (Græger &

Leira , 2014). Even if Norway lacks this history with Russia, the expansionist inclinations has caused fear in Norway. It is due to this that, even if the Russian-Norwegian relationship has been more constructive than conflictual, Russia has mainly figured as a threat to Norwegian security (Miklóssy & Smith, 2019).

2.2. The Russian Annexation of Crimea: A Display of a New Type of Warfare

In March 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in spite of heavy international criticism. The annexation took the world by surprise. According to the international community, the annexation was conducted in violation with the fundamental principles for interstate relations established after the second world (Leonaitė & Žalimas, 2015-2016).

These are the principle of territorial integrity and the prohibition of the use of force (Leonaitė

& Žalimas, 2015-2016). In other words, the annexation shook Europe to its core, and marked the end of a stability that had existed since the end of the Second World War. How the annexation was looked upon, interpreted and justified in the West differed substantially from the understanding in the East. Therefore, the annexation, in many ways, appears to be a turning point for the relationship between Russia and the West. The consensus in the West was that this was a complete disregard of international law, and a hostile act from Russia.

However, in order to fully understand why this occurred it is important to do an informed analysis of the coup that occurred this March in 2014, with an illumination of Crimea’s history. This is relevant and important for the thesis for several reasons. First and foremost, it underlines the reasons for why Russia became securitized in Norway in the wake of the Russian actions in Ukraine.

From a Russian perspective, the action was rational in the sense that it would prevent Ukraine from moving into the Western hemisphere (Magen, Baruch, & Bagno-Moldavsky, 2014), but in the West the interpretation was far from a rational move of a rational actor. The West was left in a dilemma of how to respond to the annexation. On the one hand it is in the Wests interest to prevent Russia from regaining its superpower status, while on the other hand they do not want an all-out conflict (Magen, Baruch, & Bagno-Moldavsky, 2014). Regardless of Russia’s justification of the annexation, the move was met with condemnation, fear and shock in the West. The Russian justifications for the annexation varies from fear of Ukrainian accession to NATO, references to Crimea’s Russian history to a spontaneous decision made by Putin (Treisman, 2016). Many has argued that the move from Russia was a reactive one. A reaction of the West’s eastward expansion towards former Soviet Union territories (Magen, Baruch, & Bagno-Moldavsky, 2014). Norway, was once again in a situation where its

interests and sympathies were to the West, while Norway at the same time has been clear with their intention of good relations and cooperation with Russia. Had Russia returned to its former expansionism and great power ambitions? Should Norway worry about the possibility of something similar occurring in Norway? There are some obvious differences between Ukraine and Norway’s relationship with Russia that needs to be addressed. The objective of addressing these differences, is to emphasize how the Russian annexation of Crimea not necessarily would lead to a securitization of Russia in Norway. In addition to the obvious strategic and geographic values Crimea has to Russia, it is also important to look at the

history. The previous paragraph emphasized the long standing traditions with fairly good relations between Norway and Russia. For Ukraine, the history is different. The Crimean peninsula became a part of the Russian Empire already in 1783 (Saluschev, 2014). It functioned as the station for the Russian Black Sea Fleet and was therefore considered a crucial strategic outpost of the Russian Navy (Saluschev, 2014). In 1954 the jurisdiction and authority over the territory was transferred to Ukraine (Saluschev, 2014). This led to several failed attempts to “Ukrainize” Crimea in the years to come (Saluschev, 2014). Right before the annexation, a referendum was organized leading to an overwhelming majority in favor of Crimea’s admission to Russia (Saluschev, 2014). The UN declared the referendum illegal, and it is also important to notice that the referendum was an unclear reflection of the citizens in Crimea, as Crimean Tartars boycotted the vote and opposed reunification with Russia (Saluschev, 2014). This underlines the fact that Russia, in its own view, were more or less justified in their actions on Crimea. They reacted to European expansionism. The long Russian ties to Crimea, in the Russian view, justified the annexation. They even tried to do it the “right way”.

The objective of this paragraph is by no means to justify the Russian annexation of Crimea, but rather to put it into perspective. By doing that, the thesis is able to explain how the annexation of Crimea by Russia has long historical roots, and by no means can be transferred to a potential Russian takeover of Norwegian land. It must be understood in context, a context of geopolitical history that it is unique for this region (Saluschev, 2014). This is also

something Norwegian policy makers, and to some degree the Norwegian public, knows.

Therefore, a Russian annexation of Crimea does not necessarily lead to policy change, securitization and actions in Norway. However, the annexation was preceded by several Russian displays of its new and modernized military. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, Russia went through a modernization of its military forces. Norway followed this

modernization anxiously. The Russian actions in Ukraine led to a realization of the potential of the modernized Russian military, and a new buzzword was created: hybrid warfare.

Hybrid Warfare:

What happened in Ukraine during this period was a lot more than annexation of land. In addition to breaking well-established principles of conduct in the international system and

deep peace in Europe, Russia displayed the new capabilities of its military. A new type of warfare was demonstrated to the world, so-called hybrid warfare. After the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, the concept of hybrid warfare and the analysis of it increased immensely (Winther, 2016). Many argued that the world now witnessed a new, revolutionary Russian military strategy (Fabian, 2019). The term aims to capture the changed nature and complexity of the warfare in the twenty-first century (Winther, 2016). There exists several approaches and definitions of the concept of hybrid warfare. Peter R Mansoor defines it as “conflict involving a combination of military forces and irregulars which could include both state and non-state actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose”. While this definition proves true for the situation in Ukraine, it fails to address the component of the use of irregular approaches and methods seen in modern warfare. The word “hybrid” in hybrid warfare refers to the mix of both conventional warfare and irregular methods of warfare (Winther, 2016). Frank G. Hoffman defined the concept as “threats that incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts… conducted by both sides and a variety of non-state actors”

(Winther, 2016). Obviously, the conflict in Ukraine was not where this concept derived from, however it intensified the interest of the concept in the West. Russia displayed both

conventional warfare, as well as the use of hybrid means in Ukraine. Many scholars have argued that the main reason for the Russian success in Ukraine was conventional, rather than hybrid (Fabian, 2019). The thesis recognize that this is a debate in itself, however what is undebatable is that this became a heated topic in the wake of the Russian annexation of Crimea. The Russian use of unconventional methods to reach its goal in Ukraine is the reason for this. The new nature of threat that the so-called hybrid warfare makes is taken up in both the European Union and NATO, which are working on strategies to counter these new threats (Winther, 2016). The West has recognized the hybrid threat that Russia’s military

modernization has led to.

2.3. Norwegian reactions to the annexation of Crimea

Norway was quick in condemning the annexation of Crimea. Then Foreign Minister of Norway, Børge Brende, held a speech where he said “Norway condemns Russia’s annexation of the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which is in violation of international law.

The use of military force by Russia to redraw national boundaries is unacceptable,” (Brende, 2014). It was made clear that Norway stood with the West in the condemnation of these acts,

and participated in reactions and sanctions both from the European Union and NATO. On the 31^st of July, the Norwegian Government publicized that they would implement the same reactions that the EU had, as a “reaction on Russian disregard of international law and their destabilization in Ukraine” (Regjeringen, 2014). The Norwegian government was quick to participate on the European Union’s restrictions on Russia, in an attempt to counter what Norway deemed to be “destabilizing acts in Ukraine” (Regjeringen, 2014). Among these restrictions were diplomatic measures, individual restrictive measures, restrictions on economic relations with Crimea, economic sanctions and restrictions on economic

cooperation (Council, 2014). In addition to this, Norway expelled a Russian citizen with a diplomatic passport, that they claimed to be an intelligence officer (Strand & Bergløff, 2018).

A move the Foreign Minister, Ine Eriksen Søreide, argued would weaken the Russian capacity to carry out intelligence in Europe (Strand & Bergløff, 2018). All military cooperation also came to a halt, with Norway suspending all military cooperation activities. It became apparent that Norway once again acted as a member of the Western community, and acted with them on what they viewed as Russian disregard of international law and aggression.

In the wake of the annexation, and along with the increased tension between the East and the West, the tension on the dividend between Russia and Norway increased. Norway was anxious, and with good reason. The Russian presence increased on Norwegian soil in the wake of the annexation. In 2017, Russia conducted a big military exercise called Zapad 2017.

In this exercise they simulated attacks on several Norwegian targets, NATO, and also simulated invasions on Norwegian soil (Stormark, Russian forces exercised attack on Svalbard, 2017). In 2015, the Norwegian Security Police published its yearly threat

assessment report, where Russia was listed as the biggest threat (PST, Trusselvurdering 2015, 2015). Espionage and intelligence in the digital space, carried out by Russia, were mentioned as the biggest threat. According to PST: “It is first and foremost Russia that has the intention of, and capacity to, run intelligence with a big potential to harm Norway and Norwegian interests” (PST, Trusselvurdering 2015, 2015). This marks a shift in the threat assessment of Norway. Russia hereby took over the role as “the big threat” to Norwegian Security, from ISIL and Right Wing extremism, which up until that point were the main concerns in Norway.

Norway experienced several hostile acts from Russia as well. Some undocumented and some documented. During the refugee crisis, Norway experienced an influx of refugees through the so-called “Atlantic Route” over Russia (Horn, 2015). Norwegian media speculated on

whether or not this was an act of hybrid warfare. It became clear that the fear of Russia was established in all traditional security sectors in Norway at this point. Russian aggression and provocation was everywhere. In the wake of the annexation, Norway experienced several cyber-attacks. Many aimed at political and military targets, but also industrial and

technological targets. The chief of intelligence in Norway pointed to Russia and China. This made it clear that Russia was willing, and capable, to use alternative, non-military methods to increase its influence (Nilssen, 2019 ). It became clear that Russian activity was changing in its scope. The variety of attacks, and the high degree of skill they demanded, underlined this.

Suddenly, it became obvious that Russia in fact was capable of actions the West for so long has feared. Norway’s mighty neighbor was suddenly a rogue state with a complete disregard of international rules and norms (Rowe, Fornuft og Følelser. Norge og Russland etter Krim, 2018). In many ways, there exist a strategic dissonance between Russia and the West, leading to a need of a new strategic framework (Veljanovska, 2015). The annexation led to a renewed need to define NATO’s role as a security provider for several European states, also Norway.

The annexation of Crimea led to several deployments of NATO troops in the Baltic States and Poland. In 2014 NATO agreed to deploy troops to these states to deter Russian aggression (Vanaga & Rostoks, 2018). Interestingly enough, Norway did not ask for this.

On the 18^th of March, Ine Eriksen Søreide, Norway’s Minister for Defense held a speech in light of the conflict in Ukraine. She made the Norwegian condemnation of the annexation of Crimea and the Russian support to separatists in Eastern Ukraine clear. She also informed that Norway had suspended all bilateral military cooperation with Russia (Søreide, 2015).

However, at the same time she also made it clear that Norway intended to continue the collaboration in coast- and border guard activities and rescue operations, as well as keep up the open line between the Norwegian and Russian Joint Headquarters in the Northern fleet to

“avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations” (Søreide, 2015). In other words, she underlined the long tradition of deterrence and reassurance as Norway’s strategy towards Russia. The Minister of Defense took the opportunity to underline what Norway does, and would continue to do, in order to ensure the ability to deter and defend. Among them was that Norway still values its dual policy of deterrence and reassurance This is confirmed by the NATO exercise they held in September 2018 “Trident Juncture”. The geopolitical situation Norway is in, being Russia’s closest neighbor and an important NATO member creates hassle to this day. The agreement to avoid permanent presence of NATO soldiers on Norwegian soil

still stands, but in exchange Norway has agreed to host allied exercises. When “Trident Juncture” was confirmed, the Russian Embassy published a statement on Facebook where they argued that this will “make Norway less predictable, and can increase tension and cause an arms race that destabilize the situation in Northern Europe”. Norway did however re- establish contact with Russia before any other Western country. The argument, according to the Foreign Ministry, was that it was of utmost importance for Russia to protect its own interests in the practical cooperation with Russia, while balancing this with international principles, while at the same time highlighting the cooperation in the High North (Strand &

Bergløff, 2018). This highlights how Norway is inclined to balance their policy towards Russia, more than other Western states.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.0. Chapter Outline

This chapter will outline the theoretical framework for this thesis. In order to explain the securitization theory, and how it deals with the construction of threats it is fruitful with a short introduction of Constructivism, a sort of back to basics. After that the chapter will explain the securitization theory through the Copenhagen School. The Speech Act, and its components will also be explained. This chapter will also explain the concept of desecuritization before it will introduce the concept of resecuritization. This means that this chapters attempts to make a contribution to the already existing framework of securitization theory. It will be outlined how the theory is of relevance to the research topic addressed in this thesis. How this concept of resecuritization is used in existing literature will also be established, before it elaborates on how this concept is applied in this thesis. A paragraph with the shortcomings of the

securitization theory is also included.

3.1. Constructivism

In order to best explain the relevance of the Securitization theory, a back to basics explanation of its premise is expedient. Securitization is a constructivist theory, a line of thought that has become an established reference point in the study of security over time (Peoples & Vaughan-

Williams, 2014, s. 15). Constructivism became particularly important in the period following the Cold War. According to Luckmann and Berger, constructivism can be explained by recognizing that “human reality is socially constructed reality” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).

The constructivist study of security builds on this sociological thought experiment by Luckmann and Berger. Constructivists will argue that security, and insecurity, is socially constructed. Wendt, a critic of the traditionalist approach to security, argued that the traditional view of security misses the important concept of social construction (Wendt, 1995). Rather than being static products of the international community, constructivists believe that security threats are products of social interaction, or even lack thereof. The security threat is not natural given, but rather socially constructed. It is this understanding of threats being socially constructed that puts the securitization theory under the classification of constructivism.

3.2. Theory of Securitization

In the wake of the Cold War it became apparent that the field of Security Studies was in need for change. Following this period, the field of security studies can be divided into two distinct bulks; those advocating for a narrow take on security versus those advocating for a wider take on the term. The Cold War marks a shift from the traditionalist and military-focused view on security, or the narrow part, towards the broader view on security. During this period, it also became apparent that other referent objects could, and in some cases should, be understood as issues of security. The biggest difference between this new framework and the older ones, is the wide agenda of the securitization framework. Suddenly, security could be understood in a form of duality, the security of the state was not the only concern, but societal security also became important. Where the narrow field’s main focus was the military sector and the state, the wide approach is based on the social construction of threats and the actors communicating the threats (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis, 1998, s.

207). Buzan argued that it was necessary to broaden the understanding of security from just the contents of the military sector and to a particular type of politics with references to threats and call for action (Buzan, Rethinking Security after the Cold War, 1997). Within this field, the so-called Copenhagen School became important. They argued that the goal of analysts should be to study when, how and why elites label issues as “security”, how they succeed and fail, when how and why desecuritization occurs and how to keep issues off the security

agenda (Åtland, The European Arctic After the Cold War: How Can We Analyze it in Terms of Security?, 2007). The Copenhagen School took upon them to de-construct, and thereby also re-construct, the understanding of the concept security (Santos, 2018), placing

securitization under constructivist thought, and the broader take on the understanding of security. According to Buzan, Wilde and Wæver, the wider security agenda is in line with the global success of the liberal project (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis, 1998, s. 212). Moving the topic of security away from the military sector, and over to other sectors is far from controversial in this day and age. We have seen it happen with the climate, diseases and migration.

According to Buzan Wilde and Wæver, the securitization process lifts something from the realm of normal politics (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, Security: A New Framework For

Analysis, 1998), and into the politics of “extra”. They argue that securitization should be seen as a more extreme version of politicization (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis, 1998, s. 23). When a topic goes through the process of

securitization, the society accepts that it is in need of extra attention and measures. What these politics of extra actually are has been defined differently by different author’s. According to Italy Fischhendler (2015) it should be understood as “organizational and institutional change with the aim to protect the referent object”, or it can be “institutional mechanisms to counter perceived threats” such as special representatives or committees (Heinrich & Szulecki). Most importantly, the extraordinary measures must be legitimized with reference to security (Heinrich & Szulecki).

According to securitization theory, the process occurs through a so-called “speech act”. Every securitizing process involves four components. 1) A securitizing agent, 2) an existential threat, 3) a referent object and 4) an audience. Another important component in the Copenhagen School’s theory are the facilitating conditions. These are crucial for the

understanding of why some securitizing moves are successful, while others are not (Sulovic, 2010). These so-called facilitating conditions can be social, external or historical (Does, 2013). Therefore, securitization is largely a product of historical and cultural context (Dolinec, 2011). This proves that securitization is contextual. Buzan mentions a facilitating condition that usually leads to a successful securitization, this is a referent object historically associated as a threat (Wæver, 2003). Securitization theory was first introduced by Ole

Wæver with the use of language and the philosophy of language (Santos, 2018). In his attempt

to re-thing the concept of security, introduced a discursive approach to security that lifted it beyond the objective and subjective perspectives used in the theorization on security up until this (Santos, 2018). Wæver argued that relevant utterances led to actions through the so called speech act theory. Securitization has a specific rhetorical structure (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis, 1998, s. 26). The issues are often dramatized and presented as something in need of supreme priority (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis, 1998, s. 26). In the speech act, the actor makes the case that the issue needs to be handled through extraordinary means (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis, 1998). A study of discourse is a study of securitization. They explicitly mention “survival and priority of action”. The securitizing agent, through the speech act, claims the need to use extraordinary means to deal with the threat (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis, 1998). They argue that security, in light of this, is a self-referential practice du to it being constructed (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis, 1998)

To understand this theory, and to be able to apply it, it is crucial to analyze the various steps in the securitization process. First of all, some referent objects are more likely than others to successfully be securitized. Traditional referent objects, such as the security of the state is easier to securitize than vaguer and unclear issues. Therefore, at first eyesight, the

securitization of Russia after something so dramatic as the annexation of Crimea would seem pretty straight forward. As mentioned, the process consists of a form of negotiation between the actor and the audience. This makes it clear that the process to a large extent is based on power and capability (Taureck, 2006). Sometimes, the securitization can happen through force. In cases where this is impossible, the audience would have to be persuaded through other means. This is where mass media has a substantial role in the process of securitization (Dolinec, 2011). The role of the media in the securitizing process is often under

communicated. It has several functions. They function as mediators and arenas in which the actor can speed up the process and reach a wide audience (Dolinec, 2011). It can also be argued that they have a sort of agenda-setting function (Dolinec, 2011). This is an important perspective in this thesis. Involving the general public in the process can increase the

legitimacy of the securitization (Åtland, The European Arctic After the Cold War: How Can We Analyze it in Terms of Security?, 2007). This means that the threat has to gain enough resonance so that a platform that enables the use of extraordinary means (Buzan, Wæver, &

Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis, 1998, s. 25). In addition to this it is worth